Thread by @TomMcTague

Why the backstop is a problem and will need a *political* solution acceptable to *both* sides in N. Ireland. In my penultimate piece for @POLITICOEurope I take a deep dive into the issue threatening to export Brexit chaos south, east *&* to the continent
politico.eu/article/brexit…

Key points:
1) An open border is not in the Good Fri Agreement. Power sharing is. For NI to function *double* majorities are required: ie, nationalist *&* unionist consent (see Troubles, Sunningdale). There's a risk of the backstop undermining unionist consent for power sharing

2) While not in the GFA, the reality of an open border on the island *can* reasonably be said to have become an integral part of the peace settlement — and therefore necessary for continued nationalist consent. Just because it's not in the GFA doesn't mean it's not crucial

3) May's commitment not simply to avoid a return to the "borders of the past" but to pledge "no infrastructure" on the border was, in many respects, noble, but has proved far more profound than appreciated or debated at the time — & arguably pushes at the limits of the GFA

4) Some in Dublin/Brussels see this as the major mistake of her premiership. “You couldn’t fault her for good faith,” said one senior EU27 official. “The major mistake of the British government is she did not push back vigorously enough on the definition of a 'hard border.'”

5) Not everyone is comfortable at the Irish government’s hard-line position. “There were differences of opinion on [whether] the interpretation of the Good Friday Agreement had been taken too far,” one official said. Was a less maximalist interpretation of "a hard border" needed?

6) At times Varadkar has shown almost blithe disregard for the way NI functions. After 56% of NI voters supported pro-backstop parties in May he said: “I hope the British.. get that message." If NI worked by simple majorities it would be easy. It doesn't. That's the problem.

7) The rub of it: “Power sharing cannot be imposed,” read a **1976** UK govt note, released under the 30-year rule. “The history of Northern Ireland has shown that any party representing a sizeable group within the community has the power to bring ordered government to an end.”

8) There appears to be little real understanding of NI politics in Europe. A very senior UK official on Merkel: “She has taken her own lessons, and has drawn the wrong conclusion. For her it’s just about the border with Ireland, but she can’t see the fears of the unionists."

9) It's not about economics, but identity. To many unionists (not all — see growing support for Alliance), the backstop is existential. "If your arse is hanging out of your trousers, country is all you’ve got," in the words of one senior DUP man.

10) Some senior figures in UK fear unintended consequences of the backstop, particularly a clause that allows for its unilateral temporary suspension if its application “leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties liable to persist." An invitation, some fear

11) Backstop will need to be replaced. So too any temp measures imposed in no-deal. NI only functions semi-normally with the explicit consent of the pol leaders of nationalism & unionism. A backstop without limit imposed on unionism is problematic and should be acknowledged as so