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Mini-thread: India's decision tree in responding to #PulwamaAttack is complex. The scale of the attack could demand more than the 2016 "surgical strikes" following the terrorist attack on Uri. But more substantial action against Pakistan risks escalation.
Strike in LOC or in Punjab? Against JeM or "facilitators" linked to Pakistani state? Covert or SOF ground ops? Standoff air strikes or missiles? These choices invoke a range of downstream effects, which @PerkovichG and I explored in this @TWQgw article. carnegieendowment.org/2015/05/22/mod…
Having experienced the mood in Delhi in September 2016, which we wrote about for Herald magazine, the media volume will go to 11 and the demand for retribution will be extra high given coming elections. Decisionmakers should turn off their TVs. carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/24/is-…
The temptation for a visible response with PR effects will be hard for the Indin govt to ignore. Wise Indian leaders in the past (including Modi prior to the Uri attack) have tried to manage the problem, rather than "restore" deterrence with a big counter-strike.
Some Indian (and other) analysts, citing Israeli operations against Hamas and Hezbollah, have argued instead for a "mowing the grass" strategy. This, too, is not without risk, and the Israeli experience also shows that long-term effects can be worse.
Ultimately, violent actions/responses beget more violence. The results will be terrible for Indians, terrible for Pakistanis, and terrible for Kashmiris. There simply are no silver bullet military solutions - see our book, Not War, Not Peace? [End] carnegieendowment.org/2016/08/25/not…
