A short 🧵 on oil&gas revenue: It always accrues with a lag, so a strong April for the #budget = a strong March for oil&gas, driven in part by a weak ruble. Taxes on #oil production in March had a very high coefficient (Urals at 91, USD/RUB at 104) and were paid in April. 1/3
The same holds for export tariffs which are based on past prices. Tariffs per ton are lower starting May 1.
Crude oil export tariffs per ton:
January 46.7 USD
February 47.7 USD
March 58.3 USD
April 61.2 USD
May 49.6 USD
2/3
This means that oil&gas revenue will be significantly lower in May. Reuters estimated that oil production tax could fall from 1.3 trillion to 0.73 trillion for April (paid in May). Needless to say: This is still very comfortable for the Russian budget. 3/3 kommersant.ru/doc/5340753
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Can we see war costs in #Russia's federal budget? I looked for any indications in monthly budget data. Disclaimer: #Budget execution is often erratic and it's difficult to draw conclusions from one data point. I first looked at National Defence - not much to see here. 1/7
There is a small increase in Economy, but it does not look significant (especially since the data is not adjusted for inflation). 2/7
Maybe the most interesting change: Healthcare. There is a strong increase, but it coincided with a big wave of Covid19 infections. 3/7
Bei der Folgeabschätzung eines #Gas-Embargos fehlen der Politik zuverlässige Informationen. Letztlich müsste man das Wissen der Unternehmen über Produktion und Lieferketten zusammenführen. Leider haben Unternehmen wenig Anreize, vollständig und neutral zu kommunizieren. [1/5]
Unternehmen kommunizieren teilweise strategisch (hier: alarmistisch) - nachweisen kann das keiner. Es entsteht ein düsteres Gesamtbild. Es gibt aber eine Möglichkeit, diese Informationsasymmetrie aufzulösen. Dafür muss man ökonomische Anreize setzen, nicht zu übertreiben. [2/5]
Und das geht so: Mit Embargo gäbe es eine begrenzte Menge Gas, das noch für die Industrie zur Verfügung steht. Die Rechte auf dieses Gas kann man auch jetzt, also vor dem Embargo, versteigern. Diese Auktion wäre verbindlich, gezahlt würde aber nur wenn das Embargo kommt. [3/5]
Personal view: Today, no country in the West should feel more responsibility for #Ukraine's security than #Germany. Consequently, Germany should do more than any other country to help Ukraine. Of course, we did some good as well, but we clearly weakened Ukraine's security. [1/3]
-We worked hard to keep Ukraine out of NATO.
-We denied Ukraine arms, even blocked others from doing so.
-We cooperated directly with Russia's military until at least 2014.
-We funded Russia's armament more than most.
-We helped Russia bypass Ukraine's gas transit (NS1&2).[2/3]
-But most of all, we were the last ones to invade, bomb and kill in Ukraine, and vowed "never again".
It is painful to see that other countries are stepping up more than Germany at this historic time. I hope that we can still change course. [3/3]
Einige gute Punkte in diesem Interview, allerdings sind einige Punkte ĂĽberzeichnet.
1.) Die russische RĂĽstungsindustrie ist auf internationale Kooperation angewiesen, vor allem fĂĽr neuere Waffen braucht sie moderne Chips, die Russland selbst nicht herstellen kann.
Aber die Abhängigkeiten gehen viel weiter, weil andere generische Vorprodukte für Rüstungsgüter auch mit westlichen Maschinen und Knowhow produziert werden. Die russische Kriegsmaschine ist sicherlich auf einige Monate autark, aber nicht unbegrenzt.
2.) Detail am Rande: Bei den russischen Steuern auf Öl und Gas sind es vor allem Fördersteuern, die ins Gewicht fallen. Exportzölle auch wichtig, dann kommen wohl Dividenden und dann Gewinnsteuern etc.
How can we reduce #Russia's energy revenue while keeping the #EU energy market stable? EU politicians are torn between popular outrage over high prices and calls to increase pressure on Russia. But there is a solution: Import price caps on Russian energy. [1/6]
#Italy has already started this discussion with regards to gas, and it is gaining momentum. Basically, a price cap makes it illegal to pay more than a price X for importing Russian gas, oil or coal. [2/6] bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
With a price cap on Russian energy, Europe ideally gets to have its cake and eat it too: #Russia's energy revenues would shrink, similar to a partial energy #embargo. At the same time, supply of energy to the #EU - and also to the rest of the world - would remain intact. [3/6]
#Sanctions will not rally Russians behind #Putin. The reason is that the Russian regime always needs to convey strength. So the propaganda message on Russian state TV will be: "All is good, we are in control, minor turbulences, nothing serious." [1/4]
But it will be evident to most Russians in a year or two that all is not good, not at all. At that point, propaganda becomes counterproductive: Russians will feel that their problems are not taken seriously, that the government is actually mocking them and their suffering. [2/4]
The sanctions will thus become problematic for #Putin, because they sabotage his narrative of ultimate power and control. He can either choose to look weak, having failed to protect Russia against the West - or look completely detached from economic reality. [3/4]