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Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
@ArveloaMert
Feb 26, 2023 • 108 tweets • 56 min read • Read on X
Here is the fourth thread 🧵 on #UkraineRussianWar in the transition period of both sides offensive capacity and after the intensification of clashes and detoriation of the situation in #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
3) For the events between January to February and more issues like Wood Warfare, Riverine Warfare and etc. you can look to this thread.
4) Here is the last thread that started after the fall of Soledar and focused on types of Russian offensives, use of artillery and ammunition scarcity, Russian scarcity of armoured vehicles and on the issue of Transnistria.
5) For other threads on the Russo-Ukrainian War, you can navigate through this thread;
6) Such an important analysis on the change of Russian tactical and operational outlook. Lets analyze the impacts of this on the strategic level for #Russia and how it would influence the Command, logistics, firepower and of course Ukrainian defence.
7) Here we see a change in the Russian operational an tactic structure from BTGs to Assault Units. This signs the definitive end of the Russian aspirations for a Lightning Warfare (Blitz) type strategy that tried to defeat Ukraine without a positional warfare. Image
8) This approach was borrowed from Wagner and eyes two goals; speed (to maneuver against well-fortified 🇺🇦 positions) and persistence (continously attack and attrit these 🇺🇦 lines). It unites the micro offensives with the further operational picture.
9) The decision is tightly connected with decreased number of heavy armour and artillery which is hard to move and sustain. #Russia will try to use these kind of heavy units in operational gridlocks and in duels like happens in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.
10) It would aim to relieve the logistics efforts (which occured since the January) with dispersed, mobile and light ammunition and consumes less fuel and energy. But remember that even with this tactics Wagner, now, faces with lack ammunition.
11) With Assault Platoons, Russia try to use minimal number of dispersed men to constantly threaten the Ukrainian soldiers and create exhaustion in morale and ammunition while supporting these tactical assaults teams with indirect fire and drop-down munitions like light mortars. Image
12) This would naturally increase the loss of Russian men power and will require a new mobilization. Mobile and dispersed forces are hard to supply and would struggle in things like CASEVAC. Without proper handling these tactics would require coercion and create morale problems. Image
13) What about the new Russian C2 Structure then? Here we could wittness a changed understanding from the Soviet mentality to a more German Auftragstaktik. This means definition of political goals and leaving the military Command to plan and act autonomously to achieve this. Image
14) Russian Command, now, realize that its C2 structure, force structure, logistics and communication is fractionalized. This requires a dispersed understanding of command and action and led us to Assault Platoons. This requires four things; Image
15) 1 - A creative Mission Command that can understand the political motivation and individually act to reach it with what it have and clearly take the operational feedbacks, asses it and autonomously change the ways of operations. This commanding autonomy is really hard in 🇷🇺. Image
16) 2 - A Commander's sense on the hostile environment. Even on operational and tactic level of Command, with constrained forces, a Commander needs to have a clear intel picture from reconing, surveillance and other ways. This is also problematic in Russian military. Image
17) 3 - A vertical and horizontal communication that works. A commander should have to be in complete awareness of problems and should inform these issues to High Command. And High Command should bring neccessary resources. Commander also needs to control the missions. Image
18) 4 - A transparent assesment and dailogue between the politics, High Command and the Mission Command. If goals were set without the operational reach, success is impossible. Transparency makes micromanagement fragile and this is why Assault Platoons are hard to Command. Image
19) 🇷🇺 tried to write a C2 doctrine of Reflexive Control where 🇷🇺 military deny the enemies to achieve these 4 goals and dictate its will to them. It failed and in contrary, 🇺🇦 achieved this until now. Failed attacks on Vuhledar shows how these 4 mistakes were made concurrently. Image
20) Change to a much more dispersed command via Assault Battalions is aimed to strip up the exceptionality of Wagner and disperse the resources that directed to them. If succeed, this tactics will be a huge blow for Wagner's prestige. But for now, VDV and NI is not successful. Image
21) The rivalry and enmity between different assault platoons and with High Command and other subordinate groups like Wagner and Kadyrovites would made this problem even harder and consume the Russian men power and logistics as happened in Vuhledar.
