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@jbentonheath @rodrikdani There are two problems with the argument. First, this is not a case where the WTO is being used to prevent self-harm. None of the complainants is trying to prevent the US from imposing costs on itself. The WTO is, as Lighthizer would have it, being used to enforce a contract. 1/n
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani @rodrikdani 's take would seem to prevent any international agreement from existing, or, what would amount to the same thing, would require all of them to include an exception stating 'nothing in this agreement prevents any party from breaching this agreement should it so wish.2/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani (Note that this argument is true regardless of whether this is what the security exception does; his prescription would favour an "I'd rather not" exception.) 3/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani The second problem with the argument is that WTO law already very much includes an exception for Members that would rather not comply with their obligations: it's called non-compliance. No WTO police is waiting outside to charge US government officials with breaking WTO law. 4/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani All the WTO does is state, when anothe Member argues that benefits accruing to it under the WTO contract are being nullified or impaired, whether this is the case or not. If it is the case, the Member responsible for impairing benefits of other Members can seek to renegotiate 5/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani its WTO obligations. In the case of tariffs, in fact, there is a set procedure for this which essentially allows a Member to impose its desired level of tariffs, and only then negotiate with other Members how it's going to make up for the injury (to them, not to itself) 6/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani In either case (renegotiation or non-compliance), if the Member in question is unable to offer satisfactory compensation, other Members are free to "rebalance the agreement" themselvea by imposing tariffs back on the Member that takes measures that harm their trade interests. 7/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani @rodrikdani 's proposal thus starts from an assumption about WTO rules that may be popular among economists but is only paid lip service to by diplomats (and not even that by Lighthizer): that they are there to promote global welfare rather than protect reciprocal concessions. 8/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani It then proceeds to consider, logically in accordance with its assumption, that WTO adjudicators should basically find a way to allow measures that, despite violating commitments made to other Members, are welfare- or utility-enhancing. This kind of reasoning 9/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani by the Appellate Body is heavily criticized by the US as rule-making - probably justifiably so, given the contractual character of if not all WTO rules certainly those that concern expkicitly permitted protectism like anti-dumping rules. 10/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani Then, because he considers that the decision as to what is welfare- or utility-enhancing should be made at the domestic level (a political choice that is not only defensible but probably largely correct, given the absence of political institutions at the international level), 11/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani he concludes that WTO adjudicators should let any violation pass. This is all logical, since (i) violations are by definition the result of a domestic political choice to take measures that, well, violate WTO rules and (ii)he believes domestic political choices should prevail.12/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani But the outcome, once stated thus, is, first, to make all international commitments void (or rather, subject to the "I'd rather not" exception), second, to ignore what is probably the most important function of the WTO: to mediate between large economic and political powers 13/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani and, by recording their mutually agreed rules of conduct and providing adjudication, to prevent small disagreements regarding trade from turning into trade wars. 14/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani By construing the function of WTO adjudication as "telling Members what to do for their own good" as opposed to "telling the Membership whether certain action goes against commitments to allow them to negotiate without going to war", the piece (and much of the gg literature) 15/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani misses much of the point not only of the WTO but of global governance itself. As important as promoting global good (and probably more important) is providing rules and institutions so that the leviathans have a means of interacting other than lashing out at each other. 16/
@jbentonheath @rodrikdani This is all regardless of what the security exception states. Incidentally, in my piece on the natsec report I make precisely this point: that the whole report is premised on the perceived need to not allow this function of the WTO to be hollowed out: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf… /fin
