•🇹🇷 EU membership “diluting 🇪🇺” (🇫🇷)
•🇹🇷 MB sponsoring (🇫🇷)
•🇹🇷 #EastMed provocations & 🇺🇳Libya issue 🇫🇷⛴
•🇹🇷 unilateralism in Syria (🇫🇷)
•International systemic changes (🇺🇸🇨🇳)
•Iraq war and “strategic autonomy”
•S-400s, ☢️Akkayu and Blue&TurkStream ⛽️
•Cyprus 🇨🇾 . . .
So why is 🇪🇺🇹🇷 defence (🇫🇷🇹🇷🇮🇹 SAMP-T) gaining momentum ahead of 🇺🇸🇹🇷 defence?
The 🇺🇦🇷🇺 war pushes 🇹🇷 against 🇷🇺 due to #MiddleCorridor rivalry. This unites 🇫🇷🇹🇷, thereby allowing both to compromise on previous disagreements (Eastmed/Syria), which halted 2018 SAMP-T talks . . .
And why does 🇹🇷 prefer to purchase 🇪🇺🇫🇷🇮🇹 defence? Because
i) SAMP-T EUROSAM Thales negotiations promise more tech transfer & better pricing than Raytheon Patriot Missiles
ii) Erdogan has a profound distrust of the 🇺🇸 compared to 🇪🇺 because Washington hosts Gulen etc . . .
What to expect now, in the aftermath of @NATO summit’s positive momentum (Mariupol 🇫🇷🇹🇷🇬🇷 collective evacuation agenda and 🇫🇷🇹🇷🇮🇹 SAMP-T)? . . .
Firstly, the continuation of SAMP-T negotiations under EUROSAM with (potentially) more details and timelines soon.
If things improve further: expect 🇪🇺🇹🇷 cooperation in areas like S. Caucasus on border-management/infrastructure/investment EIB/EBRD & CSDP (#StrategicCompass). . .
Separately, 🇫🇷🇹🇷 could show renewed interest in reviving Sinop Nuclear ☢️ construction with 🇰🇷🇯🇵 despite pricing issues. Other options: 🇹🇷 renewed secular-diplomatic relations with Israel, Gulf & Egypt, as opposed to radical religious movements in Africa/Muslim Brotherhood . .
In terms of energy, it is not unlikely to see 🇹🇷 play a role in one of four spaces: Iran 🇮🇷 or Eastmed 🇮🇱🇪🇬 (could go either way..) are two main contenders: South Pars/Iran gas versus Zor, Aphrodite, Leviathan etc. Less likely but long-term options include Iraq & Turkmenistan . .
An eventual 🇫🇷🇹🇷 rapprochement would likely kick-start a New 🇪🇺🇹🇷 Framework, which could then replace the ‘never-ending-accession-process’ and propose a more substantial alternative: credible, equal & long-term institutionalised and multi-sector Framework 🇪🇺🇹🇷 . . .
Such an eventual 🇪🇺🇹🇷 framework would depend on 🇫🇷🇹🇷 bilateral ties improving. Based on EU27, the framework would likely prioritise a) energy, b) defence/security & c) full #CustomsUnionReform 🛃, which would add visa liberalisation, trade in services & regional supply-chains . .
Despite such positive 🇫🇷🇹🇷 NATO momentum, the challenges are plenty, complex & intertwined.
🇫🇷🇹🇷 relations depend on many factors, but an important one is Turkey’s domestic environment. As K. Attaturk says: “peace at home, peace in the world” (Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh"). . .
Attaturk’s words apply when we analyse how 🇫🇷 sees 🇹🇷 in MENA/Africa: a balance between religious-tolerance & laicite is necessary in 🇹🇷 ’s domestic politics because it affects Ankara’s foreign-policy-alliances in with extreme religious groups and/or secular groups abroad. . .
🇫🇷 is also waiting for 🇹🇷 to decrease tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean (which 🇹🇷 has successfully done in the past year) and now Paris wants Turkey to gradually decouple (funding, exiles, support) from specific extremist groups and especially MB in Egypt. . .
In return, Paris 🇫🇷 will have to respect 🇹🇷’s legitimate security concerns on southern border with Syria. The 1998 Adana Protocol clearly outlines this & it’s a prerequisite for 🇫🇷🇹🇷. In their current form, PKK (banned in 🇪🇺) and YPG/PYD are part of a similar terror network . . .
Any new 🇪🇺🇹🇷 framework could also include #Digitalisation & #GreenDeal considering that 🇹🇷 finally ratified the #ParisAgreement 🌎♻️ in 2021. The 🇪🇺 EU’s promised 1-trillion-euro-budget 💶 is likely to be very transformative, dubbed the Marshal Plan of 21st century . . .
