Thread by @StevePeers

1/ As promised, here's an overview of the appointment process and policy platform of the 13th Commission President.

(Not counting the non-canon ones like the pre-merger treaty ECSC and Euratom presidents, or the War President, who filled in between the 9th and 10th presidents)

2/ How are Commission presidents appointed?

Traditionally in the same way as the heads of other international bodies: by agreement of governments, sometimes after lots of grumpy backroom negotiations.

This even applies to the no-dealers' blessed WTO (gasp)

3/ Over time, the *elected* (cough) European Parliament was given a role in appointment of the Commission President, alongside *elected* (cough) governments. First consulted, then given a vote of approval, ie veto. Here's the current legal rule.

4/ This was the vote that took place yesterday. Note that without a majority of MEPs, @vonderleyen would have failed.

You know what *didn't* get a majority of the electorate?

- Brexit
- the Brexit party in EP elections
- Farage as Brexit party leader (no vote)
- Trump

5/ Would another way of selection of Commission president be better?

Possibly. Some in the Euro Parliament say it should be more like national elections. Parties pick a preferred candidate, and voters judge the candidates when voting in EP elections, as they would possible PMs.

6/ Some EP parties tried this in 2014 and 2019. The problem was that unlike national elections, the public paid little attention to the candidates. Plus Member States' governments still wanted a major role in appointment (and indeed the treaty says they propose a candidate).

7/ In 2014, the EP insisted that the nominee of the largest party became Commission president. Eurosceptics went 🦍💩

In 2019, the EP *didn't* insist that the nominee of the largest party became Commission president. Eurosceptics went 🦍💩 again.

8/ Or there could be a direct Presidential election. Fine, but that needs a Treaty amendment, and raises awkward issues about weighting the vote so the largest Member States don't dominate.

Plus should the president have more powers? How do you *fund* an EU-wide election?

9/ A Commission president elected with votes from the biggest countries, probably with more powers.

Eurosceptics would of course be fine with this, and not exaggerate it at all. Of course they would. Not like them at all to exaggerate how the EU works. Noooo

10/ I'll move on to what happens next: the appointment of the rest of the Commission, and the policy programme.

I won't comment on the political background of @vonderleyen. Unlike some UK commentators, I don't have a certificate in German studies from Dunning-Kruger university.

11/ The other Commissioners are nominated, one by each Member State govt. Some have already been nominated, including the VP for external relations. They are then appointed by elected governments, with the approval of the elected EP.

Here's that process in the Eurosceptic mind.

12/ The European Parliament holds hearings for each nominee similar to US Senate hearings for cabinet members. It can (and does) de facto reject individual candidates for the Commission at this point. Commissioners tend to be ex cabinet ministers from each Member State.

13/ What are the President's powers? She has a background role in appointment of the other Commissioners (mainly urging gender equality). Also a bigger role deciding what jobs they get, setting policy priorities, and possibly (but rarely) firing or reshuffling Commissioners.

14/ As for policy, let's look at excerpts from the guidelines published yesterday.

Although the Commission makes proposals for EU law, they must be agreed by the Council (ie, ministers from national governments) and the European Parliament.

15/ The guidelines start with several pages of environmental commitments (although the Green party MEPs voted against @vonderleyen).

Some of this is vague rhetoric, some is specific commitments. Of course the devil will be in the detail of the laws proposed/agreed.

16/ Economic and monetary union - mostly a continuation of proposals already made (and hard to agree, notably cross-border deposit insurance). Some of this won't apply to non-eurozone countries.

17/ Employment law - takes over the policies advocated by the social democrats' candidate (Timmermans), who will be returning to the Commission. It's not clear how much of this would be legally binding, given the limits on EU powers as regards wages and the child guarantee.

18/ Discrimination law. A new attempt to unblock the proposal on discrimination outside the area of employment (stuck since 2008; unanimous voting applies). EU criminal law on violence against women needs a unanimous vote of Member States first.

19/ Plans to unblock the proposal on women on company boards. Analysis here: eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/06/forty-…

The CJEU has already been asked to rule on the EU ratifying the Istanbul convention on violence against women. Background by @CateBriddick here: eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/09/the-eu…

20/ Taxation, particularly of big tech companies and common consolidated corporate tax. Both existing proposals, hard to agree due to unanimous voting. No mention of the financial transactions tax proposal. Wants majority voting on tax, but Member States must agree unanimously.

21/ Tech issues - most significantly planned proposals on artificial intelligence, and on digital services, amending liability rules.

Tech lobbyists assemble!

22/ Rule of law - continuing the approach of the current Commission, which is about to publish a new communication on this. (Also more blog posts from me on this soon). No obvious concessions to the governments of Poland and Hungary here.

23/ Relaunch of proposals on the EU asylum system, stuck since 2016 mainly because of disputes over Dublin rules. No suggestion how to unstick them.

No mention of legal migration proposals. The Blue Card proposal on skilled workers is stuck. Analysis: eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-ne…

24/ Mention of more powers and staff for Frontex, the EU border agency, but note that law has already been agreed. Analyses here
1 eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/04/the-ne…
2 eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-um…

25/ External relations: rhetoric on trade, besides appointment of an enforcement officer. Brief mention of Brexit: remember the Commission needs a negotiating mandate from Member States. Defence: more cooperation, but nb this is subject to unanimous voting or opt outs.

26/ EU reforms, starting with a "conference on the future of Europe". "Open to Treaty change", although remember this would be subject to unanimous approval by governments and national ratification.

27/ Right of initiative for European Parliament, although it would take a Treaty amendment to make this legally binding. More majority voting (already proposed by the current Commission), but this requires unanimous agreement. Amendments to EP electoral law, also unanimous voting

28/ Finally, a joint ethics body, more legislative transparency (note this won't apply to most of what the *Commission* does), and more legislation on dodgy election practices. Release the Zuckbot!

29/ Overall: a mix of different policies aimed at parties across the (non-Eurosceptic) political spectrum. Keep in mind constraints on the Commission, most obviously where unanimous voting applies or where policy (ie immigration/asylum) is highly controversial. Fewer fibs please!