Law Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad has claimed that the order for 126 Rafale MMRCA could not be concluded because the Congress-led UPA was looking for bribes. But the order was only canceled by the present NDA government more than a year after coming to power.
Going by what Mr. Prasad has said, it stands to reason that the current government could have fixed the problems with the 126 MMRCA and brought it back on track, if the reason why it was stalled was a demand for bribes by the previous government.
In the first tweet, by order was canceled, I mean the tender was scrapped (by the NDA government).
Further, if there were demands for bribes at any point of time, shouldn’t they be investigated?
Also there appears to be some confusion. The Reliance that has originally concluded an arrangement with Dassault was Reliance India Limited. The Reliance that has become an offset partner for the 36 Rafale order is Reliance ADAG.
Neither of the Reliance cos had an experience to speak of in the defence sector at the time, although Reliance ADAG did acquire the Pipavav shipyard.
As it turned out, that does not appear to have worked out well.
Mr. Prasad also appears to have a misunderstanding about offsets. It does not mean some Rafale aircraft will be built in France and some in India. It means that 50 percent of the money paid for the order will be ploughed back by the Rafale vendors into work/capital in India.
This does not mean any part of the aircraft will be built in India. In fact Mr. Prasad correctly says all 36 aircraft will be delivered to India fully built.
All this aside, Dassault does have some explaining to do. The defence minister recently stated that the company had said the price would escalate if 108 of the aircraft were licence produced in India by HAL, as required by the terms of the tender/RFP.
Why would it escalate? Their commercial bid was supposed to be comprehensive on the price. Was it, perhaps, incomplete?
According to a recent story by @manupubby, the defence ministry conducted a review and found that if the 108 Rafale aircraft were indeed required to be licence produced in India, the Rafale bid would@no longer be the lowest bid. m.economictimes.com/news/defence/r…
This, alone, should be have given any government pause. Although we do not know the precise reason why former defence minister AK Antony ordered a review of the Rafale selection in July 2012, as Mr. Prasad has mentioned, perhaps it might not have been an altogether bad idea.
And given that the NDA came to power a couple of years after the review was ordered, it could be safely assumed that they were fully versed with any findings of such review (which, so far, have not been released).
It could also be further safely assumed that the findings of such a review played a part in the decision to withdraw the Indian Air Force tender for 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft, after announcing a request for 36 Rafales on an urgent basis.
Three decisions were obviously made at the time. 1. The size of the order would be reduced from 126 to 36. 2. All the aircraft would be bought off the shelf. 3. The defence ministry would stick with the Rafale.
The second point is likely the easiest to explain. There could be no reasonable business case for the licence production of any part or whole of a mere 36 fighters in India. It would also, certainly, be much quicker to acquire them from the original manufacturer.
But what was the rationale for the reduction in the number of aircraft to be acquired? It has been suggested that it might have been because there were insufficient funds available for the purchase at the time.
This may well be true. The defence budget has been subject to criticism for being insufficient for new capital acquisitions, lately.
But surely the proposed expenditure was in not a sudden shock of any kind? As Mr. Prasad has pointed out, the case for the acquisition of 126 new fighters was moved 14 years prior to the withdrawal of the MMRCA tender, in 2001.
The price tag for 126 fighters couldn’t possibly have come as a surprise, could it? Alright, say circumstances at the time simply did not permit that kind of expenditure. There could have been ways to take a decision at a better time. Six months later, perhaps a year or two?
There would have been nothing new about this. Examine, for instance, the time taken by the Indian government to finally scrap a proposed order for Multi Role Helicopters for the Indian Navy.
India is the origin of the practice of Yoga and meditation. It has also taught the world these two disciplines. It also teaches all comers, patience.
It would not have been inconceivable. But there was also an urgent requirement for new fighter aircraft. This is true. But the thing is, there continues to be an urgent requirement. The order for 36 Rafales has not solved the problem.
Something, anything is better than nothing. It’s a drop in the bucket, though, and nowhere close to existing and upcoming requirements. It does serve to service the impression that something is being done about the problem, but it seems to have created other, different problems.
Did anyone consider 126 off the shelf, straight from France? They would have been cheaper than building most of them in India. Around 2.7 times cheaper, it seems.
But it would have been untenable to drop the idea of Make in India completely, one supposes. So 126 would have been too much.
Theek theek laga lo. Two squadrons is about right, from that angle. Not operationally. But 36 was digestible, for now. So, 36.
It could have been better for the French, but not by much. This also rid off all those dreaded problems of setting up a line in India, sorting out supply chain and, goodness! Guarantee the bloody aircraft.
Throughout the MMRCA process, representatives from every single competitor have asked me with dread, “What if we win?” So, understandable.
But that is neither here nor there. If the terms require it, you have to abide by them, or don’t come to play.
And so most of them did. They put their game face on and put in the time to submit stacks and stack of documents with every conceivable head of expenditure to make sure they submitted a complete bid.
Still, it seems the French bid was not complete, as I’ve mentioned earlier. If Rafales had to be produced in India, then by golly, they would never have been the lowest bid, as has also been established.
Luckily for them, they received an order for a number of aircraft that would have been untenable to produce under licence in India. Damn. That worked out.
This kinda explains how the number went from 126 to 36, but doesn’t explain how the government of India seems to have allowed itself to get played. None of the above is, or has ever been, classified information.
So if I know this, we can bet our Saturday night Dominos that the government of India knew this.
