Thread by @bctallis

This article by @andrewduffEU is sadly typical of group think in & around the Brussels bubble.

“Nobody who knows how the Brussels institutions work-without a strong government-can be confident the EU is fit to internalize #Ukraine’s national problem.” 1/

politico.eu/article/ukrain…

It’s a well informed piece (from an #EU perspective) that on the surface might sound eminently reasonable- like some other recent attempts to fob off #Ukraine with 2nd class options. BUT, the quote in the previous tweet gives the game away. It shows 🇺🇦 is seen as a problem 2/

Rather than being recognised as the #EU’s best geopolitical opportunity in a generation, #Ukraine is presented as a cost, a burden to be borne, not a huge potential benefit to be embraced, or a possibility for EU renewal to be welcomed. 3/

ip-quarterly.com/en/integrating…

There a couple of other clues - lecturing #Zelenskiy on what he should & should not be focusing on (like adopting the body of #EU law) Honestly, I think Ze knows #Ukraine’s needs better than any of us - & he wants full membership, in time after the necessary reforms are made. 4/

Behind the facade of self-criticism (the #EU needs to reform) lurks a limited & limiting vision of 🇪🇺 seemingly still centred around a falsely rosy view of old Europe -‘voie de détresse’- (where the decay is actually most pronounced if the response to #Ukraine is any measure) 5/

And, seemingly, a desire to restore the #UK in the eyes of 🇫🇷 🇩🇪 via the same #EU ‘associate membership’ that would be offered to #Ukraine. Even if there were merit in that, sacrificing 🇺🇦’s path to real membership on the altar of 🇬🇧 inclusion is a grim prospect
- & a no go. 6/

There IS a need to find better ways for the #UK to work with #EU states - but I don’t think this is it.
A much better idea is the ‘European Security Council’ that is also mentioned here - that has real potential for getting to a better division of Labour between #EU & #NATO 7/

that is no alternative to a real #EU membership path for #Ukraine - but a potentially useful complement. It’s hard to shake the feeling that, like some other lukewarm proposals for Ukraine - it’s hard to shake the feeling that a view of a western core & an East that threatens 8/

That core lingers.
This ignores West Eur shortcomings & the #EU’s deviation from its historically successful approach (& its own failings in enlargement processes). Properly including #Ukraine offers a chance to get back on track - but, moreover, to 9/

foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/07/ukr…

Genuinely revive the #EU’s real mode of geopolitical influence, its transformative power & progressive approach to security.
Offering a clear path to #Ukraine creates the incentives for reform - there & in the EU.
Creative thinking to replace failed neighbourhood policies 10/

IS needed. But this ‘affiliation’ cannot be a permanent alternative to real membership for #Ukraine, #Moldova, #Georgia or the #WesternBalkans states. Yes, problems have emerged in eg 🇵🇱&🇭🇺- but also elsewhere in 🇪🇺. There is a general need for renewal & revival that won’t be 11/

Served by being timid, selfish or ‘can’t do’ (if that approach prevailed after WW2 we would have no #EU). Instead we need to dream a little bigger. There are signs that this is happening in eg #CEE, & the #Baltic states, which offers hope 4🇺🇦& 4🇪🇺/end

rusi.org/explore-our-re…