Provided this all happens, what are the barriers left?
i) 🇹🇷 is expected to halt its uncompetitive practices & tackle trade irritants, while preparing itself for public procurement and making sure that it’s diverse domestic economic sectors are “on board” ahead of #CUReform . . .
i) 🇹🇷 would finally need to uphold a degree of judicial independence, multi-party democracy & respect for 🇹🇷’s diverse cultural traditions (language,minority,laicite). This largely reflects 🇪🇺conditions & Turkish 🇹🇷 people’s demands for freedom, prosperity & stability today [END]
Correction: MENA/Muslim Brotherhood
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Everyone (including myself) is disappointed about last week's #EU 🇪🇺 Council #EUCO #Türkiye 🇹🇷 conclusions.
5️⃣-point 'real(ity)-politik-check'
🧵⤵️
1️⃣ Last week's #EUCO demonstrates a perfect case of the 🇪🇺 #EU reaching the lowest common denominator.
The statement (See image) recycles previous #EUCO wording and @JosepBorrellF's Joint-Communication 🇹🇷 from 2023. Its generic, reversible and dependent on #Cyprus 🇨🇾🇪🇺, which means its close-to-a-dead-end.
This has been described eloquently by longtime experts @NathalieTocci, @narisan61, @sinanulgen1 and others.
. . . (Continued)
2️⃣ Yet despite the "disappointing #EUCO results" two conclusions can be drawn:
First, the 🇪🇺🇹🇷 #EU-#Türkiye relationship seems too geo-politically-complex for the 🇪🇺 #EU to handle. The 🇪🇺 #EU doesnt have authority over core areas that are of utmost importance for key #EU Member States in dealing with 🇹🇷 #Türkiye like intelligence, defence and signifcant military-security fields linked to the #Caucasus, #Sahel, #Syria 🇸🇾, #Libya 🇱🇾 and other geo-strategic policies.
Second, a series of more quiet cross-country negotiations between #Türkiye 🇹🇷, #France 🇫🇷🇪🇺, #Germany 🇩🇪🇪🇺, #Cyprus 🇨🇾🇪🇺 and #Greece 🇬🇷🇪🇺 amongst others will likely gain more importance.
Yesterday #Türkiye 🇹🇷 witnessed a #CHP-opposition landslide in local elections.
But with a general election 4 years away, what does it mean?
5️⃣ socio-analytical points ⤵️
1️⃣ The results are historical.
The last time CHP (opposition) won nationwide was in 1977. With 90+% of the vote counted this morning it is certain that all major cities/metropolitan municipalities of #Turkiye 🇹🇷 have re-appointed CHP or switched away from AKP, including: Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Adana, Antalya, Balıkesir, Manisa, Kütahya, Adıyaman, Amasya, Kırıkkale and Denizli.
CHP won 35 of Turkey's 81 provincial capitals. This is how all political parties performed nation-wide:¹
In practice, the government (Erdoğan's party and his ultra-nationalist alliance MHP) faced a big loss, while the other more pro-opposition nationalist party (IYI) also performed poorly while Aksener has stepped down. Same thing applies for the hardline anti-migration party Zafer Party. The real winners were the opposition, with CHP and Ekrem İmamoğlu in first place, followed by a small growth for Kurdish-ex-HDP party now known as DEM. The fastest - and very important - electoral rise came from ex-Refah party which is now known as the New Welfare Party (YRP). This party is run by the son of Necmettin Erbakhan, a much loved/hated² #Turkiye 🇹🇷 Prime Minister of the 1990s. YPR is a blend of very hardline religious views (e.g. close to anti-secular), ultra-nationalism (e.g. #Turkiye First Protectionism) and vehement anti-Israel 🇮🇱 views.
(Continued . . .)
2️⃣ Municipal budget impact.
The landslide win for CHP at municipal levels across the country first and foremost means a significant increase in available funds for the opposition.
Out of the overall national tax collection, 2.85% goes to non-metropolitan municipalities, whereas 2.5% goes to district municipalities in metropolitan areas, 1.15% goes to special provincial administrations.
Metropolitan municipalities receive 5% of the taxes collected in their territory as well as 30% of the subsidies received by their district municipalities.³
In numbers: the budgets of #Istanbul Municipality is larger than some national Turkish ministries at €15.3 billion euros (516 billion Turkish Lira). #Ankara is in second biggest with a budget of €2.63 billion euro (92 billion Turkish Lira), while other major cities are within the multi-billion range, including #Antalya at €457 million euro (16 billion Turkish Lira).
