Thread by @Jesse_Norman

A thread on the constitutional and political implications of recent events 0/

One of the striking things about Brexit has been that so far it has been debated, however rancorously, through the medium of normal politics. Yes, the EU referendum in 2016 was unusual, but it was hardly a constitutional innovation. 1/

Tempers have run high, there have been all kinds of argy-bargy in the House of Commons, but the British constitution—the political “rules of the game”—has broadly held. 2/

All that changed last week. The question is, what does it mean?
First, it’s important to be clear again why the Speaker’s decision to accept the Grieve amendment really matters. 3/

The Speaker’s authority derives from his position as the elected nominee of MPs, his adherence to expert legal advice, and his neutrality. None of these was in play here: he acted on his own personal authority, against expert advice, and apparently not in a neutral way. 4/

Some people, e.g. @davidallengreen have said in effect “There has been a lot of constitutional skulduggery on all sides so far. So what?” This argument does not work. 5/

Yes, party politics can fray the understandings and trust that underlie the British constitution. But changes on personal authority by a Speaker to the rules of procedure of the House of Commons strike directly at its heart. 6/

It’s also said that this was a democratic act. But in many ways it was the opposite. It overturned the agreed rules of Parliament without notice, without previous deliberation and apparently without reflection on the precedent created, or its potential effects. 7/

It also undermined the status of the Clerks. Why should any MP or Government seek a ruling from them as to the correct legal procedure now, when the Speaker may simply decide to change the rules? 8/

Indeed, to put the issue at its most philosophical, what IS correct legal procedure, if the Speaker is making decisions as he alone sees fit? 9/

If, as media reports have now suggested, moves are under way to remove the (qualified) precedence of Government business in the House of Commons under Standing Order 14(1), that will be certainly ill-judged and potentially anti-democratic. 10/

There is a case to reform SO 14(1), of course; one advanced e.g. by the Wright Committee in 2010. But to change the rule in the heat of parliamentary battle would be the height of foolishness? With what preparation? With what consultation? For what? 11/

No alternative has been recently considered, and there might be no majority now for an alternative to SO 14(1). The result would be complete confusion, and a huge further increase in the discretionary powers of the Speaker. 12/

People have voted in general elections for more than a century on the basis that the elected Government of the day has the democratic right to put its business, including manifesto commitments, to the Commons ahead of other petitioners. These changes could destroy that. 13/

More deeply, since 1688 the great achievement of British politics has arguably been in its movement towards what David Hume described as “a government of laws, not of men”. 14/

Our constitution has evolved a unique combination of flexibility and authority, which has been widely envied and imitated. In general, contrary to various reports, it still works remarkably well. These actions would put that achievement at risk. 15/

And the central point of the British constitution is to allow the passions of politics, referenda or no, to be channeled through Parliament. Parliament may or may not do a good job, from time to time. But people undermine it at their peril. And, of course, all of ours. 16/16