Some very important points in @RidT @nytimes essay out today, which sparked a flurry of my own thinking. THREAD.
nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opi…
nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opi…
As he so aptly puts it: Putin's ultimate goal is not to strengthen a particular candidate or party, but to weaken the United States. 
We at @SecureDemocracy have been tracking Russian overt messaging on the 2020 contest. Its all about raising doubts about the legitimacy of the process and amplifying fissures. It mentions particular candidates, but the candidates are not the point.
The point is to exacerbate division. Russia largely uses *narratives we create* to do that. bit.ly/2VFj3Em (see, my conversation with @csmonitor's @christacbryant)
As I told @BloombergTV, if we look at Russia's interference activities through the narrow lens of our current political moment (ie, with a focus on particular candidates), we're at risk of missing the forest for the trees.
Another important point @RidT raises: we need to keep our eye on Russian spy agencies.
In other words, we need to understand the distinction between IRA troll farm operations (about gaining eyeballs) and those run by Russian intel (more targeted, sometimes hack and leak). @shelbygrossman and @noUpside have a great paper on the latter: cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication….
The point: We need to learn, but not over-learn, the lessons of 2016 IRA activity, which had different goals and objectives than the type of interference we seem most likely to face down in 2020.
In this context, worth re-reading @julianbarnes and @adamgoldmanNYT on our IC's assessment that Russian intelligence aims to stoke racial tensions (and ultimately white supremacist violence) here in the US. nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/…
These more sophisticated ops don't take place solely online; they include real people on the ground and cross the entire info ecosystem.
We know that FBI is investigating ties between Russian intelligence and some white supremacist groups. (And that Russia has a track record of supporting far right groups in Europe. See: cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/…, written with @torrey_taussig)
.@SecureDemocracy's foreign interference tracker (which documents incidents in more than 40 countries in the transatlantic space going back to 2000) is also a good resource for this:
This type of activity also is not new. Russia has a long history of manipulating racial tensions to discredit and weaken democracies. As my colleague @rosenbergerlm emphasized:
Last big point: @RidT's tracing of false flag operations is apt. It's high on my list of things to worry about for 2020 (and beyond -- because it's not just about elections, which are but one of many institutions in the crosshairs).
We also have recent examples from 2016 (intruding on voting systems in multiple U.S. states, potentially to lay the groundwork for a later info op...) and 2018 (falsely claiming the existence of a massive second troll farm).
As I've said before, you don't have to change a single vote to raise doubts that you might have. That alone is enough to imperil the legitimacy of an election.
The false flag approach lowers the threshold for success -- you don't need to perpetuate an operation at scale, just seed doubt (or seize on confusion in the wake of a mishap, as in the case of the Iowa Caucus debacle).
False flag approach also:
1) Exposes the soft underbelly of resilience because awareness of the possibility of interference can make it seem more likely
2) Complicates efforts to communicate about threats
1) Exposes the soft underbelly of resilience because awareness of the possibility of interference can make it seem more likely
2) Complicates efforts to communicate about threats
Finally: how will Russia seek to frame or take advantage of the #coronavirus crisis, with all its transatlantic and domestic political ramifications, peaking in the midst of a presidential election contest?
Right now, at least in the overt space, the majority of Russia's messaging on #coronavirus has consisted of basic updates on travel restrictions, economic impacts, etc. Some has sought to paint the West as racist.
But #coronavirus is terrifying, politicized, and linked to government effectiveness. That would seem to make it ripe fodder. So...
Let's hope we've:
👉comprehended Russia's big picture goals
👉 recognized our own conspiracy narratives as fodder
👉understood the distinctions between troll farms and spy ops
👉organized to see the full scope of activity (including offline)
👉 prepared for false flags
👉comprehended Russia's big picture goals
👉 recognized our own conspiracy narratives as fodder
👉understood the distinctions between troll farms and spy ops
👉organized to see the full scope of activity (including offline)
👉 prepared for false flags
Last but not least: let's hope that we've taken on board how important it is that our government mounts an effective response to #coronavirus (for its own sake! but not just...) and that our leaders get the memo and resist the temptation to politicize.
