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More than a century after WWI, the Middle East is experiencing its own 1914 moment. @CrisisGroup's new report describes how rising tensions b/w Iran & the US risk prompting a military confrontation that could devolve into a regional conflagration [THREAD]
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
2| US-Iran standoff is akin to what happens when an irresistible force – the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign – meets the immovable object of Iran’s resolve to resist rather than yield. More on background in my @washingtonpost interview:
3| We’ve already been at the precipice of military action once (back in June), and the situation is still primed for potential escalation. Everything needs to go right to avoid a conflict – and only one thing needs to go wrong to start it. bit.ly/2AlR7rt
4| In May 2018, the US withdrew from the #IranDeal. There are fair reasons to debate the JCPOA, but @RealDonaldTrump’s criticisms have always been, as he might say, “fake news”.
5| Main tools US has deployed since are unilateral sanctions against 80+% of the Iranian economy. The economic impact has been powerful: oil sales collapsed, GDP -6%. But not resulting in substantial shifts in Iranian policy.
6| Trump and his team might have different visions about the ultimate objective. As a Lebanese journalist put it: "For Trump sanctions are an alternative to war, whereas for Bolton and Pompeo, they are a prelude to war”.
7| By May 2019, it appeared that Iran’s response to max pressure – “max patience” – was no longer sustainable for Tehran. Since then, it has taken retaliatory measures both in the nuclear realm and in the region. This was, btw, entirely predictable: crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
8| On nuclear front, Iran has breached two JCPOA limits on enriched uranium stockpile size and enrichment level. These are calculated moves to push the deal’s remaining parties into delivering economic dividends the deal promised and hasn’t delivered. bit.ly/323I4d5
9| Regional tensions have also risen sharply: string of incidents against tankers off Fujairah, in Gulf of Oman & UK-Iran tit-for-tat seizures; claims of busted spy rings; drones downed by both US & Iran. Latter nearly resulted in US airstrikes in June.
10|This puts us in moment of maximum peril. As a US official told us, “hard to see how we avoid a military clash. The admin probably won’t relent on sanctions & Iran will continue to respond”. Unlike what @TomCottonAR says a clash won't to be "2 strikes"
11| Our report focuses on key flashpoints where an escalation could reverberate. These are theaters where Iran has partners built up as part of its “forward defence” policy. bit.ly/2HyOzKV
12| A clash might fuel existing fires, but US has warned that it holds Iran responsible for acts by proxies - so an unrelated incident could also trigger US retaliation. In Iraq, for example, adjacency and support for paramilitary groups give Iran particular advantages.
13| An Israeli official told us: “The Iranians are prepping Iraq as a platform with deniability”. A senior Iranian SNSC official said: “Iraq is where we have the experience, plausible deniability & the requisite capability to hit the US”. bit.ly/2VFDMbr
14| From Iraq we shift to the Arabian Peninsula & Gulf. In Yemen, cross-border attacks by Huthis on KSA and Saudi airstrikes in Yemen have intensified over past 3 months. A worsening regional environment could in turn lead to escalations there as well. bit.ly/2LZNTm4
15| Meanwhile attacks against tankers, drone shootdowns in and around Strait of Hormuz and discussions over maritime security initiatives all underscore the volatile atmosphere around an energy chokepoint that’s become a strategic flashpoint. bit.ly/2wx06Jb
16| As a UAE official put it: “We are in fragile times. War is not something that we want or seek with Iran… it’s not good for us, or for anyone. We are very alarmed at the sporadic nature of the escalation. We’re at the brink of something”.
17| The third flashpoint we look at is Syria, where a high-risk cat-and-mouse game between Iran and Israel has heightened to what an Israeli official described as a “quasi-state of war”. Key but not sole Israeli concern is transfer/production of weapons. timesofisrael.com/israeli-minist…
18| Result has been 100s of airstrikes by Israel against Iran/Iran-linked targets in Syria & poss Iraq usually w/ muted response. But past pattern of action & limited reaction may not hold. “Current ecosystem is not sustainable”, said an Israeli official. timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to…
19| An Hezbollah official claimed that years of Iranian support for the Syrian regime have transformed Damascus’ stance against Israel from “political resistance” (mumana‘a) to “armed resistance” (muqawama). bit.ly/32Zujg9
20| Related theater is Lebanon. US sanctions have also been wielded against Hezbollah, and contributed to a hit in finances. But both Israeli and Hezbollah officials noted that despite that, capabilities still formidable, and mutual deterrence since 2006 could fray.
21| A senior Hezbollah official said, “we know a conflict will be very costly to us and will result in the destruction of Lebanon, but it will be very costly for Israel, too. And besides, the alternatives are not more palatable”. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransour…
22| To be sure, neither @realDonaldTrump nor Iranian leadership appears to want a war. But avoiding a military clash and the devastating regional impact means that both sides should step back from the brink. In the report, we outline a path forward for de-escalation:
23| The US would agree to partially reinstate sanctions waivers on Iranian oil, in exchange for Iran’s full JCPOA compliance, no targeting of shipping, and progress on release of dual nationals held by Iran. In other words, enhanced version of pre-May status quo.
24| This wld offer both a win: the US could say it got Iran back to the table, rolled back Iran’s JCPOA breaches & didn’t lift its broader sanctions. Iran could recoup some its economic dividend without conceding to wider US demands. Broader negos could then start.
25| Third parties would have an important part to play in reaching this tactical détente. Europeans don’t want JCPOA to unravel further; regional states don’t want to be on the front line of a conflagration.
26|26 To be sure: this is hardly a panacea. But reaching a ceasefire before hostilities break out could avert a 1914 moment in the region. Read the full report here: crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