22) Than how this decision would affect the Ukrainian strategy? Here, the decision would also require a change in Ukrainian C2 and operational/tactical replanning. Ukraine could continue to use Sun Tzu's way of attacking the strategy and search for weaknesses of the 🇷🇺 side. Image
23) As underlined earlier logistics but more likely Command and Control posts and communication channels of the Russian military is the weak spot of this strategy. Ukraine should also change its positional defence architecture which allows Russia attrit and consume resources. Image
24) The weakest point of this strategy is the rear (fire supply, recon groups and C2 group) of these Assault Platoons. Ukraine, now, focuses on the front which were against 'advance parties'. As long as the rest of platoons (rear) survive, this frontal group could be revived. Image
25) Arrival of Bradley IFVs would have a crucial impact as these vehicles are effective against both infantry and could be armed with ATGMs and superior than older Soviet armour. We can also witness an increase in the need of anti-personel equipment in Ukraine. Image
26) And here is why Ukraine needs longer range aviation and strike capacity. To attack the rear of platoons Ukraine increasingly need counter-preparation tactics. Improving intelligence and reconing/surveillance capacity is also a must for Ukraine to counter this new dynamic.
27) The relative stability of positional defence is now turning to a curse as Russia wants to exploit this via attriting this in relatively stable and concentrated battlefield. The sure way is to improve Ukrainian capabilities and Mission Command as a whole to maintain maneuver.
28) Speaking of Command, since the Soviet Union, Russia has a great problem of Officers. This problems came from two things; the first one is search for loyalty rather than competence and skill. This is one of the core reason as Kremlin wants officers...
29) ... who are in debt to the Kremlin. This seriously hamper transparency+performance assesment based micromanaging efforts within the ranks. The other issue is officer losses in #Ukraine. Loss of mid and junior level officers hamper 🇷🇺 ability even more
30) Here we should give an ear to Sun Tzu and Jomini. Both underlined that officers that are directly bounded to War Councils or Rulers have a no chance to stand against Commander's who have the room to maneuver. The Directorship and post-revolt Soviet C2 are examples of this. ImageImage
31) #Russia took a significant move to control the support and supply to ultranationalist forces and their coalition with Wagner. Via this Kremlin attempt to abolish other two tiers of Command and put the recruitment and arming process under a control.
32) The motivation is to re-establish a control of resources, supplies and ammunition dispersion. Not easy since Wagner/Ultranationalists still have a ground and simply guns. But their arbitrary Command could help High Command to retake DNR/LNR+mobilized.
33) Recruits by non-Government controlled armed groups and mercenaries (PMCs) could easily back-fire under a weak Command structure. Here is an earlier warning by both Clausewitz and Jomini on uncontrolled recruitment and arming of people.
34) We neglect to take increased attention that #Wagner take from the West. Overextension of Wagner+ultranationalist will further block any attempt to end this war in a non-military way. Wagner increasingly started to meddle social and foreign policy of 🇷🇺
wsj.com/articles/u-s-i…
35) Here, a risky reality arises if really #Russian forces moved to Northern direction towards Zaliznyans’ke, #Bakhmut increasingly turned to a pocket that costs men and equipment while made positional defence much more harder.
36) Earlier a mistake that has done by #Russia in Lyman+Kupyansk. The best position to establish a defensive line is to prevent the enemy to walk-away from this point. 🇷🇺, now, just walks away from #Bakhmut which put the resources, supplies and the value of the town under a risk.
