1/ On #sanctions and #Russia. Nothing in the package has a characteristic of a "bomb", they are rather like flames. The longer they hold the more they hurt, and if lifted, they cease to hurt and most of the damage is lifted.
Apply them now, lift if behavioural improvement.
2/ Big difference btw deterrence and leverage. Best deterrent causes acute damage once, like a military strike. Best leverage is enduring damage over time.
Sanctions = leverage, not deterrence.
Forget trigger condition. Formulate condition for lifting.
3/
a/ If RU seeks imperial restoration and confrontation (assumption), sanction now and further measures later for our security & defence capabilities.
b/ If RU has minor Ukraine objective but wants business w. EU (alt assumption), then sanctions now, RU will change behaviour.
4/ If sanctions are tied to war, then:
If RU stays below threshold, RU goes unpunished. They will play game again.
If RU goes for war anyway, we will do same sequence as under 3/ a/ but with unhelpful delay.
Plus: risk to credibility of our resolve
=> do sanctions now
END
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1 - For a stronger West - thread
Although the emotional states of *some* of our leaders are adequately heightened, the policy responses discussed so far - #sanctions, new #NATO battle groups - are much too weak to respond to the enormity of the challenge to our way of life
2 - The prospective #Russian invasion of #Ukraine should be compared to the invasion of #Poland in 1939. Consider #Ukraine's size, a larger territory than #France, a larger pop. than #Poland. Consider #China and the axis of the two enormous dictatorships.
3 - I am not forecasting a genocide or a world war, but we are at the point of gravest danger for Western civilisation since, I would argue, the *early* Cold War (or the 1930s). And yet look at #Europe, our #military capabilities and investments are ridiculous.
1/ I did my early career in applied economic research with a focus on East. Europe. Everything I saw was about helping former Eastern bloc nations to modernise and become prosperous. Russia, too, benefitted from enormous generosity from the West at its time of greatest distress.
2/ Russia had a miserable time in the 90s because it spent decades pursuing ridiculous economic policies while also holding down a gigantic empire and a gigantic military machine. It then chose to collapse its own empire, and of course everybody who could made a run for it.
3/ While some Russians were learning humility, a deeply resentful, violent, and criminally-minded set of elites took back control in 1999 following a palace coup and what appeared to be false-flag terrorist attacks against their own civilian population.
1/ Interesting to see West. journalists and Pres Zelensky not understanding each other. Tension btw the Western mind that seeks a "single truth", e.g. mass invasion in X days (and if not, loss of interest, confusion). And Ukrainian experience of permanent war and threat of war.
2/ Zelensky is asking for money bc RU war against UA is also a permanent economic war, a war of destabilisation, internal subversion, political manipulation - plus cyber-attacks, sabotage attacks, actual combat in Donbas, provocations on LOC...
3/ Plus recurrent threats of Blitzkrieg style invasion, and note, this was also the case in 2014, and it is again now. Every time, it could be invasion. Every time, it could be a coup. And all the time, the Kremlin's goal is permanently to bully and undermine and coerce...
1/ On the "energy transition" and geoeconomics:
My experience, including e.g. lobbying for #electrification of #transport before it was cool, is that govts prefer the path of least resistance, which helps the incumbent #oil and #gas industry.
2/ So what you get is a compromise of #green policy goals (lower CO2, but not too fast, plus nuclear exit), slow-exiting of #oil and increase in #gas (good for incumbent industry), promotion of #hydrogen (helps gas industry survive), and of course #Russia.
3/ Liberal economic principles, and foreign policy idealism, are brought in just in time to prevent heavy geoeconomic measures to cut dependence on Russia. And so, Europe will do a slow energy transition with Russia guaranteed major benefits for the next few decades.
1/ Posting same video shared by @andersostlund earlier. Worth watching. The @CDU spox is very good. But even the @spdde spox sounds quite reasonable. However I fully disagree on the logic of not delivering weapons...
2/ ...the reasoning (or pretext) now given by @spdde is that GER shouldn't deliver weapons because it is a facilitator in negotiations. Well at least there's no longer a clumsy argument about history. Nonetheless the new argument is poor logic...
3/ ...delivering weapons to #Ukraine would strengthen GER credibility and put Moscow on the backfoot - if even SPD types give weapons, that means #Kremlin has gone too far. Also, @spdde argues that GER is helping UA in other ways, esp economically...
@ulrichspeck 1/ I think German "geopolitics" would be a disaster given the blind spots of many German elites - e.g. taking the EU market for granted, therefore being soft on Moscow & Beijing. That is a geopolitics of a certain kind. What makes the West tick is something else...
2/ What is more-or-less unique about America today - and the British Empire before WW2 - was that in spite of a lot of hard power politics, both at times mobilised power to impose positive change elsewhere, rather than choose the path of least resistance...
3/ Take for instance the Royal Navy's leadership in interdicting the slave trade in the 19th century - and of salient interest to all Europeans, the choices made by London and then far more importantly by Washington to confront totalitarianism...