1.1/ Few thoughts on on-chain governance:
Ability to update state via on-chain governance bypassing the state-transition function is super dangerous and invalidates the core idea behind smart contracts.
Yet it is necessary since things like TheDAO will be happening.
Ability to update state via on-chain governance bypassing the state-transition function is super dangerous and invalidates the core idea behind smart contracts.
Yet it is necessary since things like TheDAO will be happening.
1.2/
The reasonable solution is to have a flag in smart contracts indicating whether their state can be tampered with via on-chain governance.
This is not my idea, @timothanke suggested it for DFinity couple years back (medium.com/dfinity/the-df…, search for "Omnipotence")
The reasonable solution is to have a flag in smart contracts indicating whether their state can be tampered with via on-chain governance.
This is not my idea, @timothanke suggested it for DFinity couple years back (medium.com/dfinity/the-df…, search for "Omnipotence")
1.3/ @dominic_w argues that it doesn't solve the problem since the client code can be changed through on-chain governance to have a hardcoded state transition anyway (like, again, TheDAO).
I disagree with @dominic_w, the increased complexity will make it significantly more rare.
I disagree with @dominic_w, the increased complexity will make it significantly more rare.
1.4/ Moreover, the sheer presence of the "do not temper" flag is sufficient reason to advocate against the hard fork shall any bug be exploited, since contract users were aware of the flag and assumed the risk.
2.1/ Storing the runtime on-chain (@polkadotnetwork-style) is a major vulnerability. Any minor bug in block processing opens up opportunities for custom code execution exploits.
#bitcoin's approach with voting on-chain, but distributing code off-chain appears to be safer choice.
#bitcoin's approach with voting on-chain, but distributing code off-chain appears to be safer choice.
3.1/ Liquid democracy (and @dfinity nervous system) is inherently vulnerable to few people being in control of major decisions. Those people trying to stay anonymous is unlikely to help, for most of them it is obvious that they have a high weight.
3.2/ In a hypothetical liquid democracy corrupting few @VitalikButerin's of the World would be sufficient to pass any change.
Even without liquid democracy such popular figures would be able to sway voters towards a particular decision via social media.
Even without liquid democracy such popular figures would be able to sway voters towards a particular decision via social media.
3.3/ Which is yet another argument against an ability to temper with the state of all smart contracts via on-chain governance.
4.1/ Overall, the only way to see how it all works is to try in practice, so excited to see how @tezos evolves, and looking forward to @polkadotnetwork and @dfinity launch to see on-chain governance in the wild.