37) Even detoriating situation, #Ukraine is planning to continue to defend #Bakhmut and transferred reinforcements to there. This could turn as one of the decisive decisions over the frontline. Both 🇺🇦 politics and Command is unified in this decision.
news.liga.net/ua/politics/ne…
38) #Ukraine achieved to restore its energy infrastructure capacity after months long Russian efforts to strike critical infrastructure with whatever it has. This success is sourced from the efforts of technicians, intl. support for know-how and generators and Air Defences.
39) If you are curious about how #Ukraine’s energy infrastructure workers and technicians kept the country under bright, here a short documentary by BBC. Infrastructure workers, railway workers, medics, police and fire fighters are real power multipliers.
40) #Russia increased its efforts around #Kupyansk. For now, they only achieved to contest Dvorichna. #Ukraine decided to evacuate civilian population from the town. The region is crucial for both its symbolism and logistical picture around #Svatove.
41) A clear sign from the Command of #Ukraine that shows #Bakhmut is still reachable and a boost for morale. Planning and coordination will increasingly be important as the conditions and logistics is under stress. SoF mission would excessively required from now on.
42) Crowdsourcing is an emerging trend and concept in war. Rise of social media and open financial system easened this. It was important as it directly establish a connection with battlefield and people. Significant for Clausewitz's passion criteria.
43) Not only for financial means and aspects, Ukraine also use crowdsourcing for documenting war crime claims, in boosting air defence's information feed and grassroot campaigning to support civilians. Russia also use similiar campaigns but it is far from the scale of Ukraine. Image
44) Crowdsourcing is important as it makes one-wayed relationship between battlefield and people to a two-wayed one which created a feed-back from people to military and Government. Some called this as 'democratization' of battlefield. It helps on tactical and strategic level. Image
45) On strategic level we could define it as 'democratization of strategy' where civilians actively participate in supply, logisitics, morale and intelligence. The political struggle side of Ho Chi Minh's People's War concept is closely related with this new concept. Image
46) For military struggle, we could also define Crowdsource Warfare, Democratized Warfare is similiar with People's War of Communist times. But it is still conducted by regular army and there is a no 'leadership cult'. So we see a division of tasks between bottom-up and top-down. Image
47) People's War or Crowdsource/Democratized Warfare is risky as over-involvement of people and their passion could hamper the chance to end a war. But this new trend could be a chance for the Western nations to reply 'people's war' concept of China.
48) After Vietnam and Gulf War, US underlined the concept of 'Info Ops' and tried to shape media language via single-pool imagery and embedded journalism. The initiative was failed in long term. Dem. Warfare could be an alternative. But it requires an upperhand in info-space. Image
49) Initial efforts to train pilots from #Ukraine for possible F-16 transfers started. For now, trainings are focuses on simulation. Pilot skill in addition to maintaining daily operations will determine the future and efficiency of transfer of aviation.
50) Concerning news from #Bakhmut. Scarcities are not surprising as frontline is wide, troops were dispersed, comms are paralyzed in town and simply it is the nature of attritional warfare. #Ukraine needs supports faster and redesign of ops in the town.
51) Here similiar complaints came from #Wagner's head Prigozhin. The Battle of #Bakhmut, now, turn to an absolute battle of luck if there would be no significant change on ground. But Ukraine is still advantegous as a nation army who has will and courage.
52) Two important developments in #Ukraine. The first is Western Allies has already supplied air-to-ground JDAM-ER guided bombs. The munition has both CAS and Anti-AD features. Just like HARMs, UAF again show a quite succesful technical adaptation process with its Soviet planes.
53) #Ukraine’s success in the use of JDAMs would be an ultimate test for both Ukrainians and for air forces around the West. Their rates of success, efficiency in CAS and AD supression will determine whether the Western coalition will need to take the risk of providing F-16s.
54) Another important dynamic is, Polish authorities claimed that the first #Patriot Defense System has already deployed to #Ukraine. Here a thread about Ukrainian AD Architecture and Patriots. Again it is an enormous speed to learn and adapt into a completely alien system.
