Thread by @RushDoshi

I enjoyed this thoughtful piece by @stephenwertheim, but I might push back on (1) the idea that the great power competition [GPC] discourse is in service of US mil hegemony and on (2) some contradictory prescriptions for China policy.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/afgha…

A few thoughts:

@stephenwertheim 1. The piece says "a flotilla of defense analysts have proposed a strategy of 'great-power competition," largely "in the service of maximizing Washington’s military power."

First, GPC is a fact of politics. No one wants GPC; they want strategies to cope with it.

@stephenwertheim Second, to me, GPC is not primarily military.

GPC discussions go way beyond mil analysts, agendas, and instruments. Many advocate defense cuts; & even Trump appointees encourage mil deterrence over primacy.

Most analysts think pol, econ, info, and tech components are central.

@stephenwertheim In this vein, GPC is not about mil hegemony but about wielding diverse instruments of statecraft to protect wide-ranging US interests, democratic values, and the autonomy of states otherwise consigned to authoritarian spheres of influence.

It is about peacetime competition.

@stephenwertheim 2. On prescriptions, the China section makes several recommendations. While I agree with some, others contradict the piece's objectives in key ways.

To me, the China section seems torn between its impulse for disengagement and its concern over the consequences.

@stephenwertheim For example: The piece argues "the US should significantly reduce its forward-deployed military presence in Asia" & acquiesce to the PRC in the SCS.

But it should also "retain the ability to intervene if China threatens to become a hostile hegemon."

These goals are in tension.

@stephenwertheim - Significant reductions in forward-deployed forces will likely fracture alliances, prevent a prompt US response, and encourage a nuclear Japan and SK.

- Total PRC consolidation of the SCS will seriously erode the capacity for Asian intervention that the article hopes to retain.

@stephenwertheim - The article rightly encourages "providing allies A2/AD capabilities," but it also says "allied defense" must not "provoke China." These are contradictory objectives, and the article is off when it argues these capabilities are purely defensive & not provocative to the PRC.

@stephenwertheim - The article argues that the PRC is focused on local wars, & is therefore less challenging than the US imagines. But downplaying PRC efforts in Djibouti, Cambodia, & the Pacific Islands is a mistake if one hopes to retain the possibility of US intervention the article advocates.

@stephenwertheim In sum, I worry the piece's prescriptions complicate the ability for US forces to operate in the region, fracture alliances, & encourage bandwagoning - hastening a PRC sphere of influence in the world's most dynamic region.

And even so, they probably still provoke Beijing.

@stephenwertheim But what I like in @stephenwertheim's piece is the attempt to put forward an approach in Asia that is embedded in a larger global framework.

I have a different view on what works in Asia, but I hope the discourse on these subjects moves in this more holistic direction.

/End

@stephenwertheim An example of the kind of GPC perspective I'm referring to in the preceding discussion.

https://twitter.com/WonkVJ/status/1227332506845941766?s=20