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Since the start of #HKprotests in June, I’ve been asked repeatedly about Beijing’s strategy. For weeks, I have said Beijing is scrambling to come up with an effective response. However, this has changed. Over the last weeks, a full picture of this strategy has emerged.
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What is BJ's goal? Short term: end continuing mass protests, through force if necessary. Long term: tighten control, bringing/assimilating the city & its people into PRC’s political system. Essentially, Beijing wants to control HKers in the same way as it does the rest of the PRC
There are six elements to Beijing’s HK strategy:
1. Provide strong support to the HK Government & Police to enable & encourage tougher tactics against protesters. Already, we are seeing rising police violence:
1. Provide strong support to the HK Government & Police to enable & encourage tougher tactics against protesters. Already, we are seeing rising police violence:
2. Ramp up united front efforts vis-a-vis HK elite, & other “patriotic forces” in support of BJ's agenda. Eg., on Thurs, State Council’s HK & Macau Affairs Office and Liaison Office jointly held a consultation forum with pro-establishment figures.
The key message was that Beijing was fully behind them and that their fate was tied to Beijing. How these united front efforts manifest on-the-ground in HK? Here are two recent examples:
3. Step up info operations (propaganda, misinformation) & rhetorical efforts to galvanise public support in mainland China & to influence international public opinion. Since the start of mass protests, we have seen the escalation of Beijing’s rhetoric...
aimed at delegitimising and vilifying the protesters, and blame the current crisis on foreign "black hands". This laying of rhetoric groundwork is highly significant because the characterisations of events signal the "correct" political stance.
4. Cut off support for protesters by institutions/companies through punitive measures. Beijing targeted Cathy Pacific in order to deliver a clear message: support HK protesters and we will hit your bottom line. More punishments will be dished out.
5. Deter escalating protests by signaling Beijing’s strong determination to intervene with force if necessary. Beijing has repeatedly implied that China’s armed forces will be used as a backstop.
Beijing may at some point make the judgment that the situation warrant military intervention regardless of the high cost involved. But we are not at this point just yet.
We should not discount this possibility, one that will almost certainly have tragic consequences.
We should not discount this possibility, one that will almost certainly have tragic consequences.
6. Increase economic & connectivity integration efforts aimed at enmeshing HK tighter into the PRC economically. This would shift relative dependency further in favour of the mainland. High-speed trains, new bridges, and economic cooperation are all part of this long term effort.
What did Beijing learn from the past two months? Well, like 1989, the lesson seen from Beijing’s perspective is that democracy, civil freedoms & constrained government power lead to the loss of control and instability.
In the short term, this means more united front efforts and public opinion operations. In the long run, this means tighter control of HK institutions, narratives/histories, identities, and the mediums of public discussion.
There is a fundamental mismatch b/w Beijing’s agenda to assert control and the preferences of HKers to keep their civil liberties. The party-state’s relentless political logic of control will continue to inform its HK policy and this will provoke further resistance.
Beijing has a long term HK challenge on its hands, one that in many ways is of its own making.
I have followed the events in HK with keen interest because of its significance goes far beyond the city or China.
I have followed the events in HK with keen interest because of its significance goes far beyond the city or China.
It shows how the Chinese party-state interacts with other political models and pluralistic societies; it shows how China may act in the future on the international stage.
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