The #USA/#NATO have few good options for deterring #Russia’s use of #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine - or punishing such use after the fact, since “the toolkit of punishments includes the very deterrents that failed to change Moscow’s calculus in the first place.” /2
I examine the lessons from multiple failures to deter #ChemicalWeapons use in #Syria, concluding: “It is hard to prevent a highly motivated actor from chemical use, especially if the deterring side fails to respond decisively to the first crossing of the “red line.” /3
So, what options to deter CW use in #Ukraine today?: More sanctions. More arms for Ukraine. Diplomatic consequences @OPCW. Shaming Russia.
But these are unlikely significant enough "to cause #Russia to rethink its tactics, should it judge the use of CW militarily expedient." /5
What about the US threat of an “in-kind” (asymmetric/mil) response? That likely looms larger for #Russia, though I argue “Washington’s sensible aversion to direct conflict with Russia would probably dictate restraint in its choice of any such response.” cnbc.com/2022/03/24/bid… /6
My bottom line on #Russia’s likely calculations on CW use in Ukraine: Moscow will “weigh the anticipated military 'value-added' of chemical weapons against a potential, likely cautious, US retaliation (asymmetric or military).”
Hence, the use of CW is not a forgone conclusion /7
An added complication, though: "Strategists who are desperate might make decisions in a heightened emotional state of defiance & vengeance, casting sober-minded cost-benefit calculations aside." See Russian pundits reacting to Moskva sinking as example:
Should #Russia use CW, @OPCW could later use evidence gathered to enable court cases against complicit individuals (universal jurisdiction) & we might end up with Russia suspended from @OPCW. But this would hardly be commensurate with the horrors endured by victims of CW. /9
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Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.
Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift
Thread /1
A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2
Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3
Speaking w/some contacts in #Russia to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re: #RussiaUkraineWar, 3 factors stand out for me:
1. Adaptive behaviour 2. "Besieged fortress" 3. State propaganda working wonders
A thread. /1
1. Adaptive behaviour: Many Russians say "what is expected of them" - they support the #Kremlin on #Ukraine. They might (or not!) hold different views privately, but perceived social pressures + fear of reprisal drive adaptive behaviour - so you can best cope in everyday life /2
2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
Having worked in Moscow when #Russia intervened in #Syria in 2015 & engaged RUS officials/experts on #Syria for yrs, I see 5 parallels in approach to #Ukraine vs #Syria
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of #UkraineWar done, announcing focus on Donbas. In #Syria war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
#Russia and #UA, after 3 meetings - Feb 28, March 3 and 7 - in Belarus keep "constantly" talking online now; in video talks, working groups have been created. Zelenskiy on the talks: the sides are talking, "and not just throwing around ultimatums";
Podolyak: There's a dozen proposals on the table, on the political & military settlement: ceasefire (& formula for it), withdrawal of RUS troops...now all is addressed in working groups...once "mutual reciprocal legal formats" are worked out, there will be 4th (physical) meeting;
For those interested in context, amid fears that #Russia might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in #Ukraine, I've followed the #Russia#Chemical weapons dossier
Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
After #US-#Russia cooperation in removing #Syria's declared CW in 2013-14, things unravelled, w/Russia obstructing efforts at attribution & accountability for CW use in Syria. Over time, rebels were blamed for staging "false-flag attacks". Long read: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… (2/6)
I commented here on how the Russian narrative on #CW in Syria - always shielding the Syrian government, blaming rebels for "false-flag" ops - must be understood in context of broader Russian war objectives in Syria: nonproliferation.org/chemical-weapo… (3/6)
An under-appreciated feature of the #UkraineWar is the emergence of #Israel and #Turkey as key international intermediaries. Israeli PM was in Moscow this past weekend, and Lavrov/Kuleba are meeting in Antalya for 1st high-level meeting since bgn of invasion tomorrow. A🧵(1/7)
After Cold War, ISR & TUR emerged as important economic partners for Russia in ME. Russian bilat trade w/both is more significant than with most Arab partners. W/Turkey: Gas, Akkuyu NPP, tourism, mil-tech cooperation. W/Israel: agricultural & food products, minerals, metals (2/7)
Both ISR & TUR, however, also entertain major economic ties with Ukraine. And they've been worried about minority communities suffering under the #UkraineInvasion. Turkey pulled out Crimean Tatars, Israel evacuated Jewish communities. (3/7)