A month ago I wrote this ๐งต on why #import duties were not the answer to #Pakistan's Balance of Payments constraints. #ImportBans are certainly not the answer either. Rather, they exacerbate the underlying problem. Five thoughts. ๐งต๐
1\ The usual: CAD results from a macro imbalance (Saving too low relative to investment, so foreign saving needed (borrowing) (CAD is the mirror image of borrowing from the rest of the world (financial account of BOP)). Fixing the CAD takes increasing saving (cool off demand).
3\ The way this #importban in #Pakistan is done in SRO 598-1/2022 for the main items banned (cars, mobiles) looks more like an incentive to domestic producers NOT TO EXPORT than an attempt to save forex. In fact, it gives them a generous #monopoly power. Why? ๐๐
3b\ It targets built cars, built mobiles, but not its parts. Monopoly to the assembler, #Pakistan consumer captive. The domestic company will increase demand 4 import of parts (that come cheap under 5th schedule even w/tariff exemptions) and sell w/supernormal profits.๐๐๐
3c\ Imports will not change much, but composition will (more imports of parts for mobiles, less of cbu mobiles). Tariff revenue will fall. #Pakistan#trade#importban
4\ More importantly: the #monopoly power given to domestic firms producing articles under the ban are such that it'll be difficult to convince them to export! Difficult to find a large enough #tax break that compares! #Pakistan
5\ So, the #ImportBan gives no relief in the short run. More problematic, gives long run headaches in the form of distortions. Less competition, less tech transfers means less productivity. More policy uncertainty means fewer orders, fewer investment. #Pakistan
โข โข โข
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Thank you for the feedback, dear Yousuf. If you read the article carefully, you will see this is specific & data driven. A short thread to explain. ๐๐๐
Figure 2 in the article is built from a careful analysis combining micro-level *data* from all listed firms in Pakistan, & effective rates of protection (calculated based on FBR data on import duties and the latest input output *data* from IFPRI. It conveys the key message. ๐
Figure 3 comes from a careful econometric analysis we did w/@StefaniaLovo in which we recover markups from the data, and estimated systematic effects of changes in #import duties on these markups. It conveys the key message. ๐
Fast #import growth has overshadowed some very good news in #Pakistan. The latest release of disaggregated #trade data by @StateBank_Pak reveals that the first nine months of FY22 showed #record high #exports in real terms, since there's statistics.
Short ๐งต๐ w/ more results.
1\ #exports grew by 24.8% in the first 9 months of FY22 w.r.t. same period of FY21, reaching 23.7 bn for goods and 5.2 bn for services.
1\ The #CAD is the result of a Saving/Investment imbalance. The sustainable solution to the #CAD entails policies that increase #saving.
2\ #Import duties might be a patch that in the short run curbs imports, but they will curb #exports too. Why? B/C they increase the profitability to sell at home, so firms shift from export to domestic markets. Import duties are implicit #export taxes. They won't reduce the CAD.
With @StateBank_Pak releasing dissaggregated #trade data for December, we have a picture of the full 2021, which, despite #supply#chain disruptions worldwide, was 'good' for #Pakistan. Short thread below:
1\ #exports grew by 30.1% in 2021 w.r.t. 2020, with a strong pick up in merchandise, but also substantive in services.
On May 26th @StateBank_Pak released #Pakistan's disaggregated #trade statistics for April '21. We now have 10 months of the FY21. Some analysis in #thread below. ๐๐๐
The largest untapped #export potentials for #Pakistan are with #China, and with its own region, #SouthAsia, for about 13 and 12.5 billion respectively, stressing the importance #regional#integration initiatives. 3/n