Given the losses in lives and the relatively static front line, some are beginning to dismay that perhaps the tide is turning to #Russia.
That could happen. But it hasn't yet. 1/
#Ukraine is still winning the war strategically. It survives as a state & a people & has secured its capital. It has denied #Putin his ambition to seize the entire country & has forced Putin to fight extremely hard for a limited goal of seizing the Donbas, at which he may fail 2/
Operationally, Ukraine is nearing a grinding stalemate in the East. As we @TheStudyofWar warned in March, stalemates are bloody & dynamic at the tactical level. This is already on display in the brutal attrition battle for incremental advances in #Severodonesk 3/
Operational stalemate would not mean the tide is turning toward #Russia, however.
Fighting the Russian army to an effective standstill in the Donbas would be a huge victory for #Ukraine
It raises an important point regarding what success looks like as the war changes 4/
Ukrainian victory in this phase of the war wont look like the repulsion of Russian forces back to the border from #Kyiv
Russian forces have learned & regrouped. Putin clearly expects them to take the Donbas even at astronomical cost = far different from expectations in Kyiv. 5/
These factors matter. The initial shock of Ukraine's fierce defense has worn off. While Russian forces cannot fully overcome initial failures in their structure, preparation, etc they have settled in for an intentional & vicious battle of attrition. 6/
Unless Russian forces are destroyed (so damaged they cannot fight) or suffer a rout (disorderly collapse), they are unlikely to be repelled akin to Kyiv.
Instead, Ukraine wins by retaking its territory by force. Sometimes one village at a time. 7/
Forcing a halt to Russian offensive operations in the East (even a stalemate) would buy time for #Ukraine to regroup, rearm, & prepare a counteroffensive
The US & NATO should surge support to ensure it does halt Russian gains & can reset quickly for a counteroffensive 8/
In the south, the war has already entered the next phase. Ukraine has forced a limit of advance upon Russian forces & begun counterattacks
More importantly, #Ukraine is setting conditions via partisan warfare behind the front lines to destabilize Russian control 9/
This partisan activity in southern #Ukraine looks increasingly coordinated & could --> a coherent campaign to erode Russian control, impose costs that attrite Russian capability & will, & foster resistance. These effects support future counterattacks to reclaim terrain. 10/
By tying up so much of his force in the fight for the #Donbas, #Putin has taken a risk in occupied #Kherson. One the Ukrainians are exploiting (as well as shaping by fighting hard to delay in #Severodonesk) 11/
Does that mean #Ukraine will win? It surely means they have a shot. Even now. And especially if they preserve the will - and America and NATO do the same. 12/
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-A complex power balance b/t #Assad & his backers
-Evolution of Russia's integrated military & diplomatic efforts
-Russian limits in Syria
-A way forward
Thoughts on the option to retain a few hundred US troops in Deir ez Zour
Mission is still counter-#ISIS but the policy concerns include preventing #Iran, #Assad, & #Russia from seizing the oil fields. Our presence has (so far) had that secondary effect
So what can ~200 guys do?
~200 guys at best gives us a foothold & preserves:
-intel --> high value strikes on #ISIS & #AlQaeda
-some tribal support. At minimum ability to compete 4 it
-some kinetic ability to defend vs #Assad,#Iran,#Russia expansion
-option 2 surge forces again
NOT a long term solution
A small presence of ~200 guys essentially means a single US base in Deir ez Zour. It does not enable us to secure all of the oil fields. The #SDF would be responsible for securing that infrastructure, with - in theory - air and artillery support from our limited residual force
They are almost certainly leaving the country entirely. US forces depend on a ground supply line via Faysh Khabur in the far northeast, so we cannot withdraw southward into Deir ez Zour Province and sustain that presence
A sustainable presence in Deir ez Zour would require a new logistics train from Iraq, probably by air. By land would require traversing lots of terrain that we can't secure from #Iran's proxies.
I think at best a withdrawal south of the M4 highway would be a bid for time