,
22 tweets,
5 min read
Read on Twitter
Green New Deal debates have generated controversy over the right strategy to build political coalition for climate reforms. Critics worry that radical + incomplete nature of the GND will undermine efforts and feed the fire of conservative climate scepticism. I disagree. 1/
Quick preface: these debates have surfaced important considerations. Left-leaning climate advocates will need to address them head-on if they are going to succeed. I’d recommend that everyone read the important + thoughtful essay by @jerry_jtaylor and response by @leahstokes. 2/
I see this conversation as boiling down to a debate over an appropriate theory of change. One approach foregounds real constraints in the US political system. This was the approach used from 2003-2009 strategy by groups like EDF and the NRDC. 3/
We might call this the “writing climate reforms to get Susan Collins’ vote” strategy. But this strategy has repeatedly failed. The 1993 BTU Tax. The 2001 4 --Pollutant Strategy. The 2009 Waxman-Markey Bill. The American Power Act that, incidentally, couldn’t get Collins vote. 4/
By contrast, I still feel persuaded by Theda Skocpol’s diagnosis of the Waxman-Markey bill’s failings. (In an essay aptly titled “Naming the Problem”). For Skocpol, climate policy failed because no outside social movement pressed elites into action. scholars.org/sites/scholars… 5/
So I think we must name the climate policy problem. Climate reforms have failed because entrenched carbon-intensive opponents have systematically blocked reforms. Here in the US. Across the world. Any solution must address this. 6/
So: my preferred theory of change has a “green” side pushing back against extreme carbon polluter accommodation. This requires a social movement to push elites. Slavery didn’t go away through technocratic conversations inside the beltway. Neither will fossil fuel businesses. 7/
This argument is independent of the merits of the GND package, on either social or climate policy fronts. It applies no matter the policy instrument that Congress eventually chooses for a legislative push post 2020. 8/
For instance, in his thoughtful essay, Taylor argues that bipartisan coalitions force cooperation and reduce the number of veto points. I disagree. Instead, from Europe to the US to Australia, climate policymaking has always accommodated the veto voice of carbon polluters. 9/
In turn, green interests have been systematically taken for granted. Take Australia. The Labor Party was furious when Greens didn’t support Rudd’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. For Labor, it was the “most” ambitious climate policy ever + clearly greener than status quo. 10/
But Greens believed it would lock in 15+ years of unambitious policymaking. Time would run out on prospects for decarbonization. They pointed out Labor persistently ignored them during policy design. 11/
The same was true during Waxman-Markey negotiations. Waxman assumed he had the green caucus votes no matter what, and focussed on accommodating industry interests instead. The very existence of a climate bill was the “bone” given to greens. 12/
But precisely because time is running out, incremental reforms that cater to industrial interests are no longer adequate to maintain a stable climate. We have moved into an era where – rightly – the green edge can’t come along for the ride just because “anything is better”. 13/
Solving climate change will require transformative and costly change. The urgency of climate science will need to be “accommodated” politically and get equal billing to fossil fuel interests. Policymakers are going to have to negotiate with both brown and green power bases. 14/
This is not to say the GND is making all the right choices as a social movement. This is a debate we should have (and that @jerry_jtaylor's piece helpfully precipitates). There are effective and ineffective social movements, depending on the systems of power and relations. 15/
The truth is that interests group distort what elites think the public wants, as work by me + @awh @leahstokes shows (cambridge.org/core/journals/…). 16/
On the other side, social movements are one mechanism to elevate the voice of public interests and reshape the political incentives our elected officials face. climateadvocacylab.org/system/files/F… 17/
Fossil fuel opponents will mobilize against any policy option. The loudest anti-climate voices today have been screaming for three decades. We need a loud climate movement to push back. And organizations like @sunrisemvmt are trying to do that. I see no harm in their efforts. 18/
Climate change is an existential threat to all of us. Climate policy is also an economic threat to many. Any climate deal is going to be unimaginably complex and messy. 19/
To me all signs point to more ambitious climate reforms in the presence of Green New Deal voices, than in their absence. The Senate is not going to pass the Green New Deal in 2021. The social parts of the package are legislative non-starters, no matter their merits. /20
But the current attention that GNDealers are creating for climate change on the left, are elevating the issue. The current debate will make whatever Senate deal emerges more responsive to climate science, and less responsive to the self-serving interests of carbon polluters. /21
I doubt the final proposals will look much like the most radical GND elements. I doubt we’ll see climate and social policy bundled. But the GND is nurturing a social movement to counterbalance the embedded influence of fossil fuel interests. This is a great thing. 22/22
