Shortly after the Communist Revolution of 1949, China condemned Israel in the strongest possible terms. Israel was deemed an “imperial tool for suppressing national-democratic revolution movement of the Arab countries,” and a “Zionist entity,” equating Zionism to racism. 2/
Israel was always denounced as aggressive; any negotiated settlement was a conspiracy and “a betrayal of the interests of the Arab people.” People’s Daily proudly proclaimed “...we have nothing to do with Israel, neither will we have anything to do with it in the future.” 3/
Beijing exhorted the Palestinians to “continue their triumphant march along the path of armed struggle till final victory,” “regain the nation of Palestine,” and fight a “just struggle” of “life and death.” As late as 1988, Israeli policy was as “savage” and “expansionist”... 4/
...even as unofficial ties had increased exponentially and normalization was already in full swing.
Despite this harsh rhetoric, behind the scenes, China was far more flexible. After 1949 , Israel was one of the earliest non-Communist states to recognize the CCP over the ROC. 5/
China flirted with establishing relations with Israel in the early 1950s, but ended talks in 1955 with the Bandung Conference, the first large scale Afro-Asian conference, which signaled Beijing's official policy shift to the principal of non-alignment and the Arab states. 6/
Following their new allies, China cut off all communication with Israel and began attacking it in the press. By 1958, China had established official relations with Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan. At the same time, anti-Israeli rhetoric reached a fevered pitch, and... 7/
continued to intensify during the Cultural Revolution in 1966. By the mid-1960s, China supported Palestinian liberation groups with small arms, one of the first countries to do so, and made a significant contribution to the launching of the Palestinian guerilla movement. 8/
This was the only substantial case of China providing direct support to the Palestinian cause. In short order, the CCP planners found that this direct support ran counter to their overarching objective of achieving international recognition and joining the United Nations. 9/
Creating an armed “third column” upset some countries like Jordan, as it upset the balance of power. Rhetorical support was much safer, and material support was greatly reduced by late 1960s. Arab intellectuals lamented the loss of PRC revolutionary or ideological “purity”... 10/
...as its policies consistently failed to live up to the Arab expectations.
By 1971, China finally achieved a critical mass of states willing to vote for UN recognition, and with Nixon's visit to Beijing, the last obstacle to normalization of relations with Israel fell. 11/
As early as 1973, despite official hostility, China began to send quiet signals to Tel Aviv, while keeping a close eye on the reaction of its Arab allies. By mid-1970s, China began to allow for distinctions in official media between the Israeli government and people... 12/
...and no longer opposed Israel's right to exist. In 1975, the government released statements of support for Henry Kissinger's negotiated peace efforts. By 1977, they endorsed Sadat's negotiated settlement with Israel, once decried as an imperialist conspiracy. 13/
This set the stage for a dramatic expansion of ties in the 1980s and 1990s. China purchased billions of dollars of military technology from Israel, including armor, artillery, missiles, and electronics, although this was all publically denied. By the middle of the decade... 14/
...over 60 Israeli companies had secret joint ventures with China, typically run through middlemen. There were also diplomatic meetings through third parties, such as Jordan. At the same time, China maintained a public anti-Israeli position and refused official normalization. 15/
This is because China's economic ties to the Arab states remained important after it joined the U.N. China sold them weapons during the 1980s to acquire foreign currency reserves and consolidate its growing economic power. Substantial trade ties had also begun to develop. 16/
Anti-Israeli rhetoric was a useful tool for maintaining good relations with the Arab world, and so it remained. The Israelis tolerated it, just as the Americans tolerated the Chinese press continuing to call them imperialists after Sino-American rapprochemont. 17/
That the rhetoric persisted illustrates its essentially utilitarian and pragmatic function. Throughout the period, the driving force of Chinese opposition to Israel was a pragmatic assessment of alliances, not a commitment to solidarity or the Palestinian cause. 18/
Which leads us right back to where I started yesterday...
We are now starting to get some of the details of the #Iran-#Saudi normalisation deal, thanks to this excellent report from @WSJ. Some important take-aways:
1.The report confirms that much of this was the culmination of a regional peace process: years of negotiations and both sides agreeing it was in their best interests. China entered late, as the train was pulling out, but…
2.Chinese diplomacy did play a larger role than it has in previous attempts to get involved in regional politics. Significantly, China agreed to allow Iran to access some frozen funds. This was less likely incentive and more likely the price Iran asked to hand China this win.
Officials tried to avoid mentioning the issue specifically, but stressed that future development would be done with Iranian companies and investment. "It is quite clear that the National Oil Company has reached a dead end in negotiations with the Chinese."
"Over the years, they have been indifferent to all of the ultimatums of the National Oil Company...at the beginning [of the Raisi gov't], they were optimistic that the Chinese would invest...but strangely, Beijing has no intention of investing at this time."
Recently, #IranChina ties have faced faux pas, criticism, and stagnation. Tomorrow, President Raisi will visit #Beijing to try and jump-start #Sino-#Iranian cooperation. 🇨🇳🇮🇷
In March of 2020, #Iran and #China signed the fabled "Iran-China Deal", in which China reported pledged massive cooperation with and investment in Iran over the next two-and-a-half decades. The deal ostensibly called for $400 billion in investment...
But as you may be able to guess from the number of qualifiers, the deal was, much like China's espionage efforts, full of hot air. Many experts, myself included, pointed out that the $400 billion number was almost completely fabricated...
So what can you expect from this article? It fill a gap in the literature by sketching a narrative of RoC-#Iran relations between 1920 and 1949, by analyzing the factors behind #Sino-Iranian cooperation and competition in the #tea and #silk trades and at the League of Nations.
What did I find? Unofficial commercial interests, including Iranian merchants in Shanghai, played a large role in driving Sino-Iranian relations. Iranian companies were well established in China and Hong Kong, mostly shipping tea. See for example this advert in an expat paper.
#China and #Iran have agreed to expand their military ties. Of course, Fox News and the usual suspects are sounding the alarm. What does that mean, and is there anything noteworthy here?
First, this is nothing new. Chinese military have visited Iran before. They ALREADY cooperate by holding joint military exercises and collaborating on international crime, like drug trafficking and terrorism. China also does this with Saudi Arabia and other ME countries.
They’re likely to continue to deepen these ties, but they’re not particularly strategic or significant. That’s exactly what Bagheri said they’re doing, “expand bilateral cooperation in joint military drills, exchange of strategies, training issues and other common fields”.
The #Iran-#China deal has entered the "implementation" phase. This has triggered a new, yet not unexpected round of #Sino-#Iranian "alliance" panic.
But recent events hint at the limits of the Sino-Iranian partnership. Let's review... (a #ForeignPolicy#IranChina#thread) 1/
First, it's worth repeating that many aspects of the promised deal are overblown and exaggerated, including the fabled "$400 billion" investment. The deal was, and remains, aspirational and with no specific details. 2/
Iran may be forced to “Look East” in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, but the Chinese government continues to look in many directions at once. China has substantial relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and a number of other Iranian neighbors and/or rivals. 3/