CFTC brings first regulatory action against an alegal #DAO, charging #OokiDao with operating an unlicensed FCM; seeking disgorgement, restitution, civil moneyary penalties, trading and registration bans and injunctive relief. Lots to talk about here: /1 cftc.gov/PressRoom/Pres…
allegations in claim against Ooki #Dao characertize it as an "unincorporated association comprised of holder of Ooki Tokens" and legacy BZRX Tokens who have voted those tokens to govern (e.g. to modify, operate market and take other actions w/r/t the Oooki Protocol." /2
This a huge distinction. While the #DAO is itself a named party, it is unincorporated which leads to all sorts of material questions about who can be sued for what. In this case the complaint makes clear that the Dao is those who (a) have tokens and (b) have voted to govern. /3
so, the Dao isn't every passive token holder; it's comprised of the humans and entities that used their tokens to vote. /4
the complaint further alleges that the Dao itself controlled and operated the bZx protocol as bZeroX had done prior to turning control over to the Ooki Dao:
factors suggesting that the DAO retained full control post- turn over: 1. protocol remained open to be used, 2. the Dao continued to "market, solicit orders for, and facilitate access to the ... Protocol, including through individuals acting on the bZx DAO’s behalf /5
(incl the bZx Founders) and the front-end website the bZx DAO now controlled..." 3. the DAO collected the same fees as the prior operators, 4. the DAO controlled the keys which gave it access and control the operation of and the funds held in the relevant ... smart
contracts /6
the front end website "continued to advertise the lack of KYC / AML requirements as a positive feature of the bZx Protocol; offered any user anywhere in the world (including in the United States) the ability to trade on the Protocol; /7
& not act to exclude U.S. persons and/or non-ECPs from the Protocol. /8
Complaint alleges use of governance product that is broadly permissive and gives extensive control to token voters users; query how much control is too much control? /9
Complaint seeks a bar of all token holders who voted as part of the DAO from the commodities markets /10
Big picture themes to take away: 1. How much control does a Dao have? if it's too much, maybe it's the counterparty to the transactions offered by the protocol; maybe decentralization of control over the protocol, not over voting to control of the protocol is what matters. /11
2. Maybe this isnt the death of all Daos but a strong reminder that you shouldn't offer regulated transactions to US persons if you're not complying with the regulations? h/t to you know who.... /12
Important questions for those who may have received blocked property in a #grief#spray#spam attack from blocked #tornadocash#ETH addrsses remain unanswered. #OFAC may give clarity in an FAQ; are a few questions that would be helpful for OFAC to address.1st some background/1
By now all of #crypto knows that #OFAC sanctioned #ETH & #USDC addresses related to #Tornadocash and service providers and many #crypto users are struggling to adapt. Why? /2
We’re dealing with a law designed to regulate legal people & entities, &their property, not quasi-autonomous code used by third parties to transact third party assets to others. Arguably the designation exceeds #OFAC’s statutory authority. That’s an argument for another day. /3
#Dao is another word the #crypto industry uses for ...well... anything. Here's a proposed taxonomy to clarify what we mean when we say #Dao: (a quickie sunday am #thread): /1
@VitalikButerin's seminal work discussing the types of human/tech hybrid ventures that may/will be created using censorship resistant technology tools remains the first stop for this discussion: (blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/dao…) /2
@vitalik observes that a #DAO "has the murkiest definition of all... it is an entity that lives on the internet and exists autonomously, but also heavily relies on hiring individuals to perform certain tasks that the automaton itself cannot do." /3
#NYDFS issues USD backed #stablecoin guidance; must be fully backed by an asset reserve; issuer must adopt a clear redemption policy, approved by DFS in writing (!!!) redemption at par in fiat; reserve must be held in custody with /1 dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_pu…
US state/federally chartered depository institutions and/or asset custodians. Reserve must be held in govt treasuries "subject to DFS- approved reqs re: overcollaterialiation." Reserve must be subject to independent audit 1x month by independent CPA under AICPA attestation /2
standards. DFS may also impose obligations regarding cybersecurity and IT standards and evaluate issuer BSA/AML & Sanctions compliance, safety and soundness of the issuing entity; and the stability/integrity of the payment system, as applicable on Issuers. /3
Take aways from the #blockfi settlement with the #SEC (sec.gov/litigation/adm……) 1. BIA were notes under the Reves test; one factor is that there is "no alternative
regulatory scheme or other risk reducing factors exist with respect to BIAs" Congress can of course, set out a /1
an alternative framework that would potentially push these sorts of ventures into a different regulatory classification. 2. the offer and sale of notes is an investment contract. Yes, you can be debt and an investment contract; the pooling of assets is the key factor here. /2
3. Blockfi was a 40 act company; 40% of its assets were investment securities - including loans. /3
@gonbegood@lex_node@awrigh01 one of the big problems is that #DAOs as they currently are either legal entities w/ bespoke governance (legal Daos /Laos /daos w/legal wrappers) or groups acting together without legal protection who want to be protected as if they were entities. They either are entities /1
@gonbegood@lex_node@awrigh01 or they *want* the same powers & rights given to entities (individual liability limitation, power to contract as an entity, etc...) w/o the obligations and burdens associated with entities (responsibility to comply with regulation, legal addressability, paying taxes etc...) /2
@gonbegood@lex_node@awrigh01 undoubtedly #Daos will continue to evolve; the question is legislators will find that there's enough benefit to DAOs (in whatever form) to give them unique/bespoke legal standing, or whether they will devolve into ordinary entities. Or we may be inverting the question. Should /3
There has been lots of talk about #uniswap front end interfaces blacklisting #tokens that might be #securities. This is not an attack on #DeFi or regulation of #DeFi specifically, but instead a logical example of how existing regulation applies to legally addressable entities /1
including those that facilitate the use of #decentralized systems- in this case, legally addressable interface providers. And this isn’t new. Quietly, many front end providers are also engaged in #sanctions compliance. While laws obviously apply to legally addressable actors, /2
this does not mean that regulation has applied or will be applied directly to protocol code, at least not yet. This is b/c code itself is not legally addressable. It has its own rule-set governing its environment, & law cannot change code, although law can act on people /3