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Let me add a touch of scepticism to this morning's Coveney love-in. He is incisive, clear and forceful—all things which have been missing in the UK since 2016. But what did he say that, in any way, helped solve *the* hurdle in the talks: unionist political consent? 1/6
Look at Coveney's (v clearly articulated) point:
—Regulatory alignment is the *only* solution
—Nothing else works (it's been tested)
What is the conclusion?
—Unionist concerns that the backstop is the permanent settlement for N Ireland are valid 2/6
—Regulatory alignment is the *only* solution
—Nothing else works (it's been tested)
What is the conclusion?
—Unionist concerns that the backstop is the permanent settlement for N Ireland are valid 2/6
What is unionism's concern? They argue the backstop is *not* a defence of status quo but a *change* over which NI has not given consent, has no control—and has no way to leave
—Given🇮🇪has ruled out time-limit or exit mechanism, how has Coveney sought to answer these concerns? 3/6
—Given🇮🇪has ruled out time-limit or exit mechanism, how has Coveney sought to answer these concerns? 3/6
Coveney admitted “there are many unionists who are worried" about the backstop. But has he taken any concrete measures to alleviate these concerns? Varadkar and Coveney's position has hardened, if anything, to *nothing* else will work now or in future 4/6
There's talk about Varadkar and Coveney not being forgiven for "re-partitioning" Ireland. But they have already committed to policing the border in a no-deal scenario, which they say is preferable to Johnson's proposals to delay the solution 5/6
Final thought: if the difference now is between Ireland's permanent solution today and Britain's permanent solution tomorrow, isn't a *temporary solution now* the answer (legally temporary or exit-able if it's becoming permanent)? It's imperfect for all sides, but best case? 6/6