55) Rather than A-10s, which are harder to operate in denied airspace, #Ukraine prefers F-16 fighters. The main motivation in aviation for Kyiv is to supress air defences rather than close air support. For aviation, Kyiv thinks from the perspective of strategy rather than tactics Image
56) The main goal is to target AD complexes and concentration points that could not targeted by HIMARS. But if F-16s delivered and surpress ADs, A-10s could again came under discussion as Kyiv wants to take the supply burden and job on artillery forces. Image
57) A-10s have maintainance issues and possible scarcity of spare parts. Also #Ukraine knows, even if Western allies will decide to supply aviation, they know that it will be in limited numbers. So they would probably focus on multi-role, strategic ones.
defensenews.com/air/2022/04/28…
58) #Slovakia and #Poland is preparing to go further in delivering Mig-29s to #Ukraine. The assistance could help Kyiv to replenish its air power for middle term. This decision is turned out as a neccessary one as the US transferred JDAM-ERs.
#Ukraine is creating new assault brigades which named as Offensive Guards. The move is important as it shows the force planning of Kyiv. But no hints about which equipments do these Guards will use or what their tranining program consists.
kyivindependent.com/news-feed/inte…
60) This makes us impossible to guess where these forces would be deployed. But this is good for OPSEC. We also wittness increased combined arms approach with armour and aviation. So main Ukrainian aim is to break the battlefield parity and stability since the November. Image
61) Fortificiations continue to become one of the main line discussion for a possible #Ukrainian offensive towards #Melitopol and #Kherson. Here the main criticism from some experts is attributing too much function to these fortifications to stop Ukraine.
62) But we should underline this further these fortifications are not for stopping #Ukrainian counter-offensives. Here the main goal is to slow-down maneuvres via denying enemy armour and infantry through the use of trenches, Dragon's teeth and others.
63) Underestimating the Russian fortifications is a risky thing via stating that fortifications are obsolote in modern warfare. Ukraine either use fortifications and they were proved themselves as quite efficient if organized successfuly. Soviets published a Handbook for... Image
64)... fortifications in 1946. It is important as it was prepared for Cold War. The Handbook affirms that fortifications are not for stopping the enemy counter attacks but to slow down and create some fire pockets to maximize the efficiency of artillery and reserves. Image
65) Soviet fortifications have built upon three distinctive lines. I am not sure that whether Russian military also use the same system as its manpower capacity is nowhere near to the USSR. The main line which consists professional soldiers, the second and rear zones of reserves. Image
66) These fortifications consists of trenches, machine gun positions, personnel positions, supply positions and weapon emplacements. These factors were seemed as quite solid but it significantly constrain the offensive man and equipment power. Fortifications sacrifices mobility. Image
67) Classical theory of Clausewitz underline two important conditions for fortifications; 1) they should be short and well-protected, 2) they should be placed near a natural barrier. But Russian fortifications are long and in Dombass lacks natural barriers. In these conditions... Image
68) ... Clausewitz warns that fortifications would have fragile points since defending party would not have enough men to support all of them. Than how the offensive side could by-pass these fortifications?
