Thread by @UliTKuehn

A quick thread outlining the main takeaways of my @CarnegieEndow report on "Preventing Escalation in the Baltics. A NATO Playbook" carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/pre… @carnegienpp @james_acton32

1/n I start from the premise that in order to preserve @NATO unity min response to #Russia, the alliance should focus on three topical areas, i.e., deterrence and assurance, resilience, and risk reduction. My recommendations are as follows:

2/n Ensuring trip wire is pulled in a conflict, US should deploy a US Army battalion, split equally among the 3 EFP deployments in the Baltics; task: continuously patrolling/monitoring borders with Russia. NATO should avoid additional large-scale force deployments to the Baltics.

3/n NATO must clarify the roles of the EFP and reinforcement forces in the event of externally instigated domestic unrest in the Baltics or if NATO forces are deliberately targeted by protesters.

4/n Allies should streamline NATO’s internal decisionmaking process, perhaps by clarifying internally what military or political events would trigger reinforcement, so that the alliance can respond swiftly should a crisis occur.

5/n The alliance must make sure that it can move forces if reinforcement becomes necessary. It should consider enhancing the defenses of its vital logistics and transportation nodes in Western Europe and adapting its logistics in Eastern Europe.

6/n To bolster deterrence and assurance, NATO heads of state and government should convey clearer public and private messages of political resolve, while avoiding changes to NATO’s current nuclear posture.

7/n If diplomatic efforts to resolve the INF Treaty crisis fail, then, to preserve alliance unity, NATO members should consider military countermeasures consistent with the treaty. Until then, all diplomatic means of resolving the standoff must be explored.

8/n NATO must encourage civilian resilience measures to deny Russia the ability to escalate through nonkinetic operations, perhaps by making resilience-building expenditures count toward NATO members’ 2 percent goal for defense spending.

9/n Allies must counter Russian propaganda and disinformation targeted at Russian minorities in the Baltic states. The alliance should consider a joint NATO/EU fund for financing Russian-language media outlets, journalists, and social media accounts.

10/n NATO members should closely monitor the state of integration and representation of the Russian minorities in the Baltic states, perhaps through a reporting mechanism.

11/n NATO must continue to engage Russia to seek to prevent incidents and reestablish crisis communication channels. Allies should encourage Poland and the Baltic states to conclude individual incident prevention mechanisms with Moscow.

12/n NATO should start internal preparations for confidence-building and security-building measures and an arms control process with Russia, seeking transparency as well as reciprocal reductions and/or limitations on heavy conventional equipment in the wider Baltic region.

13/13 If Russia initially refuses to cooperate on arms control, allies could explore the possibility of threatening additional NATO force deployments unless Moscow engages on conventional arms control and the INF Treaty. -- END Full report here: carnegieendowment.org/files/Kuhn_Bal…