Thread by @MariaFantappie

How to evaluate the Baghdad II Summit in Amman?

Has this second Summit helped defusing tensions & strengthening cooperation as #Russia-#Ukraine conflict increasingly impacts this MENA region?

A THREAD 🧵 1/13

1/13 Let’s start with positive points. In continuity with Baghdad I Summit (August 2021), the conference built on a solid policy line:

Iraq & regional stability are interdependent: reg. tensions play out in Iraq. Iraq’s instability can spill over & fuel regional tensions.

2/13 The Summit helped the process of Iraq’s balanced & diversified FP to continue despite the change of PM.

Some GCC states knew little & looked with suspicion at new PM Mohamed Shia al-Sudani backed by traditional Shiite parties. In-person meetings help building trust.

3/13 Also, #Iran & #GCC members were finally at the same table, at a time when KSA-Iran dialogue stalls & relations are at low point.

GCC invest into military deterrence and KSA accused Iran of planning attacks, & Iran accuses KSA of interference in #IranProtests.

4/13 #EU-#Iran representatives met at a time when relations are at a lowest point in years. Talks on #JCPOA stall, Iran delivers military aid to #Russia Vs Ukraine, and EU just adopted council conclusion condemning Iran’s crackdown on protests. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press…

5/13 HRVP Borrel importantly acknowledged that the stability in the “wider” Gulf (GCC+ Iran) is key to EU’s own stability, implying, I believe, support for Gulf-Iran de-escalation & dialogue. eeas.europa.eu/eeas/iraq-spee…

6/13 Most speakers referred to common #history, #geographies and cultural #heritage, as the background of cooperation.

Shared #heritage involves a dimension of collective belonging that is as important as cooperation on technical issues (e.i. energy trans. etc).

7/13 Yet, the Summit contribution to regional stability is limited, absent follow-up meetings at working level consolidating & nurturing diplomacy & de-escalation. This is why: ispionline.it/en/pubblicazio…

8/13 Factors for escalation are growing stronger. Ukraine-RU conflict offers MENA powers leeways for multipolarism and pursue their ambitions.

Iran leverages on ties with RU, Turkey on balancing ties with NATO & RU; GCC on the West’s growing energy needs & ties with China.

9/13 Also, in the coming months, both Turkey and Iran may opt for offensive actions to deflect domestic tensions.

10/13 With elections approaching, #Turkey may continue with threats on operations in NE Syria & continue those in KRI.

#Iran’s response to protests may intertwine & accelerate regional escalation with Israel, unleashing at Iran’s borders with KRI, tension in Caucasus and Syria

11/13 While #Iran-KSA dialogue has not been revoked, it makes no progress. In #Yemen, truce hasn’t been extended. In #Iraq, KSA-Iran coexistence, requires Baghdad and Riyadh to build trust through working-level contacts beyond meeting among senior leaders in Summits.

12/13 Keeping alive EU-Iran communication, would require the EU & MS to shape a policy able to balance accountability, pressure & de-escalation; and Iran to revoke military aid to RU & show cooperation on HR investigations.

13/13 Pres. Macron supported Baghdad I & II.

But a real win would be to lead by example: commit to a process engaging working-level officials beyond top leaders, engage the support of other EU MS in follows up.

That, would benefit cooperation in MENA, as well as in Europe.

@UnrollHelper