It would be easy to freak out about Space Force because of the ridiculous name or alternatively to just dismiss it as bureaucratic reshuffling. I think it’s a mistake to do either. Thread.
Space Force won’t *initiate* the militarization of space. Satellites have been used from the get go for strategic purposes like intelligence gathering and early warning of missile launch. The military use of space intensified in the last few decades
as modern militaries (most especially the United States) started to depend on satellites heavily for navigation and precision guided munitions, global communications, etc.
Satellites are fragile and they are expensive. This leaves the Pentagon in the uncomfortable position of depending on something difficult to defend. They’ll call it “offense-dominant,” meaning it’s easier to attack satellites than to defend them.
In the meantime, the rest of the world has benefitted from the development of space. 85% of satellites are non-military. We use satellites to monitor the earth’s environment, to broadcast tv shows, to get around town, study the universe, and to watchdog governments. etc.
Back to Space Force. Here’s a very good detailed look at what it is and isn’t by @lorengrush with insight from @krjohnson626 and @brianweeden theverge.com/2019/12/11/210…
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden For now, it’s a pretty modest change, essentially budget and personnel-neutral. But Congress has also made important structural changes, for example, giving Space Force Title 10 authority and the Chief of Space Operations a seat in the Joint Chiefs.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden Whether it’s a good idea depends on the question. If the Pentagon’s interest is to keep their satellites dependably & safely working, then they’ll want both to ensure systems are resilient to disruption (using backups, redundancies, hardening) and to reduce the threats they face.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden It’s possible a reorganization of military space bureaucracy could do a better job on resilience. But you can bet that creating a new military service focused on space will also create bureaucratic incentives to hype the space weapons threat and build new weapons to counter them.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden That’s likely to make the space environment more contentious and dangerous.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden This weekend, the Air Force Chief of Staff General Goldfein outlined his priorities for space and stated that “we have to defend what we have… But it’s not good enough to take punches in the ring. At some point you have to punch back.”
defensenews.com/smr/reagan-def…
defensenews.com/smr/reagan-def…
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden Pentagon officials constantly emphasize that Russia and China are developing anti-satellite technology, it’s in every public intelligence report, but they leave out the fact that the United States is far ahead in sophistication as well as capacity of such technology.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden In fact, having anti-satellite weapons will do very little to keep one’s own satellites safe from attack. And unconstrained space weapons development will lead to a competition that makes space more dangerous, costly, and unpredictable to use.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden It will make conflict on earth riskier, too, creating incentives to speed up conflict. As Gen. Goldfein also said, “In every war game we determined that if you move first in space, you’re not guaranteed to win. But if you move second, you’re likely to lose,” Goldfein said.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden Testing ASAT weapons, much less engaging in an actual conflict in space, can have profound effects. The destruction of a single large satellite in low earth orbit would more than double the amount of dangerous debris in just those most-used orbits.
notendur.hi.is/thg29/Aflfr%C3…
notendur.hi.is/thg29/Aflfr%C3…
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden In the absence of any agreements about protecting satellites and the outer space environment, more countries are developing weapons that can destroy satellites on orbit. Earlier this year, India obliterated its own satellite, proud it had joined this “elite club of space powers.”
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden We all would be better off with constraints on conduct in space and on particularly dangerous technologies. Such constraints could augment stability in crises, avoid the drive to arms race, and provide guardrails to preserve the space environment.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden The international community has struggled to overcome ideological divisions meet this challenge, but the benefits of continuing to work at it are obvious.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden However, despite the United States having the most investment in space—nearly half of satellites—it has put very little effort into diplomacy. The State Department is in hiding—it consistently rejects the Russian-Chinese proposal but doesn’t provide an alternative vision.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden Not only do we not curb technology, the absence of substantive engagement already makes us less safe. Information about potential adversaries’ technical capabilities is plentiful, but assessing their intentions is notoriously difficult.
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden We are prone to misunderstanding each other. Understanding an adversary’s intentions brings more clarity and streamlines decisionmaking in a complex operating environment. Understanding comes with substantive engagement. thediplomat.com/2019/11/the-us…
@lorengrush @krjohnson626 @brianweeden This is where I want to go: an outer space environment that is sustainable for the next generations to use, one that helps to make our planet healthier and our lives safer and more equitable. unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwor… /fin
