The #GTD2017 data is out! Some big-picture takeaways from @START_UMD's overview of the data: start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD…
1. Even though the overall number of terrorist attacks globally seems to be declining, this has to be considered in context. Annual terrorist violence prior to 9/11 was less than one-third of what it is now.
(We might chalk some of this up to better data collection post-2012, but a trend of this magnitude is not a methodological artifact.)
2. A decline in terrorist violence doesn't necessarily mean a decline in *violence*. Terrorist attacks are down in Yemen, for example, but the civil war there is raging. Decrease in terrorism =/= security and stability.
3. The geographic distribution of attacks sheds light on another aspect of ostensible decreases in terrorist violence—namely, decreases in activity by one group vs. another. It's misleading to talk about Boko Haram's decrease in attacks w/out considering IS–West Africa.
3a. (And it's misleading to talk about a decrease in BH attacks without also considering Cameroon, where BH was extremely active in 2017. Shifting activities out of Nigeria doesn't mean the group has been defeated.)
4. The most significant takeaway, in my mind, is that singling out any one organization or type of violence, noting its decrease, and declaring a defeat of any sort is meaningless without considering the larger patterns of violence at play.
5. Lastly, ICYMI (I did): terrorism in Nepal increased *474%* in 2017. This pattern isn't uncommon surrounding South Asian elections. Still, Nepali election violence appears more targeted at opposition candidates than civilian/municipal targets (as in Bangladesh).