First condition is fire power. Combined fire power of air, artillery... Image
69) and infantry would significantly reduce possible losses. Second condition is supplies and logistics. The territory behind these lines would be completely enemy lines with limited entrances. So healthy logistics is hard but essential for sustaining operations. Image
70) Third condition is equipment. Assaulting side should have neccessary mine-clearing, dragon teeth cleaner equipments. The fourth condition is ISTAR. As Russian fortifications are long, it naturally have weak points. Intel picture for these weaknesses are essential for success. Image
71) But Ukraine should be aware that some of the gaps in fortifications could be sham. Soviet fortification doctrine underlines that Soviets should leave some gaps for enemy to exploit where later they can concentrate their fire from the nearby fortifications. Image
72) After completing these conditions, the fifth condition is speed and shock. Once assaulting side break a fortified line continous saturation attacks are crucial to sustain the advance and clear mines to provide a way of breach to the following infantry and light armour. Image
73) So #Ukraine, as #Russia's main focus is now on Dombass and region lacks huge natural barriers, Kyiv could expect that those positions would be packed with personel and euipment. While Melitopol and Kherson would have less soldiers and more reserves since it is protected by... Image
74) Dnipro River. Here #Ukraine has an opportunity but combined arms and logistics would be the determinant factor. Ukraine should gain a serious foothold accross the river to organize vulnerable logistic lines while countering Russian firepower. And finally on the Ukrainian... Image
75) equipment. Does Kyiv have neccessary engineering equipment and armour to continue this? Answer is a limited yes. #Ukraine has neccessary anti-anti-armour clearing and mine clearing equipment for concentrated use in a single theatre of offensive. 🇺🇦 needs to achieve dispersed, Image
76) concentric counterattacks. So constant+careful planning and C3 could help 🇺🇦 to easily overcome fortifications in Melitopol or Kherson with paralyzing 🇷🇺 logistics and could disperse the pressure on #Bakhmut. But without this fortifications are STILL important to work on. Image
77) Combined with wood and fortifications, #Russian forces achieved to hold in #Kreminna for now. This shows that fortifications are serving as obstacles and the importance of the #Ukrainian need for neccessary equipment and combined arms to advance further. Image
78) After #Russia’s MoD stopped #Wagner’s mercenary enlistment from prison inmates, the PMC started to recruit from ordinary Russians in malls and high schools. This is really shocking and dangerous for Kremlin as it never faced that kind of challenge of political mobilization.
79) Both sides use the wood around #Kreminna quite efficiently to defend their positions. Quite surprised by Russian performance at there. More reliance to infantry, less use of armour due to mud and fortified positions made quite stable lines for both sides.
80) #Ukraine has seemed as quite disadvantaged in #Kreminna as #Russia has the town and roads as its rear. While 🇺🇦 holds rural part. Until now, 🇺🇦 used its professional training and equipment advantage to hold the lines. But it is not enough to deliver an positive-aimed result.
81) An escalatory move by #Russia. I am quite curious about what the US will do in response. By the way an American P-8 is flying around Romanian coast probably looking for Russian submarines.
82) #US defined Russian harassment of the Reaper as deliberate and unprofessional but downing of it as accidental. So it is unlikely for Washington to take retaliatory move other than diplomatic protest. The UAV was in ISTAR mission and recovery operation is not on-going yet. Image
83) This one of the most intense footage from the war that shows how hard is fighting in wood. The importance of reconing, hardships with vision, men power, Commander's creativity and coordination&communication. A live lesson of wood warfare.
84) If you want a quick refresh of thoughts about wood warfare, you can visit the previous thread. #Ukraine is mostly a country with plains but Dombass has small but frequent wood coverage from Svatove to Kreminna to North of the Bakhmut.
85) The thread is less active for last days. There are little changes in both strategy and situation. #Russia concentrates its attacks towards #Avdiivka and #Bakhmut. 🇺🇦 reinforcements are showing heroism but situation is still hard. 🇷🇺 feels ammunition and manpower burden. Image
86) #Kreminna is stable despite experiencing intense clashes. 🇷🇺 move in #Kupyansk faces dramatic shortages of man+capacity. 🇷🇺 Offensives were costly despite little gains and shows that 🇷🇺 is not ready. This lingers the problem vs possible 🇺🇦 counter-off.
87) A special emphasis on #Vuhledar as #Ukraine effectively use anti-armour mines (RAAMs). 🇺🇦 effectively used mines to deny 🇷🇺assault units in assault and withdrawal. 🇺🇦 use vision, comm and coordination problems which excarbated by the search of speed.
