So was the assassination of Soleimani a good idea? At this point, no one knows; anyone who says yes or no is giving you an ideologically-based answer, not an evidence-based one. We need time to see how the pros and cons evolve; quick thread on this.
The most obvious, and clearly important, benefit: Soleimani, a powerful adversary who was directly and indirectly responsible for a very, very long list of atrocities, violent actions, terrorist attacks, etc., is gone. That is a net benefit, and a major one.
This, of course, has to be nuanced. Soleimani is dead. But is this a "major blow" to the IRGC and to Iran's power projection? No; at most, a minor one. Solaimani was a tactical and strategic military genius, but he has helped build a strong organization, with a deep pool of...
talent and experience. The Quds Force will pretty much continue doing what it's been doing. Always remember that when a leader leaves (because of death, retirement, promotion, etc), you simply don't know what the impact on the insitiution or (terrorist) group will be; he may...
be replaced by a weaker leader (so the institution weakens), or a stronger one (so it strengthens; thnk of Hassan Nasrallah, who became head of Hezbollah when his predecessor was killed, and proved to be a far stronger leader).
The other potential benefit, but one that will take time to quantify: I do think that down the road the deterrence value will be positive (though how positive is far from clear yet). The US has sent a strong signal: if Iran targets American assets, there will be a high price.
The costs are easy to suggest, but cannot be quantified yet. The most obvious one is the risk of escalation and destabilization in the region. I tend to be on the side of those saying that Iran is unlikely to respond immediately, since it wants to avoid an escalation that...
it would be sure to lose. That's why suggestions of an imminent regional war are unlikely to materialize (and those of WWIII are fantasy). Still, eventual Iranian responses, which are very likely, will raise significant risks of regional destabilization.
The counter-argument to this, of course, is that if Iran was (partly) successfully deterred, its reponses are likely to be smaller, and thus less destabilizing. Only time will tell.
The nuance here is that I think the most likely scenario is for Iranian reprisals to mostly avoid American physical assets (personnel, infrastructure), since Trump has clearly signalled - and demonstrated now - that doing this triggers a disproportionate response.
So expect Iranian cyber attacks against the US, potentially large ones (and we know that Iran has significantly developed its capabilities at this level). Also, expect Iranian reprisals (directly or through partner groups in Iraq, Lebanon or elsewhere) to target US partners...
in the region. Including Saudi Arabia: given the climate in the US, where support for Saudi in the media and Congress is at an all time low, it will be difficult for Trump to commit significant resources to come to its aid. Iranian reprisals against Israel are also possible...
though here again, Iran is well aware that a domestically vulnerable Netanyahu would hit back, hard (and Israel has shown it has very good intelligence on Iranian assets in Syria).
Another potential cost: the US presence in Iraq. We need to wait for the dust to settle but at the very least the US margin of maneuvre in Iraq will be constrained (more security risks so less movement, etc); at worst, the US (and allies) will be kicked, out, a major loss.
Many critics have also highlighted that this action causes further damage to the rule of law and the international liberal order. I will leave it to lawyers to say whether this attack was legal or not. But I think this is, at most, only a mild net cost. Trump is doing far more...
damage to the rule of law in so many other ways that this particular issue is minor.
What about damage to relations with allies? If, for example, the US has to leave Iraq (unlikely in my view, but not impossible), so will allies involved there, including Canada. They (we) will be annoyed. But, again, Trump, is doing so much damage to American alliances that...
this will not, once the dust settles, be the biggest negative consequence of the Soleimani killing. It will basically get drowned in the other damages that Trump is wrecking-balling through US alliances.
What about the war against the Islamic State? This has to be in the "con" column; I simply don't see how it can emerge in the "pro" one. No, Soleimani was not an "ally" against IS; that is non-sense (ie, Iran and his role in supporting Assad have done *a lot* to feed IS, etc.).
But it is quite plausible that if US margin of maneuvre in Iraq will be constrained (eg., reduce movement, close remote bases for security reasons; loss of intelligence; etc). Then yes, the US ability to fight IS is reduced.
So where will the balance of pros and cons evolve? The "con" column is definitely longer than the "pro" one, but it is also highly uncertain. (end)
Adding to all this, excellent thread by @MaloneySuzanne, on the domestic angle in the US:
Good piece by @AnujChopra on the reaction in Saudi Arabia, quoting my thread:
news.yahoo.com/saudi-not-cons…
news.yahoo.com/saudi-not-cons…
@AnujChopra I would add another negative element to my cost-benefit analysis above: as I've often said, the US obsession with Iran leads to a major inflation of the threat it poses, distracting it from more pressing priotities. The current crisis is just monopolizing too much bandwidth.
