Thread by @HannaNotte

What will happen, should #Russia use #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine as it escalates in the Donbas?

Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.

Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift

Thread /1

A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2

Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3

https://twitter.com/jseldin/status/1506661010484174849

Similarly, former @OPCW Dir.-Gen. Üzümcü argued: @OPCW attribution tools are now so sophisticated that those responsible would be “identified & held accountable”– insinuating #Russia will think twice before using CW in #Ukraine, fearing being caught. project-syndicate.org/commentary/wil… /4

Such arguments fundamentally assume that #Russia cares about attribution. Instances of CW use in #Syria, and the Skripal/Navalny poisonings, however, suggest otherwise: /5

In #Syria, after the 2014 destruction of Assad’s declared CW, the regime continued to use them. Though Russia supported @OPCW tools to establish use (FFM) & attribution (JIM), once Syria was found guilty, #Russia shut down the JIM & declared new attribution mechanism – IIT ... /6

... illegitimate. Add to that: Russia’s disinformation campaign to smear the OPCW FFM as biased, unprofessional, politicised. The consequence: polarization @OPCW over the pursuit of attribution for CW attacks & complete blockage of UNSC path. /7

As a result, few avenues for pursuing accountability for Syrian victims of CW use remain: Europ court cases under principle of universal jurisdiction, which benefit from FFM/IIT material. While these might result in criminal accountability for individual Syrians officials.../8

...the Syrian state has not faced any consequences – except for the largely symbolic suspension from the OPCW in the spring of 2021. /9

The Syria CW saga was disastrous in that the “red line” over CW use was not enforced & selective punitive mil. strikes (April 2017 & April 2018) failed to restore deterrence. A possible #Russian decision to use CW in Ukraine, & responses to it, will be shaped by that backdrop./10

Next: #Russia’s navigation of the #Navalny poisoning @OPCW has compounded the challenges, since Moscow has blocked probes not only of the attempted assassination, but also of suspected novichok stocks. Russia’s CW file @OPCW was closed in 2017. Reopening: not straightforward. /11

#Russia blocked an OPCW Technical Assistance mission post-Navalny poisoning. Challenge inspections (per Chem Weapons Convention, CWC) have never been invoked. So, right now, the Navalny case is “stuck” in the CWC’s Art. IX (2) clarification process. carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/860… /12

Technicalities aside, what does this mean? We don’t have a good sense what CW #Russia might (not) have, though @StateDept has doubted Russia’s compliance with the CWC for years. So, should Russia use CW in Ukraine, the Syria/Navalny cases suggest that we will have 3 problems: /13

Problem 1: Moscow will say, “We don’t have any CW, that file is officially closed. How can we use CW if @OPCW certified we don’t have any?”. Challenging that @OPCW will not be impossible, but an uphill battle. /14

Problem 2: Russia’s long discrediting of OPCW mechanisms will pay off: Whether or not OPCW investigators could collect samples/Q witnesses at a scene of CW use in UA, Russia will likely discredit any efforts, like in Syria. Its disinfo will resonate selectively (see #Bucha). /15

Problem 3: Anything an OPCW FFM might collect in UA & pass to IIT for attribution will never lead to anything @UNSC (Russia/PRC vetoes). The best we could hope for is criminal accountability for Russian individuals, way down the line. And shaming of Russia (but does it care?) /16

This thread has ignored 3 other central Qs: What CW does #Russia have? Would it likely see a useful military purpose for using CW in Ukraine? And what economic, political & military consequences might individual Western states take in response to Russian CW use in Ukraine? /17

These are important questions in their own right. But at the OPCW and UNSC, avenues to pursue attribution, accountability & deterrence of any prospective CW use in #Ukraine will be few and far between. /18 #RussiaUkraineWar