88) But also for #Ukraine ammunition and man power is continue to be a risk for future operations. Kyiv does its best in producing old-Soviet era equipment but NATO Allies needs a serious plan for sustainable production and force conversation.
reuters.com/world/europe/u…
89) Fortifications are accepted as static and strategic in their nature. Power of current fortifications were came from countermobility ‘tactics’. It is one of the main pillars that NATO and the US Army builds-upon. Defence of Vuhledar is an ultimate lesson for this. Image
90) Symbolically significant move by International Criminal Court. The move did not legally binding for all countries but it significantly curtails any future visit of President Putin to Western states. More decisions about others could follow this as reportings would increase.
91) #Ukraine shifted to an extensive use of precision guided firepower (combined) with better coordination and reconnaissance against 🇷🇺 forces. This significantly denied 🇷🇺 movement and counter-battery efforts. But the move requires excessive ammunition.
nv.ua/amp/raskryta-t…
92) #Ukraine could mitigate the problem of maintanance and pilotage in F-16s via use of volunteer personel. Numbers are not clear but this will speed-up the process. Pilotage would be the problem since there are less pilots and 🇺🇦 airspace is different from any 21st Century war.
93) The main requirement would be a double-way learning where volunteer airmen will learn indigenious conditions while 🇺🇦 airmen learns systems. This is not a problem for 🇺🇦 as both foreign legions and 🇺🇦 forces in abroad trainings shows that 🇺🇦 forces are highly adaptable. Image
94) Modern warfare brought us many unanticipated problems. For example, soldiers increasingly relies upon the use of mobile phones and tablets for reconing, targeting and communication. These requires extensive use of powerbanks and phone batteries which increase the WIA numbers. Image
95) Concerning reports from #Avdiivka. The town is another strongpoint of positional defence with #Bakhmut. It is still unsure whether this is a 🇷🇺 move to test possible vulnerabilities or a breach. #Ukraine needs to defend this position as it would not want to have 2nd Bakhmut.
96) #Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrived to Moscow to meet with President Putin. We need to follow this trip in focus so it may require another thread. I don’t expect any announcement about lethal assistance but surely it would be discussed. Image
97) 65 #Ukrainian soldiers mastered the US #Patriot ADs earlier than expected since these men have excessive knowledge of how air defence systems work. Another important issue is those 65 men consist engineers which fastened the technical process.
98) There is a demand from American Senators to give cluster munitions to #Ukraine. As #Russia use cluster munitions against urban centres, giving it to Kyiv could be justified since neither US nor Ukraine is a signatory in banning these kind of munitions.
99) I am quite pessimistic about possible transfer of cluster munitions by the US to Ukraine since it could took objections from the world. As 110 states, including the allies of the US and Ukraine, is a signatory in this treaty.
un.org/disarmament/co…
100) CMs frequently fails to detonate so they become a risk for civilians after the war. It increase the infliction of uneccessary harm to human life. But strategically CMs could help Ukraine to curtail Russian mobility since CMs are highly inflammatory.
101) CMs are hard to defend against and has an impact over wider area. Soldiers has to be trapped inside concrete buildings. It not only harms the soldiers but also cars and SUVs. But of course its impact on environment is beyond of its strategic utility. So it is highly unlikely Image
102) Here an interesting information about why cluster munitions were banned. You can see an area from Laos where was bombed during the Vietnam War. All red dots shows the number of unexploded munitions that was found in 2015 which is a hazard for human life. Source:CM Convention Image
103) But here I don’t want to deceive you. In military there is another approach which is consequentionalism which empowers officers and strategy makers to act in ‘proportionality’ which is highly a relative and interpretive concept. Cluster Munitions remains as gray zone weapon. Image
104) Another example is land mines. It is forbidden to use land mines without marking them (in some cases even transfering them). Again many US allies were signatory for this but it didn’t prevent the use and transfer of them by both sides. Here Clausewitz argues that... Image
105) ... if one side exceed the ethical limits, it would have an advantage over the other side. The main focus is on Commander who has a goal to protect his men and reach to the goal: victory. This is the concept of consequentianalism and problematic ethics of responsibility. Image
106) #UK added positional defence and trench warfare to its training program that was offered to reserve forces of #Ukraine. Compared with #Russia, Ukrainian soldiers take a long and diverse training opportunity which could make difference.
