Thread by @TheStudyofWar

Special Edition: #Russian Military Capabilities Assessments Thread
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

We discuss below some instances in which #American and other officials have presented information in ways that may inadvertently exaggerate #Russian combat capability. We do not in any way mean to suggest that such exaggeration is intentional.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

We assess that the #Russian military will struggle to amass a large and combat-capable force of mechanized units to operate in #Donbas within the next few months.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

#US DoD statements that #Russia retains 80-85 percent of its original mobilized combat power unintentionally exaggerate the Russian military’s current capabilities to fight.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

The dozens of #Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that retreated from around #Kyiv likely possess combat power that is a fraction of what the numbers of units or total numbers of personnel with those units would suggest.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

Reconstituting these units to restore any notable fraction of their nominal power would take months. #Russian forces withdrawn from around #Kyiv and going back to fight in #Donbas in the next few weeks, therefore, will not have been reconstituted.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

The #Russian armed forces likely have few or no full-strength units in reserve to deploy to fight in #Ukraine because of a flawed mobilization scheme that cannot be fixed in the course of a short war.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

The #Russians cannot expect to benefit from the roughly 200,000 conscripts and reservists they are currently mobilizing until late summer or fall at the earliest.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9

Morale is a key element of combat power, and consistent reports indicate that the morale even of elite #Russian units remains very low.
isw.pub/RusCampaignApr9