Dabaiba’s friends in the political Islam milieu have been Sallabi & Muqatilah, 𝒏𝒐𝒕 #Ikhwan.
Bearing that Feb 2021 precedent in mind is useful to anyone looking to understand why Meshri is so deeply against Dabaiba & pro-Aqila at this juncture.
Dabaiba as PM neglected the Ikhwan & gave them no ministry.
Will the #Ikhwan do better cohabiting w/ Haftar, Buzeriba, et al.?
In all cases, a Prime Min Bashagha will be a huge win for #Morocco’s diplomats who’ve been investing time & energy on this Saleh-#Ikhwan compact since Apr 2018, when Meshri emerged as Swehli’s successor at the HCS’s helm.
Almost 4 yrs of Moroccan mediation that may pay off big…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;
[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.
The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.
& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
Other #local antagonisms that became evident on 5/17 in Tripoli include Mustafa Qaddur’s animosity vs. his #Mukhabarat superior & Dabaiba ally Hussein al-#Ayeb.
Nawassi — which holds a major grudge against Bahrun, too — coordinates w/ Buzeriba & Wershefana’s Muammar al-Dhawi.
In late May 2019, Belqacem Haftar visited DC in a bid to secure U.S. assistance in setting up a mechanism meant to deposit $$$ proceeds from #oil exports into a special account in lieu of sending them straight to the CBL in Tripoli.
The next year, in the summer of 2020, the US & the UN endorsed the idea of preventing oil $$$ proceeds from being funneled directly & systematically to the CBL in Tripoli.
But the rationale now promoted was not the one advocated by Haftar & his associates.
In 2020, international diplomats began suggesting the formation of a special #committee overseeing the equitable & transparent distribution of oil #revenues among the three provinces, & among essential #budget categories.
Said #committee would be above the govt & above the CBL.
Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.
In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.
Historically, 1 of the top reasons #Russia has acquired a clandestine #military presence in #Libya is the fact that it’s key strategic territory on #NATO’s southern flank. The #Ukraine crisis of 2014 deepened the Kremlin’s perception of NATO as hostile to Russia’s core interests.
The possibility of a #parallel govt — capable of rallying several presidential candidates & other anti-Dabaiba forces — has been pre-announced by #Aqila for months.
Such an entity may indeed emerge now.
Beyond symbolism & posturing, will it affect the current reality?
Militarily, bcos Dabaiba has secured the mobilization of Mahjub, Halbus, & al-Jahawi, Bashagha won’t be in a position to contribute much in Misrata, Tajura, or Tripoli itself.
For the #parallel govt to create pain for Dabaiba, it’ll have to consider being in cahoots w/ the #SSA.
In the eventuality above, a new #parallel govt may pull off truly bothersome disruptions in the greater #Tripoli area, but Dabaiba will not be removed from power by force in the foreseeable future.
No can do.
The Turkish-backed setup now protecting the PM is just too formidable
1 must go back to May-Oct 2018, when both #UN & #US began exerting a pressure on the #CBL in #Tripoli.
At the time, an #LNA attack on the capital wasn't seen as imminent, nor was a #Hibri-#Kabir reunification considered a hot priority
Following #Haftar's Jun '18 #OilCresc blockade, #US (thru the #UN) helped #CBL devise a measure, which was implemented after the Aug-Sep '18 LoC battle in Tripoli.
An LoC #tax now made the de-facto conversion rate 3.9 dinars to 1 $.
$10k packages were introduced for households.
The #US-designed measure—rolled out by #Kabir in Oct ’18—was effectively a devaluation of the dinar w/ the added benefit of attracting banknotes back into the system.
The measure turned out to be a success.
It also reduced the amount of political controversy surrounding #Kabir