Thread by @pptsapper

One of the things I like to get across when I teach people about ARNG history is mobilization timelines of volunteer/National Guard units over time and the impact it had on their readiness

Cause damn, that shit is fascinating when it comes to force projection

RevWar is a simple one. Flash to bang for the initial mobilizations of New England militia companies was literally hours to a day or so. But that's just raw manpower, some training, efficiency drops as time goes on.

Still, remarkable readiness levels in MA militia companies

War of 1812 is hit or miss, since militia was in disarray. Took over a year to get an operational force in the field that could conduct offensive ops, and another year before it was effective. Based a lot on the populace being split on support for the war

1846-48 War and we're talking a few weeks to assemble regiments of US volunteers, but more time to move to the front. Some militias in higher states of readiness than others, especially when it came to armament and equipment

Civil War, and holy shit. 1st Vermont Volunteer Infantry went from being assembled at Lincoln's call for 75,000 to being on the front lines conducting patrols in less than a month

Better equipping, but very little training time for regiments. That's where you get Bull Run from

War of 1898 and again, it's about a week for fully formed state NG regiments to reach full strength, muster in as US volunteers, and head to MOB station

The Army botched the MOB process & more guardsmen died of disease CONUS than of enemy action OCONUS

1916 hits and the call up for the Mexican Border happens. First full call up of NG units as a whole into Federal service. Less than a week at home station then travel to the border and occupying positions along Rio Grande. NDA of 1916 showing its value there.

1917, and about one week again for muster-in, then a few months in-state to recruit to wartime strength. Then 2-3 months at training base down south (minus 26th Division) to form, equip, train Guard units into division elements from old state units. Then overseas to front.

1941 sees mobilization of most Guard divisions for peacetime maneuvers. On entering WWII, most NG divisions entered a period of sequential training (platoon, company, regt, div) before going to Europe or Pacific (minus 34th Division). Required to undergo more validation training

Korea saw rapid initial deployment as stop-gap, NG divisions entering fight with less preparation, much like AC counterparts. Vietnam was less NG presence, but not as much pre-deployment training as WWII

Desert Storm was back to rapid deployment. No real MOB station, just get your shit on the boats and get your asses to Saudi Arabia. Showed the issues with the Round-Out brigades where they were not properly equipped/manned and some couldn't be ready in time

Brings us to OIF/OEF, where a generic 1-2 month stay at a MOB station to validate units on training and equipment became the norm, with significant pre-deployment training at home station (minus the initial frantic 2003 push). Predictable timelines allowed a deliberate approach

So. Why does this matter. Because when we talk NG readiness to "Fight Tonight" it's not based around a mobilization timeline that includes train-up. And yet the two conflicts where the NG was most successful (WWI/WWII) as strategic reserve incorporated significant training time

Shifting to operational reserve precludes this option, meaning NG units kept to higher readiness levels, which hurts the overall force in retention and recruiting. At a certain point, we need to ask "what was the NG created for and has our mission changed to be incompatible"

We've never been able to fight a war without using citizen-soldiers or the draft. Ever. It's either been a combination of the two or just the draft. Given this model, we have to find a working answer for how we project power while retaining a force capable of sustaining itself.

Worth pointing out that this is glossing the surface of the issue and doesn't take into account a multitude of force structure and readiness initiatives across the total force post-WWII, plus legislative issues and societal changes, as well as the shifting global role of the US

These ideas were spawned reading the @ArmyChiefStaff transition team report. Was good to see that he sees these tensions, has them on his radar, and is thinking about the health of the Total Force

I'm glad smarter heads than my own are looking at these issues