2/5 We have a dangerous, aggressive, criminal state to contend with.
We must take steps to minimize the capability and the intent of that state to do us harm.
Krastev implies it shouldn't be done and wouldn't succeed anyway.
I say: should be done, can be done, must be done.
3/5 The issue is not whether the RUS economy will survive. It will. RUS has enormous domestic resources. It also has alternative partners. But Western containment will make RUS: militarily less dangerous, and less capable of political subversion against us, other things equal.
4/5 Dealing with Russia, we need a strong containment policy - very low levels of trade and other forms of contact - and a strong military posture to deter the Kremlin from aggression.
The rest is Russia's problem, not ours.
5/5 We should not be induced into giving concessions due to some clever rhetoric about Russia's internal dynamics that we may somehow be able to save or that may somehow threaten us.
Enough.
Close the markets. Rearm. Stand guard.
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1/5 I keep on feeling underwhelmed by commentary which puts great stress on fear and on escalation risks without clarity on concrete scenarios and concrete alternatives. It's simple: if Russia attacks NATO, the Alliance goes to war against Russia.
There is no dilemma.
2/5 The #Kremlin forced the current war upon the world. For NATO nations to do nothing to help Ukraine would be not only unconscionable, but also strategically blind, in terms of deterring future wars, and in terms of upholding international norms of the highest value to us.
3/5 As a result we are compelled to assist Ukraine materially. It is an important Western interest to massively raise Ukraine's chances of survival and Russia's probability of defeat.
However we refrain from outright intervention as we aim not to expand the scope of the war.
1/7 Why I agree with Anton:
One cannot accept nuclear threats as a cover for aggression. If yes, then aggression cannot be deterred and will not stop. The solution is the resolve to fight a just war in spite of all threats.
The aggressor, preferring survival, will retreat.
2/7 The resolve to fight a just war is the response to the worst case scenario of a nuclear power carrying out wars of annihilation. The analytical insight is that only defenders facing an actual risk of annihilation are in an existential struggle, whereas aggressors are not.
3/7 Being prevented from carrying out a genocide, or an invasion, is never an existential problem. Therefore, Putin's war against Ukraine is not existential. He has ample opportunities to survive without it.
1/6 @marceldirsus As an economist I understand that, but I strongly suspect there's a lack of imagination here. DEU policy making in my experience very reliant on asking industry point-blank what they think (want). Lack of state leadership, too much listening, not enough leading
2/6
Here's a few ideas I suspect are insufficiently studied:
-Re-think gas rationing concept if shortage: some industries to furlough 12-24 months, state to pay maintenance and salaries and, crucially, subsidise replacement imports for what they produce to plug supply chains
3/6 -For gas for residential and buildings: ask more effort from them, there's popular will to make sacrifices as polls show. So in sum, more gas for industries that truly need it, less for households and industries that can be furloughed.
1/4
There is indeed a moral trade-off, lives matter more.
But there is also the long view on the national security trade-off, *including* its economic aspects. And this is where @OlafScholz is mistaken for the #German case.
A temporary recession may occur, but can be dampened.
2/4 Gas-dependent industries can be furloughed and import subst. for industrial goods can be arranged. Together with rationing and price & tax management, a lot could be done.
If only for oil, dropping fuel taxes would go very far - they are enormous in Germany.
3/4 And there's a deeper national security question. How exactly would #Germany survive in case of a broader war? Isn't it high time to learn the hard way how to live without RU energy? If not now, then when?
And then there's the issue of forcing RU into better behaviour.
1/8
Western support to #Ukraine is good but insufficient. There appears to be a strategic miscalculation based on a lack of resolve to take on heavier economic costs and to ensure a comprehensive #Russian defeat. Ukraine is *already* acting as a shield and protector for Europe.
2/8
But this is neither the time for cynically dragging out the conflict at the cost of Ukrainian cities and lives, nor for dirty compromises at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty. Our values must mean something. And our strategic interest is clear.
3/8
Our short-term goals should be:
A: A defeated and humbled Russian state with diminished and demoralised armed forces
B: A net gain for Ukraine in terms of its sovereign control of its territory and in terms of military prestige and honour
1/ Viewed from the perspective of #EU & #NATO members only, I fear that a strict policy of non-intervention is demoralising for us and emboldening for #Russia and #China. What do our governments think the world will look like in the next few years if Russia ultimately prevails?
2/ We should not underestimate the demoralising effects on the West of the suffering of the Ukrainian nation and of the brazen and massive violations of International Law and of every principle of civilised behaviour now pursued by the #fascist#dictatorship in #Moscow.
3/ Our nations and governments must be fully mobilised in the service of what we hold most dear, not only in the defence of our territories, but also in the defence of the freedom of #Ukraine. Stepping behind the triple red line of #NATO is not enough.