An amazing analysis of the current #Ukraine️ #war
@kamilkazani takes us back to Cold War and evolution of Russian war machine based on those weapons/tactics.
Question: Will this op prove to be as much a watershed for #Russianarmy as it was for #UkrainianArmedForces in 2014?
@kamilkazani takes us back to Cold War and evolution of Russian war machine based on those weapons/tactics.
Question: Will this op prove to be as much a watershed for #Russianarmy as it was for #UkrainianArmedForces in 2014?
https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1511528319656755205
In addition, the entire situation raises further questions
1-As mentioned in the tweet above, would this stimulate transformation of military affairs in the #RussianArmy in particular and #RussianArmedForces forces in general?
Especially considering the points @kamilkazani made?
1-As mentioned in the tweet above, would this stimulate transformation of military affairs in the #RussianArmy in particular and #RussianArmedForces forces in general?
Especially considering the points @kamilkazani made?
2-Actually, and retrospectively, this raises more questions. And these questions are based on President #Putin own past career in particular and the post #SovietUnion combat experience of the #RussianArmedForces in general
3-Arguments have been made that current Russian army is continuation in weapons/tactics of #Soviet army & little more.
Secondly, there is a dearth of feedback to higher echelons, all the way up to the big man himself, about shortcomings.
Bureaucracy with lots of red tape.
Secondly, there is a dearth of feedback to higher echelons, all the way up to the big man himself, about shortcomings.
Bureaucracy with lots of red tape.
4-This viewpoint does seem to overlook that President #Putin himself has long and deep rooted links with the Russian armed forces and a deep insight into both western society, its views and NATO: all by virtue of his KGB and political career.
5-It may seem erroneous to simply say that President #Putin (and the Russian leadership at large) didn’t understand/expect/foresee the western covert and overt war machine, their intelligentsia, their economic and diplomatic weapons.
It was his #Career & #Job to study this.
It was his #Career & #Job to study this.
6-#espionage & #counterespionage between Russian & Western powers is stuff of legend. And extremely deep links established by virtue of businesses, trade & diplomacy all underline that there simply was no way that “they didn’t know or expect” whether it’s sanctions or resistance
7-There’s immense business, investment/residence/academic tourism
This may not be a fuel for espionage
But this does allow deeper socioeconomic understanding of global mindset. Again, making argument of being in a bubble, weak.
eg Mr #Lavrov daughter is #Columbia University grad
This may not be a fuel for espionage
But this does allow deeper socioeconomic understanding of global mindset. Again, making argument of being in a bubble, weak.
eg Mr #Lavrov daughter is #Columbia University grad
8-The #RussianArmy has been in combat operations including high intensity urban combat since the breakup of #SovietUnion in #Chechnya & Dagestan. Add to it the 2014 Ukraine war. Then #Syria and #Libya.
And lest not forget pre breakup #Afghanistan either.
And lest not forget pre breakup #Afghanistan either.
9-#Afghanistan gave a taste of guerrilla opposition in occupied territory against a motivated and (reasonably in later stages) adversary (why the #Mujahideen never got ATGMs is strange).
This created officer corps with experience in land and combined air-land ops.
This created officer corps with experience in land and combined air-land ops.
10-#Chechnya wars & #Dagestan war again reinforced the lessons of going up against well motivated, trained and equipped guerrilla forces, but different from Afghanistan in being #urbanwarfare, something that were 50 yr old chapters on Leningrad/Stalingrad in Russian army syllabus
11-#Syria and #Libya opened new dishes on the menu: namely modern #drone combat, coupled with #specialforces being lynchpin of combined air, land (and sea launched weapon) strikes against well trained & equipped forces. With drone vs land system combat a frequent occurrence.
12-In 2014 invasion of #Ukraine, the lessons went back to urban combat, previously having had a “picnic” to the countryside in Libya and Syria.
In terms of equipment, the Ukrainians were orders of magnitude better equipped than anything the Russians had faced since Barbarossa
In terms of equipment, the Ukrainians were orders of magnitude better equipped than anything the Russians had faced since Barbarossa
13-All above conflicts had an important constant: the #RussianAirForce and Army aviation.
Since Afghanistan, these units have been baptised with blood. Providing close air support in face of AAA & SAMs. In rural and urban battlefields, continuously adapting tactics & aircraft
Since Afghanistan, these units have been baptised with blood. Providing close air support in face of AAA & SAMs. In rural and urban battlefields, continuously adapting tactics & aircraft
14-So simply saying #Russians weren’t ready for economic/diplomatic/military resistance May not be entirely correct
An army experiencing war since 1979
Intelligentsia that’s seen #coldwar since 1945 & diplomatic corps/businessmen closely interacting with west since 1991
An army experiencing war since 1979
Intelligentsia that’s seen #coldwar since 1945 & diplomatic corps/businessmen closely interacting with west since 1991
15- To conclude, there’s more to the entire situation than meets the eye. Many senior analysts seem to be skimming the surface of entire tactical/strategic scenario, individual battles and the whole war as it’s the more convenient thing to do. Image👇credit @AJEnglish @BBCWorld
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