1/ A few thoughts prompted by Geoff and Chris's piece.
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2/ First, let's assume arguendo--as Geoff & Chris appear to do--that the Art. 51 threshold was crossed, i.e., that the US had the right to use force against Iran *in some way* to retard/deter further attacks, in light of an established pattern of continuing attacks ...
3/ ... on US forces attributable to Iran. There are actual a lot of disputed factual US claims on which that depends--esp. whether Iran was responsible for the 2019 attacks on bases; if so, ...
4/ ... whether those attacks, w/other evidence, demonstrated a design for continuing attacks against the US; whether non-lethal force could have accomplished the same ends; whether force against Iran now was more likely to retard than exacerbate attacks on the US by Iran; etc.
5/ But let's (very generously) assume here that the US was right about *all* those questions *and* that the US actually carefully considered them ex ante (a even more generous assumption). Geoff & Chris then say that, in that case, Soleimani was a lawful target under IHL.
6/ Which is true in the sense that he wasn't an *unlawful* civilian target--IHL, after all, is merely prohibitory, and they're right that the IHL prohibitions *might* not have been violated (although we'd need to know more about questions of in bello proportionality here). OK,
7/ ... but even so, I think they're overlooking at least a few important questions apart from IHL (not even including IHRL)--questions still on the ad bellum side of the ledger. Most obviously, was it N&P to make the strike *in Iraq*? And even if the strike had been in Iran, ...
8/ ... was it N&P to target Soleimani? That question entails at the very least asking whether it was reasonable to believe that doing so would lead to fewer rather than more hostilities, and whether the objectives couldn't have been accomplished with a less deadly use of force.
9/ I think these are the most important & most difficult-to-assess issues, *if* one gets past the evidentiary uncertainties at the outset (a huge "if"). I don't think Geoff and Chris have tried to assess them--not yet, anyway.
The fact that the whole lot of you were speechless (tweetless) in response to this thread suggests *either* that I got something (roughly) right for once *or* that it's so embarrassingly wrongheaded that you've all conspired to spare me the ridicule. Either way--thanks!
