Thread by @KasraAarabi

1) As the EU & UK consider listing IRGC as a terror group, the issue of Iranian conscripts has emerged as a potential barrier.

@SaeidGolkar & I outline why conscription should not be a barrier to listing the IRGC as a terrorist org 👇#IRGCterrorists foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/30/ira…

2) Opponents of designation claim listing the IRGC would punish draftees who are conscripted to IRGC and have “no choice” but to complete their compulsory service. They argue listing IRGC, which would bar IRGC members from entering Europe, would unfairly punish conscripts.

3) However, the very premise of this argument is based on a flawed understanding of the recruitment and drafting mechanism that the IRGC uses for Iranian conscripts. This process is in fact far more nuanced and requires attention. Let’s take a look 👇

4) Firstly, identifying & distinguishing between IRGC members & conscripts is straightforward. IRGC members do not receive their “end of military service” card—a legal document—until they retire. Conscripts receive this card after completing their compulsory military service.

5) In Iran, it’s compulsory for all healthy men above 19 to complete a 2-year military service. Out of Iran’s annual intake of some 400,000 conscripts, only 50,000 are drafted into the IRGC. But the IRGC is extremely selective re its 50k intake of conscripts. Here’s why👇

6) After 1997, Khamenei restructured & increased indoctrination in IRGC with the goal of nurturing more extremist and ideologically pure future generations. He again doubled down on this goal post-2009 unrest—resulting in indoctrination making up 50% of overall training in IRGC.

7) This goal had direct implications for IRGC’s conscript intake. To prevent outsiders from diluting the ideological commitment of other recruits, in 2010 IRGC instituted a new system for evaluation & appointment that sought to restrict conscript intake to active Basij members

8) Since 2010 more than 70% of draftees in the IRGC have been active members of the Basij. In Iran’s major cities, where demand for IRGC military services is higher than elsewhere, this has even reached 100% of draftees. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

9) So, since 2010, we know that at least 70% of the IRGC’s 50,000 conscripts are ideologically aligned to the Guard as they were already proactively affiliated via the Basij, which operates as the IRGC’s voluntary civil militia. institute.global/policy/irgc-ag…

10) But what does this mean for the remaining 30% of the conscript intake? Are they just ordinary Iranians who have unluckily been deployed to IRGC? The answer to this is more nuanced than “yes” or “no.”

The intake from this remaining 30% can be broken down into 2 categories 👇

11) The first are university graduates with a master’s or Ph.D. Due to their postgrad degrees and subject-matter specialties, these draftees complete their 2-year service by applying for desk jobs through directives (amriyeh) from different ministries and agencies.

12) Each draftee has a personal choice on where to apply for their amriyeh. These include the health ministry, the industry ministry, and the defense ministry and the IRGC’s affiliated organizations (cultural, political, economic).

13) Those who serve their amriyeh in the IRGC will have made the proactive decision to work for the IRGC during their 2 years of conscription in spite of its reputation. We can conclude these individuals may have ideological convictions that align with the IRGC & its objectives

14) Determining whether an individual served his amriyeh in the IRGC is achievable through the relevant documentation, incl official letter of amriyeh + pay slips. These individuals will have an official letter from IRGC & will have been on the IRGC’s payroll for 2-years.

15) Finally, in some unprivileged areas, due to insufficient Basij numbers, the IRGC also accepts non-Basij soldiers. Of IRGC’s 50,000 conscripts, these individuals constitute maximum 20% of the intake.

16) While filtering and determining this category would require a special degree of scrutiny, it can be achieved on a case-by-case basis. They will have no amriyeh documents & almost all will have only a high school diploma or below.

17) The case for proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organization is clear & compelling. The IRGC is a violent, Islamist extremist organisation that operates no differently to listed groups in the UK and EU: from ISIS and AQ to Hezbollah. @InstituteGC institute.global/policy/making-…

18) For +43 years, the modus operandi of the IRGC has been—and remains—terrorism, militancy, hostage-takings, and hijackings. It has been involved in terrorist operations against civilians—inside and outside Iran—and has created some of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world

19) The rise in IRGC terrorist activity across Europe, coupled with its increasing propaganda presence—designed to nurture homegrown radicalization in Europe in a way not too dissimilar to the Islamic State—has added urgency to proscribing the Guard. unherd.com/2023/01/irans-…

20) Listing IRGC as a terror org would give EU member states & UK a clear mandate to ban activities & content associated with IRGC + increase safeguarding measures to prevent against homegrown IRGC and Shia radicalization—something not currently covered by existing IRGC sanctions

21) Through the above mechanisms, Western states & international community more broadly will be able to ensure that ordinary Iranian conscripts are not targeted. In sum, conscription in the IRGC should not be a barrier to listing it as a terrorist org. foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/30/ira…

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