The thing to understand about Ulster unionists: they don’t trust *any* English man or woman (hint: 1972, 1985 etc).
And they don’t feel betrayed yet 4/15
a) Does unionism retain some agency over its own future?
b) The upcoming general election and the marginal seats it is defending
c) What are the risks of saying no? 6/15
Under May’s deal, Northern Ireland was locked tightly into EU law—GB less so. The risk was that London would inevitable loosen its relationship, but Northern Ireland never could.
—Is *this* risk mitigated in the Johnson deal? 7/15
Key point: an administrative customs border in Irish Sea might be practically harder than the May offer, but legality matters. Can Johnson work up a permanent solution that keeps NI in UK zone, with acceptable administrative solutions down Irish Sea? 8/15
Consent—as I have been banging on about for a while—remains important. Dublin has said it cannot accept a unionist veto. Unionism doesn’t want a nationalist veto.
But what about a simple majority in Stormont? Neither side has a majority any more 9/15
The DUP is being asked to take an electoral risk *just before an election.* What would Sir Humphrey say?
However, it is not that simple. Middle unionism wants a deal—the DUP can’t afford to fall too far out of step... 10/15
One senior unionist to me last night: “The only prism to judge DUP decisions through in the next few days is what it means for general election in key marginal seats.”
And if you thought Brexit was complicated, make a judgement on that... 11/15
Will their voters punish them if there’s an extension and an election? Unclear. I’m not best placed to judge.
But what of unionism’s relationship with (conservative) Britain—its ultimate supporter/protector? What does a “no” do? 12/15
Unionism has felt abandoned before. In 1972 and 1985. It is prepared to be abandoned again, but it’s not a comfortable place. Is it even sustainable? So the question is also *when* to compromise, to say you’ve got the most you can get? 13/15