In its opening remarks, the #US follows the trend of other states by invoking its right of intervention under art 63, but also underlining the erga omnes partes nature of the Genocide Convention obligations. 2/
For its personal touch, US underlines its involvement in developing the Convention and pointing to its past invocation of art VIII regarding Darfur (recourse to UN organs) and its support [yes, I know] for tribunals prosecuting genocide and other crimes. 3/
Wasting no time, the US makes clear at the outset perhaps what will be one of the most controversial aspects of its intervention: its construction of the compromissory clause (art IX). Note that the US entered a reservation regarding that very provision. 4/
The US addresses its reservation in a footnote to a different paragraph (where it confirms its party status to the Convention). The US adopts a very literal interpretation of art 63 and the Wimbledon judgment. 5/
Critics would likely point to art 21(1) #VCLT, in that for the US's intents and purposes, the Genocide Convention to which it is party does not include an art IX as such, but rather as it has modified through its reservation. 6/
Moving on. In declaring the provisions it seeks to give a construction, the US cites arts I, II, Ill, IV, VIII, IX. The US also refers to arts 31-32 of the VCLT as the customary rules of interpretation relevant for its constructions. 7/
The US proceeds in analysing the cited provisions of the Genocide Convention. It recalls the ICJ's jurisprudence on the due diligence obligation to prevent genocide through means permitted by international law and also analyses the meaning of "genocide" under the Convention. 8/
Interestingly, the US seems to concede the discrepancy between its interpretative declaration upon ratification and the ICJ's jurisprudence on destruction "in part" of a protected group, but without conceding its position. 9/
The US then proceeds to make the (straightforward) point, on the basis of a survey of its provisions, that the Genocide Convention does not authorise aggression in the prevention of genocide. 10/
US then proceeds to make the argument that jurisdiction extends to adjudicating non-violations (albeit not with that heading). It emphasises the broad wording of art IX while also citing statement in travaux by #India representative to support that understanding. 11/
In conclusion, the US declaration makes quite straightforward interpretations of the Convention. Yet (at least for me) the elephant in the room is the US reservation to art IX. 12/
It should be emphasised that the reservation would not seemingly get in the way of the US's constructions of the substantive obligations under the Convention; particularly, its defining genocide and arguing the lack of authorisation to engage in aggression. 13/
Yet, the tricky part will be reconciling the US's constructions relating to jurisdiction for non-violations and its reservations to the compromissory clause. 14/14
And with that, Shabbat Shalom!
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Probably most controversial finding in today's orders is the (thinly reasoned) finding that the interruption of movement along the Lachin Corridor plausibly constitutes violation of #Cerd.
J Yusuf's criticism of shoehorning disputes into Cerd compromissory clause worth a read. 2/
Given the ICJ's finding in 2021 that Azerbaijan's claims relating landmines did not plausibly fall under the Cerd, little surprise that it rejected Azerbaijan's claims this time round. However, a few nuggets in the individual opinions... 3/
Both 🇫🇮🇪🇪 invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. 🇪🇪 also invokes J Cançado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/
🇫🇮🇪🇪 also consider capacity to intervene on jurisdictional issues, noting art 63 does not distinguish between different phases. They refer both to Judge Schwebel's opinion in the Nicaragua case and to leading treatises on the subject to justify intervention on such issues. 3/
Ireland, like almost all the other other interveners, invokes both its right to intervene pursuant to art 63 of the ICJ Statute as well as the nature of the obligations found in the Genocide Convention to justify its intervention. 2/
Ireland (only) invokes two provisions of the Convention as those it seeks to give its construction on: art I (prevention and punishment of genocide) and art IX (compromissory clause). 3/
To begin all three states invoke their "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while Denmark and Italy also invoke the nature of obligations in the Genocide Convention. All three also try to add their respective personal touches. 2/
🇵🇱 invokes its "history of supporting efforts to prevent and punish genocide", following "genocide perpetrated on Polish nationals during [WWII] by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (the predecessor of [Russia])", while noting Soviet perpetrators were never held to account. 3/
Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
As for the provisions of the Genocide Convention it seeks to offer its construction, by reference to Ukraine's application France cites arts I, II, IV, VIII, IX. 3/
To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/
As for the provisions it plans to offer its construction on, Romania cites arts IX (compromissory clause) and I (prevention and punishment), the latter in turn necessitating interpretation of arts II, III, VIII. 3/