An opposition victory of this calibre has a structural impact on funds, as described above. This will likely foster new dependencies, which can (grossly) be summarised as more money and campaign-capacity to CHP ahead of any future elections.
As a result, it is realistic to expect some disputes concerning how national and local funds are allocation/disbursed.
On this Monday (29th) and Tuesday (30th) the #GlobalGateway 💶🌐#InvestorForum is held in Brussels with signing of new partnerships & major funds for #EU-#CentralAsia 🇪🇺🇰🇿🇰🇬🇹🇯🇹🇲🇺🇿 ⤵️
🔹Geo-Economics?
🔹Why Central Asia?
🔹What Projects?
🔹What To Expect from Forum?
Full Article (20-thread) 🧵⤵️
1⃣Introduction ⤵️
China’s 🇨🇳Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has long been viewed as an important source of investment and international connectivity.
Despite providing huge sums of money to willing-partner countries around the world, BRI now faces a string of undesirable consequences ranging from local discontent (e.g. pollution, land possession, and protests) to issues like low labor standards, debt, and non-inclusive growth.
To date, the most comprehensive and granular study of 13,427 Chinese development projects indicates widespread and unsustainable debt trends (e.g. 10% debt rates) at a time in which Beijing 🇨🇳is facing economic uncertainty.
. . .
2⃣ In parallel to the BRI story, the European Union (EU) 🇪🇺 has been rolling out its largest-ever foreign investment and infrastructure initiative, known as the Global Gateway🌐💶.
In typical #EU 🇪🇺fashion, this went more or less unnoticed, despite it being worth €300 billion, or the equivalent of #Portugal’s 🇵🇹entire annual Gross Domestic Product.
Since its inception in 2021-2022, #GlobalGateway has focused primarily on infrastructure, connectivity, and investments. It distinguishes itself from BRI by rooting all its funding in strict accountability, debt #sustainability, inclusive #growth, and #green transition.
In addition, it is legally tied to improved labor conditions, tech transfer, and fostering regional integration (e.g. ASEAN, CA), while constructing renewable and independent sources of energy. These concepts aim to give countries more autonomy, improved ownership, stability, and growth based on the #UN’s 🇺🇳 Sustainable Development Goals.
‘#Turkey/#Türkiye 🇹🇷 in the New European Security Architecture’ is part of @EurLiberalForum’s annual security handbook.
🔟-point 🇪🇺🇹🇷 summary🧵below👇⤵️
*This publication is part of @ALDEParty’s think-tank which provides advise to 🇪🇺 liberal parties & politicians:… https://t.co/4vMFPpjUI2twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
1️⃣ Context: #EU & #Türkiye 🇪🇺🇹🇷 are extremely inter-dependent on one another (e.g. FDI, trade, supply-chains, CU, migration, corridor to Asia, energy transit, renewable needs, technology etc.). This is both well-documented and unavoidable in part due to the 1995/1996 Customs… https://t.co/1CfYHc3yjstwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
2️⃣ Theory: The ‘Weaponisation concept’ popularised by @markhleonard & @MarkGaleotti says that the 1990s-2000s tied the world together through globalisation and made everyone dependent on each other: institutions, finance, technology and many more sectors became internationally… https://t.co/pvlA9c6Vlltwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
Five 5️⃣ simple facts 🧵 (below) help explain why the 🇦🇿🇮🇷 Azeri-Iranian relationship has deteriorated and what’s really behind the recent attack against 🇦🇿 Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran ⤵️ . . .
1️⃣ #Sociologically: Azerbaijan 🇦🇿 & Iran 🇮🇷 are very different societies. Iran’s regime has a hardline, old and extreme interpretation of Shia-religion, while Azerbaijan has a more modern interpretation (gender parity, customs etc). It lay at the root of many differences . . .
2️⃣ #Historically: Iran (& Russia) colonised Azeri and South Caucasian people, while today large Azeri communities continue to live inside of Iran, many of which have strong linguistic and cultural bonds to Azerbaijan and do not accept Tehran’s radical governance-style . . .
1️⃣ Crimean Khans are “. . . descendants of the Golden Horde (Mongols of Lake Baykal) and vassals of the Ottoman sultans from 1475 until 1774, when that tie was (temporarily) severed as a prelude to their annexation and occupation by 🇷🇺 Czarist state in 1783” . . .
2️⃣ The maternal grandfather of Sultan Süleyman I (Magnificent) is believed to have been Chrimean Mengili I Giray. This helps explain why 16th Century Ottomans allowed for the Khan of Crimean Tatars to potentially succeed an Ottoman dynasty in case of no male heir . . .