Commenting thread on the below and similar analyses:
There is too much emphasis, in many assessments of #Russia's 2014-15 & 2022 invasions of #Ukraine, on allegedly fundamental or even fatal mistakes made in these decisions by #Putin & his entourage. /1 journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13…
There is too much emphasis, in many assessments of #Russia's 2014-15 & 2022 invasions of #Ukraine, on allegedly fundamental or even fatal mistakes made in these decisions by #Putin & his entourage. /1 journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13…
The ideological predisposition towards an irredentist revanche, in the neo-Soviet & -Tsarist elite of #Russia, has been strong since the 1990s. This imperial drive was waiting to become unleashed, and has been marginally contained by rational calculus & strategic deliberation. /2
It was looking for different ad hoc opportunities rather than developing competing long-term #strategies to become implemented. Soft, dark, sharp and other forms of non-military power instruments were only applied to the degree that they could replace traditional #hardpower. /3
By 2021, Moscow had tried all means other than a massive use of its regular army to keep its influence in & regain control over #Ukraine. #Miscalculation was secondary to plain #desperation as the prime factor in the #Kremlin's decision to invade lands it considers #Russian. /4
Perhaps, Putin & his entourage knew more of the risks linked to the "special military operation" than we assume. But the revanchists had, from their point of view, no other choice than to go for all-out war. /END
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