1. New UN report on AQ and IS is out, here are the most interesting tidbits in my opinion: Like this paragraph saying that several member states noted IS-#Somalia's Al-Karrar office sending $25k a month to IS-Khorasan via crypto documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/…
2. Obligatory mention that everyone's least surprising candidate to succeed Zawahiri is indeed Sayf al-Adl and AQ's silence is meant to protect the Taliban
3. Buried in here but yet should be WAY more significant is the assertion that veteran AQ leader Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, captured in Kunar #Afghanistan in 2010 and freed during the Taliban takeover in 2021, is now leading an AQ unit in Kunar. AQ presence in Afghan is very undersold
4. Also buried in here is the notion that because IEDs are becoming more advanced in both #Mozambique and #DRC, member states aren't ruling out the possibility of the Islamic State sending trainers to ASWJ and ADF, respectively.
5. UN also states that Islamic State's Mozambique Province is reduced to ~280 fighters, but yet it still plays an outsized role in the group's overall propaganda output:
6. Also the assertion that IS-#Mozambique is not under a unified command structure:
7. In the Sahel, al-Qaeda's JNIM consolidating power across much of central #Mali and north/east #BurkinaFaso, while also still relying on AQ's guidance in how to achieve these goals. Wrote about this proverbial playbook here: ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/upl…
8. The composition of IS-#Libya's foreign fighters is also very interesting, with members purportedly from further afield places such as Ghana and Kenya. Meanwhile, AQ is practicing its aforementioned playbook by guaranteeing its long-term presence in the area via intermarriage
9. Al-Qaeda's branch in #Syria, Hurras al-Din, is reportedly still receiving direct instructions from Sayf al-Adl
10. Elements of the Turkistan Islamic Party worked with IS-Khorasan to target Chinese interests in Kabul, while the group as a whole still cooperated with al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. Unclear if TIP is playing both sides now or just rogue elements of the group worked w/ IS
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1. Latest @LongWarJournal: Here I provide more detail, background, and analysis on a recent book written by veteran al Qaeda member Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani, in which he calls for jihad in his native Sudan. Previous thread on this here:
2. Abu Hudhayfah has a long and interesting history with AQ. He first joined the organization in Sudan, followed them to Afghanistan, and later took part in a failed Bin Laden-ordered attack on a US airbase in Saudi Arabia in late 2001.
3. That plot, meant to shoot down American planes at the Prince Sultan Air Base, was overseen by Mohammed Atef and later Ibn al Shaykh al Libi and Sayf al Adl. Al Sudani was part of the team that ultimately carried out the plot, but it thankfully failed.
1. Flew under the radar but Abu Hudhayfah al-Sudani (senior AQAP leader and veteran AQ figure) released an 83 page book last week, providing guidelines and acting as a rule book for the establishment of a new unified jihadist group in #Sudan. Interesting bits summarized here:
2. Unsurprisingly, Al-Sudani frames the timing as ripe for jihad in Sudan following the 2020 constitutional agreement making the country a secular state. He argues that the mujahideen in Sudan must unite to form a "fighting vanguard" and it is up to them to fight for Shari'a
3. He spends many chapters laying out the typical ideological foundation for why jihad should be the focus in Sudan now (democracy = idolatry = bad, general corruption, abuses against Muslims, etc).
I have nothing major to add to today's great opining about the future of AQ, but I will say that it is disheartening to see this field fall into many of the same confirmation biases, groupthink, or other generalized consensus errors that happened after the death of bin Laden.
Many of the same arguments, or assessments of AQ, or its future therein, are being recycled today or being neatly repackaged as "new." But yet many of those arguments, analyses, or assessments turned out to be false - we can do better. We have to do better.
There's something to be said about how many of the arguments against Zawahiri's leadership is seemingly based off of his public videos. While for sure boring, there's a lot that happens behind the scenes we're not privy to.
1. Starting a running thread here documenting jihadist eulogies or laments now being released for Ayman al-Zawahiri:
2. Here is Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi, the emir of Jaysh al-Ummah, a pro-al Qaeda group in Gaza #Palestine. Abu Hafs wishes for Zawahiri the highest level of 'paradise.'
3. Another early one is from Abu Yusuf al-Muhojir, the leader of the Syrian branch of Katibat Imam al-Bukhari. The group also operates in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda. Muhojir asks for Zawahiri to be blessed with 'paradise' after a long life of service in jihad.
Well, one we need to define what "core AQ' even means. It has always been imprecisely defined and never took into consideration individuals who would be considered "core" but not based in AfPak (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Anas al-Libi, Khalid al-Suri, Jehad Mostafa, the Iran guys...etc)
And two, if we do take those guys into consideration, it would be clear that AQ's general command - which imo would be the "core" and not one singular nucleus in AfPak - has been geographically dispersed for quite some time. Nasir al-Wuhayshi being the GM as case in point.
That he was AQ's general manager would suggest he was also very high on the line of succession even though he was the regional emir of one its branches - and this was almost a decade ago. So the interpretation should be that this is unsurprising and is how AQ is modeled imo.
This is the first Islamic State claim against African Union troops in #Somalia since Sept. 2018 and first in #Mogadishu since Oct. 2016 - though there does not appear to be any local corroboration for an IED targeting @ATMIS_Somalia today
To put in context, the Sept. 2018 claim against Ethiopian troops allegedly took place outside of Bosaso which was more than likely false. And the Oct. 2016 claim was against an unspecified AMISOM member (though likely Ugandan given the location) which was also never corroborated
Most of IS-Somalia's operational claims are in Mogadishu, though it very rarely ever claims anything against AU forces. This is just the 6th time since April 2016 which is when IS first starting claiming operations in Somalia