Not sure I agree, but @shifrinson raises an important question. Here are a few thoughts.
The implicit assumption here is that the US has done provocative things and China has done proactive things, therefore there's a spiral. But isn't this view missing something? 1/
The implicit assumption here is that the US has done provocative things and China has done proactive things, therefore there's a spiral. But isn't this view missing something? 1/
A spiral presumes not only actions but intentions and reasoning. For a spiral to exist, one side's provocations must be the reason the other side acts provocatively, and on it goes iteratively. 2/
Establishing a spiral requires getting at China's intentions and perceptions - that is, knowing why Beijing does certain things and how it sees certain things - and that is hard to do without access to authoritative Mandarin-language Party sources. 3/
I try to do this in my dissertation, part of which argues that China's post-2008 assertiveness began during a *conciliatory* phase of US policy. Available CCP docs suggest the cause of PRC assertiveness was a changing perception of intl structure & US power. 4/
Admittedly, the shift in US policy in the early Obama administration from reassurance towards something modestly more competitive may have been in response to China's assertiveness. So that creates half the spiral... 5/
But in my view the other half is missing. Much of China's continued assertiveness is -- at least in my parsing of texts -- not in reaction to US "provocation" but propelled by the idea that the structure has changed, America has weakened, and old grievances must be addressed. 6/
In other words, what we are seeing is not a simple reaction to the US but a fundamentally different grand strategy based on different assumptions about the world and a desire for a sphere of influence. That desire is entirely unsurprising but also very problematic. 7/
Fast forward to today. Is China's assertiveness in the SCS, on Taiwan, its doubling-down on SOEs, its protectionism, its repression in Xinjiang, its close intercepts, econ coercion, all in response to the US? Is it because the US is perceived as provocative? Probably not. 8/
It is instead because the PRC is pursuing something that the United States cannot easily accept. Call it hierarchy, order, hegemony, or a sphere of influence in Asia. This eventually provoked a reaction that is changing US China policy. 9/
But this whole debate really began over "who is to blame" for the downturn.
I suppose if you think the US should concede to a PRC sphere of influence, you could blame the US.
If you think, as I do, that PRC assertiveness provoked the downturn, you fault Beijing. 10/
I suppose if you think the US should concede to a PRC sphere of influence, you could blame the US.
If you think, as I do, that PRC assertiveness provoked the downturn, you fault Beijing. 10/
But at least for now, I'm not sure we're seeing a spiral. One side is reacting to the other; the other side is pursuing a more fixed strategy based on its perception of structure.
Admittedly, that could change. 11/
Admittedly, that could change. 11/
cc @jacobstokes @ZacharyKeck @shifrinson who've already had a really great back-and-forth over these issues
