Thread by @Usherwood

Since we're still not at a resolution of this, I'd like to revisit it and consider some options:

1/

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by @rdanielkelemen view original on Twitter

In essence, the problem is that there are three apparent requirements for the Irish dimension, that don't appear to be simultaneously satisfiable. @rdanielkelemen's diagram explains that very nicely, so I'll limit myself to also including my take here

2/

So far, so well-discussed

So what ways out of this are there?

3/

It seems to me that two main paths are available here:

- delay

- changing preferences

4/

Implicit in this scenario is that this needs to be resolved now, to meet the needs of IE, Art.50 and the general improvement of relations

5/

But that's to take only one level.

Already we know that all parties want a transition to end 2020, in which this isn't resolved: UK will stay in everything as now

6/

And indeed the backstop includes a similar notion of a temporary arrangement until a more permanent one can be found

7/

Together that suggests an option that uses transitional arrangements to preserve the SQ, while also allowing parties to both state and have accepted final end-states

8/

To frame that differently, rather than try to satisfy all three objectives simultaneously, you stagger them

9/

Obviously, some issues with that.

1st, who goes for jam in some years' time, rather than today/tomorrow?

2nd, what are the knock-on implications of delay (eg on other trade arrangements)?

10/

I'll leave those there, only noting that the onus has been v.much on UK to be the one to wait

11/

Which brings us to the second path: changing what ppl want

If you can't resolve the thee preferences, then why not change those preferences?

12/

There's a harder and a softer version of this (as so often in life)

13/

The harder version is an explicit dumping of one of those objectives: proper U-turn stuff.

14/

That needs both a situation where dumping it makes relatively clear sense to publics, and politicians wiling to take the risk (because it would indeed be a risk)

15/

You'd spot it by the shift in framing and calls to 'how things have changed', plus by likely side-payments to constituents to keep them on board

16/

Again, the problems are manifest and multiple, so I'll let you work through those yourself

17/

The softer version would consist of unpacking each objective and considering what it actually means and how it can be adapted to the situation

18/

Here, I'm thinking again of good old 'principled negotiation', which asks negotiators to look at interests, not positions: why do each of those objectives exist?

19/

If you can understand the underlying concern, then you can then think about different ways to tackle it

20/

(if you'd like another example, read up on the Camp David peace agt btw Egypt and Israel, where dispute over the Sinai was addressed by this process)

21/

This wouldn't need an explicit rejection of any objective, rather an elaboration of how that's addressed by the deal

22/

As for difficulties, the main one is that it requires parties to know what they actually want, in that broad, interest-driven way, which is never very simple and certainly not here

23/

So, to return to the original point, the trilemma might be unresolvable in the bold terms stated at the top of this thread, but options do exist once you start to unpack the assumptions

/end