Thread by @SecDetective

The more time I spend thinking about it, the more confident I become in positing that a worthwhile and consistent code of morality can be reduced to principles of rights (or freedoms), and corresponding responsibilities to refrain from infringing the rights of others.

This is no original notion. It was put best by John Stuart Mill in ‘On Liberty’ thus:

“the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”

While rights may seem arbitrary at first glance. Their validity relies on whether they stand on principle with no possibility of being logically demonstrated to descend into a reductio ad absurdum.

I say that such principles apply without blemish to the issue of free expression.

There are two rights which are inextricably linked to the issue of free expression: (1) that to be free to ignore any speech which one chooses to, and (2) that to be free from assault. (I will expand on the definition of “assault” shortly.)

The first right speaks to a beautiful (almost mathematical) symmetry at play. The notion of freedom of speech is meaningless without a corresponding freedom to ignore.

The key feature of the speech under scrutiny here is its means or mechanism.

There are some mechanisms of speech which, in certain circumstances, render the freedom to exercise one’s right to ignore quite impossible.

A preacher on a moving train carriage, for instance, knows that his audience’s attention is gained by dint of not being able to leave.

I believe that this infringement is the principle behind what we call “harassment”.

A victim of harassment is so because their freedom to ignore the speech (text messages, calls, letters etc.) is being infringed by their harasser. This ties in well with a freedom to privacy.

The other right—to freedom from assault—can be infringed by speech when it’s content (not the mechanism this time) constitutes a threat of violence.

Here I’m using the legal definition of a (common) assault, which effectively communicates the principle.

The Criminal Justice Act 1988 holds that “An assault is committed when a person intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend the immediate infliction of unlawful force.”

Though this can be in the form of words alone, such speech infringes this right.

Notice that this principle also deals with untrue threats such as bomb hoaxes. Such communications clearly infringe the viable right of others to live free from threats of violence.

I submit that neither of these rights can be reduced to a reductio ad absurdum.

In ‘Trigger Warning’ Mick Hume goes to great lengths to explain his line between “speech” (which must be free) and “action” (which may be rightfully curtailed).

I submit that speech becomes action when its mechanism or content infringe the rights explained above.

And I submit that when speech crosses no such line—when it remains mere “speech”—that there is no justification for either state interference or private curtailment through violence (the application or threat of force).

The expression of an opinion, however unsavoury, will never constitute violence or “action”.

If offended, we may instead invoke our corresponding right to ignore whatever speech we wish, and even persuade others to do the same with theirs.

But that is all we may rightfully do.

We may not insist that the state protect us against offensive opinions, as such a right would descend rather obviously into a reductio ad absurdum.

If one offensive opinion can be outlawed, why not all?

I would trust no one, least of all the state, to be such an arbiter.

We may not use our own means of violence to curtail offensive opinions, as again such a right descends quite blatantly.

If one offensive opinion can be suppressed through violence, why no all?

We may not assume vicarious offence on behalf of others. Such things are personal.

I worry that we are opening a door that once breached, will be very difficult to close.

Free speech is perhaps the most precious of rights. Our history is a comedy of errors, and it would serve us all well to protect our only means of error-correction for our posterity.

We must speak without equivocation on these issues, as the soft intellect of conflation between terms such as “speech”, “rights” and “violence” draws poorly-define lines which make us fearful of approaching the blur.

Such conflations are a great hindrance on this front.

And this front—this hill, is in my submission, the one to die on.

While I’ve advanced ethical positions on a range of subjects, I’m never as confident that I’m on the right side of the debate than here, in the meta-ethical defence of the system by which others can be decided.