Thread by @CasMudde

There are lot of received wisdoms about #FarRight (often wrongly referred to as #populism ) and #COVID19 so @JakubWondreys and I looked into it. Turns out, shocker, most are wrong.

Below is link to Open Access article. Main points in #thread

cambridge.org/core/journals/…

1. We focused exclusively on main far right parties in Europe and on the first wave. However, recent update shows that little has changed.

2. First, we looked into stereotype that "populists" (i.e. far right) ignores or minimizes COVID-19. This is almost exclusively based on Bolsonaro and Trump, who turn out to be exceptions rather than rule.

3. Most far right parties in Europe were among the first to raise alarm over COVID-19 and have taken it more serious than most mainstream parties.

4. In most cases, far right parties called for closing of borders (duh) but also public provision of PPE and a quick but short lockdown.

5. However, once mainstream parties implemented a lockdown, many far right parties (in opposition) became biggest critic, saying it was too much/long and power grab.

6. Only few far right parties copied Trump's ignorant approach. Unsurprisingly, Thierry Baudet and FvD did, which seems to have cost them (before scandal). But Geert Wilders and PVV didn't, and profited.

7. All parties responded in line with their core ideological features, nativism, calling for closed borders, suspended migration, and often linking spread to immigrants/foreigners.

8. Most parties responded with populism, particularly those in opposition, after the lockdown. But far right parties in government would target opposition parties in usual conspiracy/populism frame.

9. Biggest difference was in authoritarianism. Parties in (coalition) government supported authoritarian response, parties in opposition largely rejected it.

10. While "populism" has been called "first victim" of COVID-19, electoral effects of pandemic have been fairly marginal -- not just for far right parties, but for all parties.

11. Irrespective of government status, electoral effects were marginal over first wave (i.e. March to July).

12. While average effects have increased a bit, they remain with margins of error of the polls!

13. Did COVID-19 at least expose "incompetence" of "populism", as pundits have claimed over and over again?

NO! On basis of official numbers, far right parties in (coalition) government have actually dealt better, not worse, with the first wave of COVID-19.

14. There are many caveats though:

- data are problematic (everywhere)
- far right in power (H & PL) tested less
- all far right in government are in Central Eastern Europe, which has been overall less affected in first wave (except for Western Balkans)

15. In short, we can conclude that:

- Most received wisdom is wrong
- Bolsonaro and Trump are exceptions rather than rule
- Far right is heterogeneous and thus there is not ONE effect/response
- Being in government or opposition has major effect

16. As said, this was all based on first wave. We have updated the data (until November) and it mostly remains the same. However, we are still in second wave, and CEE has been hit harder this time.

17. While it is still early, I think it is highly unlikely that the pandemic will significantly affect European politics one way or another. Few crisis, real or perceived, really do (beyond short-term shock).

18. The biggest effect will probably be the knock-on effect from the almost certain economic crisis, which will hit in 2021. Still, effects of that crisis will again be diverse, as the far right is heterogeneous!

19. Also, effects are highly influenced by which political discourse will dominate post-pandemic debate, about extent of economic impact, about EU and national response to crisis (egocentric austerity vs European solidarity), and many other factors.

20. Want to read the whole article, which is Open Access and will hopefully soon be up in fully edited and proofed version, please download it below. #TheEnd

cambridge.org/core/journals/…