THREAD on #Russlandverstehen:
There was in September 1999 a Russian spark of support for then still obscure prime minister #VladimirPutin, against the background of the #FSB's blowing up of Russian residential buildings that left ca. 300 Russians dead. /1 fb.watch/eP8tm5fxe5/
This curious popular reaction, in spite of early signs revealing the role of #Russia's secret service in the mass murderous terror attacks on #Russian civilians, points to worrisome psychological deformations of the Russian national mind. /2
The mixture of collective escapism, myopic personalism & necro-masochism that came to the fore already more than 30 years ago should have consequences for Western policies. It indicates that verbal signaling may be of only limited use in communication with the Russian nation. /3
Material rather than merely symbolic gestures, with concrete practical consequences for a large amount of people, may be the only way to trigger substantive repercussions in #Russian thinking, planning and behaviour. /END
THREAD
Feelings of Deja Vu for a student of post-Soviet affairs: Are we back in the 1990s? Moscow's December 1994 intervention in an inner-Chechen conflict was the beginning of the end of Russia's Second Republic (after the First one of Febr-Oct 1917). 1/3
Moscow's September 1999 start of the #SecondChechenWar, against the background of, probably, #FSB-organized apartment bombings blamed on #Chechen terrorists, was the beginning of #Putin's popularity rise. Now, #Chechens are fighting on both sides of the #RussianUkrainianWar. 2/3
Ukrainian socio-economic life in the non-occupied territories has returned to levels of the 1990s. Russia's economic life will soon too be back to the 1990s. Chechnia may again become a headache for Moscow. More conflict in the Caucasus & Central Asia has become more likely. 3/3
THREAD:
The critique of @amnesty of the behavior of Ukraine's military is inapt for one or both of the following two reasons:
It can (a) be a critique of tactical decisions taken on the spot by Ukrainian army officers. However, @Amnesty is not a military agency or think tank. /1
The human rights NGO has neither the professional competence nor the public authority to assess the military necessity of, or putative alternatives to, an occasional stationing of Ukrainian troops in residential areas or near other civilian facilities. /2
Even more worrisome about the foray of the reputed NGO into military affairs is an absence of consideration of possible human rights repercussions of the publicly suggested more cautious tactical behavior of the Ukrainian armed forces. /3
Did the West provoke Moscow? Comment on Sweden's and Finland's forthcoming accession to NATO: 1. In principle, the forthcoming northern enlargement of NATO does not change much in the geopolitics of Europe.
CC: @Konflikt_Sicher@Geopoliti_org@GeopoliticsMag@GSPSipo@debates_eu
3. The accession to NATO of Finland doubles the length of the NATO-Russia border. Sweden's and Finland's entry into the alliance was explicitly warned against by Moscow's statements in 2021.
1. I wonder what the plan of the remaining sane parts of the Russian elite is: Their country is becoming more isolated and distrusted accross the globe, by the month. Russia is entering a major socio-economic and political crisis.
2. Growing tensions between the center and periphery of the pseudo-federation could lead to the country's break up, or even to a civil war. In many other countries, #Russians with known ties to the current regime are or will become stigmatized, as enablers of a genocidal regime.
3. Many #Russians also do not understand the rapidly increasing public role of Ukrainians with their deep grievances, in the societies of the Western world. #Ukrainians will make sure that the Russian elite & its children will feel uncomfortable throughout Europe & North America.
2. Many generalists' underlying argument, whether im- or explicitly indicated, is that #EasternEurope specialists suffer from professional distortion. An emotions overload weakens their political judgement. Thus the generalists' texts are often educational rather than analytical.
3. #Areaexperts, in contrast, suspect the #generalists of suffering from a lack of empirical and contextual information. They are afraid that the generalists neither properly know nor fully understand (or are even not interested in) key peculiarities of the #RussianUkrainianWar.