It got real yesterday. First reporting abroad, that all was not well. It’s what made Bofors a household name in India. AgustaWestland ne toh naam hi badal diya.
I have wondered about this. Why Rafale? Even if the first two decisions are adequately explained, it still doesn’t rationalise the decision to continue to consider the Rafale and only the Rafale, even if it was 36 for two sqns.
The justification given for this by the defence ministry is that: A. The IAF had qualified the Rafale B. The process was over and once the Rafale has been selected the lowest bid (L1), no backsies
Both of these assertions are correct, but selective and incomplete.
The IAF technically qualified not only the Rafale, but also the Eurofighter Typhoon. The only way the Rafale could possibly have won the MMRCA was if only the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon were shortlisted by the IAF, and no other aircraft.
Damn. That was lucky. But this is a story for another day.
The defence ministry also attempting to ignore the statement of Prime Minister Modi, when he said this was part of a process that was separate from the MMRCA tender process, during his announcement of the request for an order on an urgent basis.
The 36 Rafale order was not tied to the MMRCA tender process, except, it seems, when convenient. There was nothing to prevent the government of India from telling the Eurofighter guys to come back with a quote for 36 flyaway in a couple of days.
The Eurofighter Typhoon people had already been in touch to lower their quote for the MMRCA. They would have taken the call. And if nothing else, competition always stimulates the discovery of the lowest possible price.
Even if the IAF had its heart set on the Rafale, it couldn’t have hurt the effort to try and get a better price. Negotiating with the French was hard.
In 2016, I had the opportunity to attend the Shangri La Dialogue defence ministers/service chiefs conference in Singapore. Then defence minister Manohar Parrikar was conspicuous by his presence. An Indian defence minister had only attended the Shangri La Dialoge once before.
(That was AK Antony some years back) As a hopefully good and cussed reporter, I chase him across the lobby of the hotel as he went from one meeting to the other, all day, for two days. He wouldn’t say anything.
His last meeting on his last day was with Jean-Yves Le Drian, known as the best arms salesman to come out of France. Also defence minister.
I stood outside and waited. The two were meeting alone. Not a single aide with them. They were all outside, waiting with me. There was not much speculation as to what was being discussed between the two.
It couldn’t have been anything but an attempt at compromise on the price of the sweet 36. 30 minutes. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar comes out. I stop being lazy and throw a question at him: “Sir, how were the discussions?”
He turned and replied, “Kyun peechey padhey ho.”
Negotiating with the French is tough. They’re always frenching around.
It would, perhaps, have helped to let the French know they had a competitor. But the government of India had already decided. And, it seems, made it clear to them.
Again, why was the Indian government so fixated on the Rafale? Could it have been the oooh-wait-for-it ‘India-specific enhancements’?
Yep, those are pretty good. Neat. The thing is, some of the other aircraft already had some of those things, standard.
It’s like going to buy a car. You have few models in front of you. You pick the one without the built-in music system, speakers and GPS. And then, after buying it, you say, “Mujhe ismey music system, speakers aur GPS lagwana hai.”
‘India-specific enhancements’. The were mostly present in the MMRCA tender requirements, as well. That’s why we say all kinds of new branding for fighters. F-16IN, Gripen IN, F/A-18IN - even the Rafale has something like that.
They all decided to brand the configurations of their respective aircraft (with the India-specific enhancements), differently.
So please, can we please hold off on the excitement over the Indian Rafale being the most advanced Rafale ever and that even the French Air Force doesn’t have it? It’s like saying the iPhone XS/XR are the most advanced iPhones ever. 🙄
And guess what? Even if the French Air Force doesn’t have it, they can get it if they want. See, somebody else is paying for it. Good gig if you can get it, huh.
Does the IAF desperately need new fighters? Yep. Are these new fighters? Yep. Is this a solution? Hell, no. India is purchasing half a pair of shoes (really good shoes - with India-specific enhancements). If you know what I mean.
Karoge kya.
You know this would not have been so much trouble, but for one thing. Again, there is some context here. Allow me to explain.
Everytime there was some kind of bilateral visit before this government, the MoD spokie and/or the MEA spokie would be asked, “Any chance of an order being announced?” Reporters would be scolded and chasitised: “This is a bilateral state visit. We are not shopping in a bazaar.”
It turned out different in April 2015. And the major reason the prime minister is the target of criticism, today, over this order for 36 Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft, is because he chose to make a surprise announcement about it and irreversibly associated himself with it.
A chief minister of a state is possible the most powerful person in India. But the prime minister has to answer to a lot more people. This is how the system is. Perhaps the difference was not apparent, at the time.
So what does Hollande’s thing do? For the first time, the allegations of the opposition/Congress (so far based on circumstantial instances and theories) received a foundation.
With later reportage, some can claim that Hollande was misquoted or has done a U-turn (he hasn’t, as far as the AFP report is concerned), but it doesn’t appear that away and it’s far too convenient. This is not going away anytime soon.
The thing is that irrespective of the outcome of this mess, the IAF has another tender to run. Still need new fighters. Many more.
So we have a farcical situation. Not only do we have the MMRCA 6 in the fray, we also have a seventh fighter throwing their hat in the ring.
One would have imagined that after the 2001-2015 process would have given the IAF and the defence ministry clarity on what they wanted in a fighter aircraft. One would be wrong.
There is little doubt to me that much of the blame for this mess falls on the IAF. Hopefully they can run the next one better.
Yeah, fin.
