Thread by @JMJalel_H

[ thread🧵]

Is a protracted #stalemate burgeoning in Libya?

PM #Bashagha took his oath in Tobruk a month ago—& he still hasn’t swept into office or begun governing.

He himself told the media about the physical act of #entering Tripoli “w/in days”, but that hasn’t happened yet.

Bashagha & his ministers entering Tripoli soon is w/in the realm of the possible.

But the thing is, That won’t necessarily be enough to discard Dabaiba.

I.e., entering Tripoli won’t necessarily put an end to the current crisis.

A slew of profound issues are still outstanding.

A big chunk of opinion & sentiment in both Tripoli & Misrata remains skeptical about Bashagha.

Latter has been making a bit of progress but there’s still a gap.

Plus, the passage of time alone isn’t doing all that work for free, *no matter* how isolated & weak Dabaiba looks.

Turkish decisionmakers, incl. Hakan Fidan’s people, have been talking to Bashagha’s top emissaries & advisors. Such conversations are routine; they aren’t in short supply at all.

But fact remains: Turkey could afford to keep chattin’ & still maintain Dabaiba for a while longer.

Turkey isn’t the sole skeptic right now.

Some aspects of Bashagha’s current cabinet are seen as problematic by Western powers (apart from France, which is 110% behind it).

One issue, for example, is: the minister of Planning shouldn’t be the same person as the min of Finance.

If Bashagha enters Tripoli & sets up shop in some hotel, senior officials from foreign states like France & Russia might call him to congratulate him. But that doesn’t equate formal recognition by the UN.

And UN Advisor Williams’ constitutional basis initiative isn’t dead yet.

So far, Egyptian-backed HoR Speaker Aqila Saleh has brazenly boycotted UN’s effort twrds a constitutional basis & a tangible timeframe for #elections.

But the maximalist approach hasn’t worked yet. For Bashagha to become easier to accept, Aqila & Cairo might have to relent a bit

There’s also the Financial Committee issue.

US wants Kabir+Sanalla+3rd individual to oversee state expenditures going forward.

But Cairo fears that—if such a Financial Committee is set up successfully—Dabaiba might get emboldened since expenditures will resume for all provinces

There are many other stumbling blocks that could described here.

But the general idea is that there is a distinct possibility of having a long stalemate take hold in Tripoli.

If that turns out to be case, 3 facets will be interesting to watch as additional weeks elapse:

• will Bashagha manage to avert any “time decay” that might damage his image & standing while his Deputy PMs Zadma & Qatrani get used to operating w/out him?

• will the Haftars lose patience & make a fatal mistake by confusing 2022 w/ 2019?

• will Tripoli clashes flourish?