Friendly memo to #Russian cynics joyful when #Russia's #cruisemissiles fly into #Ukraine: A thread, in three parts, on unjoyous aspect of your weekly little triumphs. (Let your children and grandchildren also have a look, or tell them. It concerns them too!) Analyze this:
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PART 1:
Your missiles are expensive. Many never reach their target, but are intercepted or defunct. Those that hit their targets often destroy infrastructure whose reconstruction is less expensive than your missile. Sure, #Ukraine looses something. But #Russia looses more.
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Rebuilding destroyed #Ukrainian infrastructure will be partly done with Western funds. The more you destroy, the more help #Ukraine may get & the more sanctions may be imposed on #Russia. Sure, everybody looses. But, in relative terms, you may loose most. Compare & compute!
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PART 2: Killing & meming Ukrainians may backfire. Your missile might hit its target successfully & kill or wound many #Ukrainians. But are you and your children ready to take the hit back? Even if you destroy all of #Ukraine, millions of Ukrainians will survive & not forget.
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Tens or hundreds of millions of non-Ukrainians are, unlike you, sympathetic to #Ukraine. Outside #Russia, #Ukrainians are regarded as human and not #subhuman. Many Ukrainians & some non-Ukrainians will seek revenge or, at least, justice for the people killed or maimed by you.
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Are you & your children ready for a long fight continuing for decades, after the end of your "special military operation"? Are you already preparing your children to repent and ask #Ukrainians for forgiveness for #Russia's misdeeds? If not: How do you plan to get out of this?
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PART 3:
Eventually, #Russians will pay for much or even all of #Russia's destruction in #Ukraine. Sure, YOU may not think of Ukraine as a state and nation. But international law, organizations and courts do regard Ukraine and its citizens as ordinary subjects with full rights.
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Are you and your children ready to compensate #Ukrainians for the harm done by #Russia's army during the "special military operation"? No? But Ukrainians will seek and get assistance from various international and national courts and organizations when seeking compensation.
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A self-respecting Russian patriot may, of course, not recognize the authority of non-Russian courts and organizations. Yet, the Russian economy is a part of the world economy. #Russia has assets abroad. Or are you & your children ready to turn Russia into a large North Korea?
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CONCLUSIONS:
Sure, when the next Russian cruise missile hits a Ukrainian city, you may feel proud, or joyful, or both. But are you ready pay the full bill for Russia's unique adventure? Are your children aware of the consequences the "special military operation" has for them?
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What is the endgame of all of this for #Russia & its citizens? To stop, declare victory & go back to normal life? You may want move on &, perhaps, forget what happened. But millions of Ukrainians & non-Ukrainians will not forget, but seek revenge, justice & compensation.
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Sure, Russia may attain victory in Ukraine, with carpet bombing, or using weapons of mass destruction, or weaponizing nuclear power plants, or all of that. But what would follow such a hypothetical victory? Can Russia become exempt from international law & ethical judgement?
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A hypothetical victory will not be accepted by millions of Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians. To be sure, the more ruthless Russia is in Ukraine, the more short-term military successes it could attain. Yet the claims against Russia will only grow. Somebody will pay for them.
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Read most of #Dugin's texts published until 2007 (when submitting a dissertation on him at @Cambridge_Uni). Cannot remember anything intellectually stimulating, in his many books and articles - unlike in the often interesting investigations of the interwar #Eurasianists. /2
#Dugin often makes pointedly pompous statements that are either trivialities or absurdities, or a mixture of both. When he discusses an interesting theory, it is not his own. He reads & writes a lot, but it is unclear why he does. /3 @FascismJournal@HNationalism@russia_matters
THREAD on #Russlandverstehen:
There was in September 1999 a Russian spark of support for then still obscure prime minister #VladimirPutin, against the background of the #FSB's blowing up of Russian residential buildings that left ca. 300 Russians dead. /1 fb.watch/eP8tm5fxe5/
This curious popular reaction, in spite of early signs revealing the role of #Russia's secret service in the mass murderous terror attacks on #Russian civilians, points to worrisome psychological deformations of the Russian national mind. /2
The mixture of collective escapism, myopic personalism & necro-masochism that came to the fore already more than 30 years ago should have consequences for Western policies. It indicates that verbal signaling may be of only limited use in communication with the Russian nation. /3
THREAD
Feelings of Deja Vu for a student of post-Soviet affairs: Are we back in the 1990s? Moscow's December 1994 intervention in an inner-Chechen conflict was the beginning of the end of Russia's Second Republic (after the First one of Febr-Oct 1917). 1/3
Moscow's September 1999 start of the #SecondChechenWar, against the background of, probably, #FSB-organized apartment bombings blamed on #Chechen terrorists, was the beginning of #Putin's popularity rise. Now, #Chechens are fighting on both sides of the #RussianUkrainianWar. 2/3
Ukrainian socio-economic life in the non-occupied territories has returned to levels of the 1990s. Russia's economic life will soon too be back to the 1990s. Chechnia may again become a headache for Moscow. More conflict in the Caucasus & Central Asia has become more likely. 3/3
THREAD:
The critique of @amnesty of the behavior of Ukraine's military is inapt for one or both of the following two reasons:
It can (a) be a critique of tactical decisions taken on the spot by Ukrainian army officers. However, @Amnesty is not a military agency or think tank. /1
The human rights NGO has neither the professional competence nor the public authority to assess the military necessity of, or putative alternatives to, an occasional stationing of Ukrainian troops in residential areas or near other civilian facilities. /2
Even more worrisome about the foray of the reputed NGO into military affairs is an absence of consideration of possible human rights repercussions of the publicly suggested more cautious tactical behavior of the Ukrainian armed forces. /3
Did the West provoke Moscow? Comment on Sweden's and Finland's forthcoming accession to NATO: 1. In principle, the forthcoming northern enlargement of NATO does not change much in the geopolitics of Europe.
CC: @Konflikt_Sicher@Geopoliti_org@GeopoliticsMag@GSPSipo@debates_eu
3. The accession to NATO of Finland doubles the length of the NATO-Russia border. Sweden's and Finland's entry into the alliance was explicitly warned against by Moscow's statements in 2021.