This OpEd is misleading in so many ways...I’ll try to recall few elements :
https://twitter.com/ghoshworld/status/1304350417556389888
1/ For a smarter read on the French-German division of labor, @JosephdeWeck explains why you need military solidarity with Greece AND mediation efforts with Turkey. internationalepolitik.de/en/pariscope-h…
2/ A more serious analysis of the rethoric wld show TUR officials started issuing insulting statements against Macron personally in 2019, while his own statements focused on policy disagreements with TUR. There are simply no “rhetorical broadsides against Erdogan”.
2/i/ The discourse against Macron personally is of another kind. The last example from the Turkish presidency :
https://twitter.com/fahrettinaltun/status/1304133043049951232
2/ii/ Or this for the speaker of Turkey’s Parliament.
https://twitter.com/abdbozkurt/status/1303727129364963329
2/iii/ 10 days later
https://twitter.com/abdbozkurt/status/1304487119944114177
2/iv/ But there are examples from before (2019). Here: reuters.com/article/us-tur…
2/v/ Or here: bbc.com/news/world-eur…
2/ vi/ Or also here : dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-Ea…
2/vii/ And here is an informed guess about what this is maybe about for the AKP.
https://twitter.com/sonercagaptay/status/1304409433540366338?s=21
2/viii/ Compare now TUR rhetoric with the French discourse... 
3/ The author can criticise positions or negotiation tactics as much as he wants but at least he should base his case on the actual statements. From NE #Syria to #braindead or #EastMed, French statements & actions have always emphasised the need for dialog. A few examples:
https://twitter.com/morcos_pierre/status/1302434046497173504
3/i/ The recent #Med7 Summit issued another call for dialog. politico.eu/article/emmanu…
3/ii/ And the joint statement of the #Med7 summit is pretty clear. Here are snapshots re #EastMed but the summit was actually not just about #Turkey : diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-fore…
4/ Besides, the notion that the Turkish military moves are just a French problem is just wrong. There are tactical differences in the EU on how to respond but the EU as a whole shared the same concern. Many reports exist on this. For instance by @StevenErlanger.
https://twitter.com/nytimesworld/status/1290527918096027648
4/i/ The #med7 Summit also confirmed theee larger European concerns. But the author ignores them because it contradicts his case. euronews.com/2020/09/10/sou…
5/ The author also ignores some recent Turkish messages that are, to say the least, surprising. One example:
https://twitter.com/fahrettinaltun/status/1297971223591358465?s=12
And to be clear, I leave it to Turkey experts to tell me what these speeches mean, but this is also part of the context of European reactions to the #EastMed situation.
On a technical note about diplomacy & communication : Turkish PR strategy increasingly echoes Russian methods (statements from authorities are spread through State controlled media, also in French & English for the international audience, and trolls aggressively follow up)
One might say this is nowadays part of the game. Fair enough, but that still tells you a lot about who is for a dialog and a fair negotiation and who is looking for a scapegoat to avoid it.
It might be a smart PR move by TUR to paint EU concerns as a isolated French dementia, but the reality is that TUR has isolated itself by moving alone militarily on several issues & everybody is now trying to find a way out from the escalatory ladder without giving a free pass.
Bottom line: as much as the disagreements are serious between FRA and TUR, Paris has been clear about EU sovereignty for some time now and has always emphasised the need to settle things straight with Ankara through diplomatic channels, not military moves or PR campaigns. (End)
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