107) #Ukraine achieved to create a fire-control in #Bakhmut especially in the vicinity of Yahidne and Ivanivske where crucial GLOCs located. Given the depleted 🇷🇺 equipment and men this is a significant opportunity for Ukraine. But situation is still hard.

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More from @ArveloaMert

Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Sep 17
It's worth reading this impressive initial report from the Financial Times. It is linked to Israel and is quite significant in terms of offensive cyber operations. Lets analyze, #Israel's large scale cyber operation against #Hezbollah in #Lebanon.
ft.com/content/dbaac6…
1) Firstly, the attack was designed to cause real damage using cyber/virtual tools vs a strategically important network (communication infrastructure). It was carried out in a very organized manner, but it is also stated that the attack was not heavily based on 'remote intrusion'
2) Another observation is based on the fact that the batteries of pagers are unlikely to cause this level of injury. Lithium-ion batteries are dangerous and flammable, but the condition of the injured suggests the possibility that the batteries were designed to be more explosive.
Read 15 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Oct 21, 2023
Lets start the twelfth and the newest thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that will cover fall offensives. #Avdiivka #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Robotyne #UkraineWar #Kherson #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Berdyansk #Verbove #Novoprokopivka #Tokmak Image
1) Here is the previous thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that includes issues like information warfare, Allied trainings for Ukraine, situation in #Avdiivka offensive and #Kherson counter offensive, Zaporizhzhia and modern day fortified wars and other issues.
2) Lets talk about #Russia’s losses of officers in #Ukraine. Russian Military lost unbelieavable number of 3000 officers in Ukraine from different ranks. However, the lion share the losses were concentrated on junior officers like Lieutenants and Majors. This group is important.
Read 109 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Aug 23, 2023
Lets start our tenth and the newest thread on the strategy of Russo-Ukrainian War which will cover operations during the late August and early fall. #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson Image
12) Few words on #Tokmak. We have to carefully asses the claims that state #Russia’s defences in the town is in the brink of imminent collapse. The town is one of the #Ukraine’s critical operational goals with Melitopol. Its South has key railroad link that makes the land bridge. Image
12) #Tokmak is heavily fortified town which increasingly become a target of #Ukraine’s long range strikes. But still the town is main position for #Russia to hold-on. Leaving Tokmak without a fight is highly irrational for 🇷🇺 as it would not only risk the theatre but entire war. Image
Read 92 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jul 15, 2023
Here is the ninth and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Zapoizhzhia #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) Mistrust increasingly become visible after the #Wagner's mutiny within the Russian Command. After General Surovikin (who is the most senior officer that disappeared), Major Generals Popov and Vladimir Selivestrov were dismissed from their duties.
Read 45 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jun 19, 2023
Here is the eight and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Zaporizhzhia #Ukraine #Bakhmut #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
13) The Attacker could use firepower to prevent this laying process. But just like the first aspect, defenders could increase their fire power which would decrease the operational pace. Russian decision to relocate troops from Kherson and further risking of air power shows this. Image
14) But different from what Malthus claimed, just like population all this laying and firepower increase process has a limit of production, resupply and logistics. In long run with long-range strikes #Ukraine could balance this rate if they can achieve to protect their equipment. Image
Read 97 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
May 28, 2023
Here is the seventh thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early summer. Russia took the control of #Bakhmut while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) British MoD underlined that, as planned, #Wagner is now withdrawing from the center of #Bakhmut. The defence of the town will be transferred to so-called DNR forces combined with VDV units. This shows that Wagner will not be in defensive efforts.
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