At peace and war, China’s #cyber activities alter its target’s actions with threats to punish unwanted behaviors and apply pressure to coerce. Insikt Group® analyzes the 2 elements of #weishe theory in its application against Taiwan and more. 1/5 Read: bit.ly/3VjLQd1 Image
In weishe, coercion comprises two distinct theories of action to change the behavior of a target: #Deterrence and #Compellence. Deterrence uses the threat of punishment to prevent undesirable actions, and compellence wields punishment to motivate desirable behavior. 2/5
An instance of cyber coercion might be the #defacement attack on public TV screens in #Taiwan in response to the Taiwan visit of the US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in August 2022. 3/5 Image
The rapid exploitation of recent Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities by multiple groups in China also lends further credence to the theory that a “digital quartermaster” ecosystem exists within China’s security apparatus to distribute shared capabilities. 4/5
All editions of Science of Military Strategy from China’s National Defense University, reviewed for this study, emphasize the importance of military-civil linkages in preparing for, and carrying out struggle in the #networkdomain. 5/5 Read the full report: bit.ly/3VjLQd1 Image

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More from @RecordedFuture

Nov 17
Discover multinational #InfluenceOperations at work. See how #Iran and #Venezuela can use state-sponsored media outlets, social media influencers, proxies, surrogates, and political activists in the #AlexSaab influence campaign. Read full report: bit.ly/3EPYPhv 1/8 Image
Insikt Group® identifies four phases of a multiyear influence campaign centered around indicted Alex Saab, the alleged financier and special agent to Iran for the Nicolás #Maduro regime. The Alex Saab timeline shows significant events from indictment to postponed trial. 2/8 Image
Saab, an alleged conduit of Hezbollah operations extending into Latin America, is a Colombian and Venezuelan businessman wanted by Colombian law enforcement since 2018. Maduro appointed him a special envoy to Iran after a corruption designation (by OFAC). 3/8
Read 8 tweets
Oct 13
Take a look at how #China #Russia #Iran and #DomesticExtremist conduct influence operations – #disinformation and #misinformation campaigns – to disrupt and influence US #Midterms2022 elections. Read the full report here: bit.ly/3ew3zhN Image
The #Russophobia theme emerged on a #RussiaTimes interview with #DmitryBabich and in June 2022 with FSB-directed #Southfront. This appeal to ethnic Russians could drive tension between them and US govt, possibly motivating a hack-and-leak or hack-and-fake #OctoberSurprise. 2/7 Image
Russian state-controlled media are diversifying existing infrastructure through registration of alternative website domains – website “mirrors” – and are increasingly using country code Top Level Domains within existing infrastructure. Chart shows mirror mentions for #Sputnik 3/7 Image
Read 7 tweets
Sep 22
Recorded Future analysts monitor targeting of ethnic and religious minorities by Chinese state-sponsored groups. In the first half of 2022, #TA413 exploited zero-days #Follina and CVE-2022-1040 with new custom backdoor #LOWZERO in Tibetan targeting. 1/9 bit.ly/3LwzoDf
#MalDoc lures, in Tibetan language, pose as applications for compensation, contest... This one sent from tibet[.]bet was weaponized with #RoyalRoad SHA 028e07fa88736f405d24f0d465bc789c3bcbbc9278effb3b1b73653847e86cf8, drops #LOWZERO and contacts hardcoded C2 45.77.19[.]75. 2/9 Image
Sent from the same domain, this lure has #phishing email links to tibet-gov.web[.]app posing as the Tibetan government-in-exile. Sent in 2 waves, the 1st email links to .docx attachment hosted on Google Firebase which attempts #Follina via the ms-msdt MSProtocol URI scheme. 3/9 Image
Read 9 tweets

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