I'm going to go super law nerd THREAD here and just quote this brief about why Trump's Supreme Court argument is wrong. And mind you, this is from former Republican members of congress, exec branch officials who served Republican presidents, and conservative legal experts. /1
"Since the Founding, it has been a bedrock principle in this country that nobody is above the law, not even the president. The king against whom the Founders rebelled was immune from judicial process, which was considered “incompatible with his dignity.” United States v. Burr. /2
In creating the presidency, the Founders explicitly rejected this model of leadership. See Federalist No. 69 (Hamilton) (“And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain /3
Instead, they created a president who, like all Americans, is subject to the law. Recognizing the Founders’ intent, this Court has been mindful of the principle that no one is above the law when considering questions of presidential immunity from legal process. /4
People of good faith may debate how to accommodate the legitimate needs of the executive branch, but all agree that it must be done in a way that ensures “a government of laws, and not of men.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). /5
Petitioner [that's Trump] now asks this Court to depart radically from that principle by holding that criminal investigations may not touch the president’s affairs in any way, even when those investigations require nothing at all from the president. /6
This extraordinary assertion is not based on any specific claim of privilege, but rather on a sweeping claim of absolute immunity. There is no principled reason to depart from the Court’s historical approach and create such a far-reaching, /7
per se rule shielding all of the president’s unofficial affairs from criminal investigation. Such a categorical rule is certainly not required by Article II. While there may be reasonable arguments that certain criminal proceedings such as the actual indictment or prosecution /8
of the president—might so interfere with the president’s duties under Article II that they should not be imposed on a sitting president, it does not follow that all criminal proceedings must always steer clear of a sitting president’s affairs in every respect. /9
In a case like the present one, which concerns only a subpoena to a third party, the criminal process need not interfere with the president’s duties in any way, because it does not ask him to do anything at all. The burden on a president arising from a third-party subpoena is /10
certainly less than the burden imposed by other types of legal process from which this Court has refused to immunize the president. For similar reasons, the Supremacy Clause does not require absolute presidential immunity from state criminal processes. /11
The Constitution is concerned with the supremacy of federal law, not the supremacy of federal officials. There may be circumstances where a state’s attempt to regulate the conduct of a federal official interferes with the execution of federal law. /12
But this case does not present such a circumstance. A subpoena for documents that concern the president’s personal affairs—rather than his official conduct—cannot possibly implicate the Supremacy Clause, /13
because it does not impede federal law or the operations of the federal government in any way. Nor is there any basis for this Court to speculate that refusing to provide the immunity that Petitioner seeks would lead to a deluge of state criminal subpoenas /14
directed at the president. The Court should not assume that local prosecutors will abuse their power. Instead, it should apply its usual presumption that government officials will act in good faith. /15
If, in the future, state prosecutors use their powers to harass presidents in unjustified ways, reasonable people may conclude, as a matter of policy, that presidents should have some immunity broader than the existing immunity against indictment, prosecution, and /16
compulsory attendance. If future circumstances made a broader presidential immunity seem desirable, the decision to create such an immunity and decisions about its scope should be made in Congress. Congress is better positioned to legislate /17
the contours of any new immunity policy, and Congress is accountable to those Americans who, like amici, are deeply concerned about the specter of an unaccountable president. For these reasons, the Court should affirm the
Second Circuit." /end protectdemocracy.org/project/presid…
Second Circuit." /end protectdemocracy.org/project/presid…
